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1. Introduction 
To mark the official begin of the election campaign on the 7th of April 1993, UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali paid his visit to Phnom Penh. The meeting in the 
headquarter of the United Nation’s Transitional Authority to Cambodia (UNTAC) 
constituted one of the rare occasions where the representatives of all 20 newly founded 
Cambodian parties came together. Since the beginning of the mission in 1992 
thousands of people from 46 nations had worked to organize this country’s decisive 
elections and in his address to the party leaders Boutros-Ghali made it abundantly clear 
that there was more at stake in this upcoming event than the individual victory or loss 
of any of those standing before him. Cambodia was to be the model case, symbolizing 
a new era for the entire world, a triumph of democracy after the end of the Cold War:  
“Your experience is of greatest importance, not only for the Cambodian people, not only 
for the Southeast Asian countries, but also for the international community. […] The 
concepts of peace, economic development and pluralist democracy are today inseparable. 
There are hundreds of different definitions of democracy. The simplest one […] is the 
participation of the entire population. And in order to assure this participation “we need a 
multiparty system […] Different opinions are important because it is [these opinions] that 
make a democracy”1 
These promises of change and a better future for Cambodia translated into one word 
that was repeated incessantly during the year of the intervention: Choice. After 20 years 
of a war that had left no family intact it would now be up to the people and not their 
leaders to decide about their fate. On October 23rd 1991 the four main conflict parties 
had put their signature under the Paris Peace Agreements and agreed to endow the 
United Nations with unprecedented powers to oversee the organization of the country’s 
first free and fair elections. In order to ensure the ‘participation of the entire population’ 
UNTAC had created its very own Khmer language radio and TV station. Fictional 
dialogues between Cambodians and UNTAC personnel like the following one, were 
broadcasted to both inform and reassure people: 
 
 
                                                 
1 UNTAC, Compte-rendu de la réunion du Secrétaire général avec les représentants des parties 
politiques, 8 Avril 1993. Unsigned protocol. Original French, my translation. 
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Aunt: I'm worried about the political environment in the campaign stage. 
Niece: Are you worried that there will be trouble if this party or that party 
tries to show that they have strength some place? 
Aunt: Well, if a strong party uses it power to prevent parties from working, 
what will happen to them?  
Ali: This is a difficult problem to solve. But it is UNTAC's goal that during 
the election campaign, all political parties will work in a neutral political 
environment. 
Uncle: We have been thinking about politics. What exactly does UNTAC 
mean by a politically neutral environment? 
Ali: In a politically neutral environment all parties can set up offices, recruit 
members and campaign for votes. All Cambodians can visit party offices, 
talk to politicians, and ask them questions. All parties, the strong as well as 
the weak, are tolerant of each other. If you let the general public speak 
freely. 
Niece: Sometime some people say things that some people with power 
don't want to hear or want to let the people say. Then what?  
Uncle: That's true. But a war of words is better than a war of guns. I'm sick 
of all this killing. In Cambodia, our leaders have been fighting each other 
for a long time. The Paris agreements give your leaders a chance to solve 
their problems peacefully. The agreements allow them to stop being 
enemies on the battlefield and start being competitors in the political 
arena.2 
With a total of 20 registered parties competing and a voter turnout of almost 90 percent 
of the eligible population on election day in May 1993 the United Nation were still 
hopeful to have gotten their model case; despite a renegotiation of the results and the 
questionable compromise to install two prime ministers. But after a total of five 
parliamentarian elections that always ended by confirming the leading position of Hun 
Sen and its Cambodian People’s Party, it becomes evident that UNTAC did indeed 
“not alter the historical nature of power in Cambodia”(Chopra 1994, 52). Despite its 
relative stability since the UN mission, Cambodia figures among those countries cited 
to proof the failure of the international community’s panacea against internal conflict: 
                                                 
2 Radio UNTAC: Dialogue Nr. 27: What is a neutral political environment?  
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The establishment of a liberal peace with a market economy and a pluralist democracy 
as its key ingredients, as Boutros Ghali had summarized it for his audience in 1991.  
The experience of the United Nations in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, or Kosovo – to 
name some of the most dramatic failures or difficult missions – have dramatically 
decreased the confidence and self-esteem that marked the climate in both diplomatic 
and academic circles throughout the early 90s. What slowly emerges as the new 
consensus is the realization that the Western model of politics cannot be imposed on 
other countries and its people. Ignoring the violence and the suffering caused by 
ongoing conflicts around the world is politically (some would say, morally) no option 
either. Which begs the question: What needs to be done to garner local support for the 
establishment of a stable and peaceful order? 
In search for answers the academic literature on state-building has shifted much 
of its attention from management to politics and from institutions to ideas. While earlier 
generations of scholars kept a narrow focus on the modes of adapting, transferring and 
integrating a new political system into a foreign country and the challenges these tasks 
posed for interveners, more recent contributions aim at evaluating the perceptions of 
the local actors and elicit the reasons for their cooperation or acts of resistance in the 
course of such joint efforts. It is in the context of this ongoing debate that we will revisit 
Cambodia during the year of its intervention. In a standard reading of the narrative that 
analysis of UNTAC provide, the newly created parties were from the start engaged in 
a futile battle against the FUNCINPEC and the CPP, the two most powerful contenders. 
The Cambodian people believed in democracy and showed will and determination by 
turning out in millions on Election Day despite the threats against their life. But because 
of the ruling elites’ continued disregard of the people democracy could not take root in 
the country, despite the United Nations’ best efforts.  
Written by mostly Western scholars in the immediate years after the 
intervention this summary of events evidently flatters the United Nation and overly 
simplifies the nature of power in the context of this intervention. More importantly 
though, it is a narrative that renders it redundant to engage with the concepts and ideas 
for Cambodia’s future that have been presented in the month prior to the elections. The 
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experience of the 20 parties, which Boutros-Ghali had deemed so important in his 
speech, has been entirely devaluated. 
In the realm of state building research Cambodia has been presented as a closed case 
for the past two decades. This is mainly due to the fact that the events after the mission 
fit neatly into the models evoked both by advocates and critiques of the liberal peace 
model. In line with current wisdom the former would argue that the main fault of the 
mission lay in its overly ambitious character. Instead of succumbing Cambodia to an 
interventionist shock-therapy and force a democratic system on a defensive elite in the 
course of only 13 months it would have been more promising to settle for a pragmatic 
approach; that is one that was less likely to threaten the interests of the established elite. 
Critiques of the liberal peace would rather problematize the narrow institutional focus 
of the reform efforts.  
The Paris Agreements represented a state building blueprint that showed little 
regard for existing political or social structures and had been devised entirely by foreign 
governments. Its legitimacy was derived from the support of the international 
community, universal principles of democratic governance and the agreement of the 
local elite to proceed with its implementation. UNTAC then appears to show how 
wrong it is to devise strategies based on the premise that a liberal socio-economic 
system is the ideal everybody should be evolving towards. 
The case specific disregard of the ideas for Cambodia’s new political order that 
evolved in the year of the Transitional Authority is thus somewhat understandable. But 
even the broader review of existing literature on United Nation’s missions of this kind 
shows how little we actually now about the development and the negotiation of ideas 
in the context of an intervention: How exactly do interveners convey an image of the 
new political order? How do local political actors imagine the political future? What is 
the image they convey to their constituency? And how do converging or contradicting 
ideas affect the relationship between interveners and local actors, and the reforms at 
large?  
The review of current state building literature in Chapter 2 can further show 
that this gap in research and the lack of analytical models to approach these questions 
is partially due to the way in which the critique of the liberal peace has evolved. New 
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contributions of this subfield highlight the importance of internal legitimacy for the 
sustained support of political reforms and are guided by an interest in the production 
of knowledge as it relates to power (they hence also contributed to introduce Foucault 
to the study of state building). Both as an academic and a political project this research 
presents itself explicitly as an alternative to the technocratic, top-down approaches that 
continue to inform implementation strategies: Instead of understanding themselves as 
experts in state building, both practitioners and academics should approach the task of 
rebuilding a new political order as a joint project between true partners in 
peacebuilding. 
Analytically, this debate calls for models that can account for the different 
perspectives of international and local actors in devising legitimate strategies and 
institutions. While previous state building literature judged its objects of research based 
on a comparison with pre-defined ideals, the new generation favors theoretical 
approaches that are more open with regard to the potential of ‘hybrid’ institutions. On 
one side the resulting analysis do therefore aim at deconstructing the assumptions that 
legitimize and rationalize the decisions interveners take. On the other side they 
highlight the agency of the marginalized, the subalterns of state building and their 
(silent) struggles outside of established policy structures in the realm of the everyday. 
Chapter 2 identifies two weaknesses of this critical approach; the first one being 
that the arguments often reinforce the simplifying notion of the relationship between 
interveners and local actors as one between imposers and imposed upon: The demand 
to be more open, more emphasizing and more willing to learn is regularly explicitly 
constructed as the reversion of a ‘traditional’ approach, one-dimensionally described 
as coercive. Second, the attempts to demonstrate that local actors are no passive 
subjects or recipients of the reforms (i.e. that they resist the attempts of imposition) 
often leads to the transfer of a bargaining model in the world of ideas: Actors are 
described as having the agency to reject, negotiate or adapt political reforms, which 
implies the notion of policies as clear cut objects that are being offered, scrutinized and 
treated with favor or rejection.  
It will be argued that the critique has therefore turned its back to quickly on the 
political elite and their role in shaping the outlines of a new political order. 
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Dismissively treated as inauthentic and non-representative for true local knowledge 
and needs, political actors are framed as rational acting power maximizers and their 
interaction with interveners seems to take place in a world rather isolated from the one 
of the general population. It is a perspective that de-emphasizes the fact that state 
building or peacebuilding missions take place in highly politicized contexts where 
factions and political parties have formed and sustained close ties with their supporters 
in years of conflict. In other words: It play down the importance that political actors 
have in promoting ideas that will affect how the people may comprehend and interpret 
the newly evolving institutions. 
To overcome these conceptual limits and contribute to the current search for 
more dynamic analytical models, able to capture the integrative effects of local-
international interaction, the concluding part proposes to shift attention to the symbolic 
dimension of their engagement. Instead of analyzing new institutions as an expression 
of converging or contradicting ideas, such a perspective could directly ‘access’ the 
realm of ideas and observe the meaning behind actors’ decisions to accept or reject a 
given course of action.  
Chapter 3 builds the theoretical basis for such an approach. It takes the current 
debate over the nature of the state and its implications for state building analysis as a 
point of departure. The relevance of a deeper engagement with the symbolic dimension 
of actors’ interaction is tied to a conceptualization of the state as the result of ongoing 
negotiations and struggles within society. The chapter discusses the theoretical 
implications of this perspective when applied to the realm of state building and 
identifies three important hypotheses. Together, they constitute the basic premise of 
the intended analysis: 1) Notwithstanding their intentions, interveners do always 
engage in nation building, 2) The practice of interveners is always political in nature, 
3) Interveners are in a competitive relationship with other political actors.  
The second part of Chapter 3 builds on these assumptions. It presents the theory 
of interpretative authority and discusses the theory’s potential and limits in order to 
devise an analytical model that is capable of observing the ongoing struggles between 
local and international actors over the meaning of reforms, while accounting for the 
power bias between them. The theory proposes an understanding of political authority 
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that is tied to processes of identity formation. It stipulates that any institution that 
intends to guide a political transformation without having to rely on threat or coercion 
needs interpretative authority. Defined as the potential to take decision regarding the 
nature of the common ground of a society, this particular type of authority is never 
given, but must be continuously reproduced. It is based on a perpetual circle of 
interpretations regarding the nature society’s common ground issued by such an 
institution and the expressed acknowledgement of their validity by others. 
Based on the theory discussion it is possible to argue that struggles between 
international and local political actors over the meaning of the new institutions can best 
be observed in the public political discourse of an intervention society. In order to 
enforce their own vision of the new political order, international actors need to create 
opportunities for others to publicly confirm the validity of their ideas for the future. 
The theory distinguishes between three analytical dimensions: symbolic conditions, 
opportunities, and interpretative practice. These dimension are used to pre-structure the 
analysis.  
Applied to the case of the United Nation’s Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
the Paris Peace Agreements are defined as the symbol of Cambodia’s new political 
order. To develop interpretative authority UNTAC needed to establish this symbol at 
the center of the country’s public political discourse in order to discipline the ongoing 
deliberations over the character and meaning of the new institutions. Based on the 
literature review and the theory chapter the concluding part formulates the research 
question guiding the analysis as follows: How did the Paris Peace Agreements shape 
ideas of the new political order in Cambodia during the year of the intervention?  
Chapter 4 describes the case design and the methodology used to collect, secure 
and analyze the empirical data. The study follows an interpretative approach: This 
means it relies on qualitative data which is submitted to several circles of interpretation 
guided by the preliminary theoretical framework. In the course of each ‘analytical 
round’ categories are developed and refined. Instead of testing pre-defined hypotheses 
it is the aim of the analysis to make a ‘compelling argument’ for the chosen perspective, 
by developing and presenting a sound empirical case study.  
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The analysis centers on the work of UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit 
(InfoEd). This particular unit was charged with the control of Cambodia’s information 
sector during the intervention. Transitional Authorities are the most encompassing 
missions of their kind as interveners are mandated to assume the governmental 
responsibilities of the intervened state. Questions of legitimacy present themselves with 
particular urgency here. In the case of Cambodia, no blueprints for such missions have 
yet existed, it was the first of its kind. The Information and Education Unit has been 
widely praised for its creative interpretation of the mandate, while the politicians of the 
main factions regularly criticized its members of abusing their mandate.  
Prior to the elections in 1993 InfoEd produced a TV program to present the 
Cambodian public with the 20 newly registered political parties. All of them were 
invited to discuss their programs and ideas for the future, guided by questions of an 
UNTAC moderator. While the program was described as an opportunity for the 
political parties to present their vision for Cambodia’s political future, the theoretical 
framework allows us to inverse this perspective and describe it as an opportunity for 
UNTAC itself: All of the programs rules and procedures are analyzed as attempts to 
enforce a particular vision of the new political order and discipline the public political 
discourse. The local political actors’ acts and statements, on the other hand, are 
perceived as attempts to confirm, reject or re-interpret the TA’s interpretative practice. 
It is in the justifications of the local actors’ interpretative practice, and their related 
attempts to build interpretative authority for themselves, that we can discern the 
symbolic dimension of international-local interaction and observe how ideas of the new 
political order come into being.  
The chosen focus of the analysis and the possibility to evaluate InfoEd’s 
interpretative practice and the resulting policy strategies is first and foremost based on 
the available materials: The members of InfoEd have archived the records of the United 
Nation’s very first radio station and large parts of the Unit’s internal communication, 
including analysis reports, documents related to the preparation of the elections and 
letter exchanges with international and local politicians involved in the peace process. 
Chapter 4 includes a detailed description of the two main archives, The Radio UNTAC 
Archive at the University of Wisconsin Madison and the Collection of Cambodian 
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Election Materials 1992-1993 at the Center for Research Library in Chicago. I 
undertook extensive archival research at two separate occasions: I first worked in the 
archives in August and September of 2011 and continued my research in the United 
States in June and July of 2012. The first stay has been financed as part of the DFG 
research project on the Institutionalization of Interpretative Authority in Post-Conflict 
Societies while the second stay was financed with the help of a grant-in-aid by the 
institution Friends of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries. Two digitized 
collections comprising over 2000 documents and two catalogues describing their 
content are the result of this research. Based on these results it was possible to 
reconstruct the internal workings of this particular unit and observe the decision 
making processes behind their policies and products.  
The TV program Political Roundtable Discussion was saved on video cassettes. 
Radio and TV UNTAC broadcasted in Khmer only. In the course of my research these 
records have been digitized, transcribed by a Cambodian research assistant and finally 
translated into English by me. In the course of this work 10.5 hours of video recordings 
have been transformed into an English text of over 230 pages. This text forms the main 
body for the analysis in Chapter 6 and is included as a commented version in Annex I: 
An introduction details the translation process and the footnotes inform the reader 
about the meaning of the political representatives’ subtle references or remarks. These 
comments are the result of the research undertaken during two field trips to Cambodia, 
in the course of which selected archived materials and the Roundtable transcripts were 
discussed with Cambodian scholars and politicians. The first trip to Cambodia lasted 
from November to January 2011 and the second one from late August to early 
December in 2012. 
The analysis is complemented by eleven semi-structured expert interviews 
conducted with seven members of UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit and four 
interviews with former participants of the 1993 elections. The majority of these 
interviews have been conducted in the course of the second of two field research trips 
to Cambodia in 2012. Chapter 4 details the different methodology behind the contact 
strategies and the interview design. Annex III provides a table with all the statistical 
details of the interviews.  
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In a last part, Chapter 4 describes the chosen approach behind the interpretation of the 
selected materials according to the leading questions guiding each of the four main 
analysis chapters.  
As the Paris Peace Agreements’ authoritative interpreter UNTAC derived its 
interpretative practice from its mandate. In order to challenge these interpretations the 
local political actors on the other hand attempted to substantiate their own claims for 
authority in reference to the country’s history and the most pressing political issues of 
their time. The symbolic dimension of their negotiations over the meaning of the new 
political order cannot be understood without an awareness for Cambodia’s troubled 
past and its different interpretations thereof. The actors’ claims for authority and 
UNTAC’s self-ascribed status as the conflict’s neutral moderator are all in one way or 
another linked to the promotion of a certain perspective regarding their role in the 20 
year long conflict. Through their attempts to develop interpretative authority both 
interveners and local political actors did therefore engage in remapping the borders of 
Cambodian identity.  
Chapter 5 will present the conflict history, which has its roots in the 1960s’. It 
distinguishes between an internal and an external dimension of the conflict and guides 
the reader through all five regime changes leading up to the UN intervention in 1992. 
The focus lies on the narratives developed by the conflicts’ main actors, including the 
foreign governments involved in it, to legitimize their ever changing alliances and 
ideological affiliations. The analysis depends to a significant degree on the readers’ 
knowledge of these unresolved tensions, as the new rules and procedures implemented 
by UNTAC to discipline the public political discourse derive much of their meaning 
from their ability to appeal to the people’s collective knowledge. For a quick reminder 
and overview Annex II provides a short summary of the conflicts main events and 
turning points. To provide information regarding the context of InfoEd’s work and their 
role in the United Nation’s mission, Chapter 5 will also recount the efforts of 
UNTAC’s individual units. In preparation of the subsequent analysis it assesses their 
contributions in view of the United Nation’s overall goal to change the country’s 
political order based on the goals defined in the Paris Peace Agreements.  
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The analysis in Chapter 6 presents the reader with an image of the United Nation’s 
mission that takes into account the perceptions of the local population and the hopeful 
contenders in the country’s first mission: How did they perceive the liberal multiparty 
democracy that was supposed to be created under UN supervision? This assessment of 
the Paris Peace Agreements’ symbolic conditions as the country’s symbol for a 
peaceful new order is followed by the main analysis. Set against the background of the 
unresolved tensions between main conflict factions we observe how the Information 
and Education Unit attempted to promote a vision of the new political order by creating 
a public centered on the PPA. This public provided UNTAC with the opportunities to 
offer interpretations of Cambodia’s future and the political contenders with 
opportunities to acknowledge the symbols superior status. The program Political 
Roundtable Discussions is representative for such a public, and its analysis can reveal 
the mechanisms behind UNTAC’s attempts to generate political authority as 
interpretative authority. By observing the local political actors attempts to challenge 
UNTAC’s interpretations of their country’s political future, we can access the symbolic 
dimension of their negotiations and struggles and understand how the Paris Peace 
Agreements shaped ideas of the new political order. The chapter discusses the dynamic 
of different negotiations and confrontations between UNTAC and the contenders in 
length, with a particular focus on the mobilized knowledge and its implications for the 
relationship between the mission’s members and the local political actors. The 
conclusions in Chapter 7 provide a broader assessment of the potential long-term effect 
UNTAC’s efforts to generate interpretative authority may have had on the 
establishment of a liberal multiparty system in Cambodia. It further links the analysis 
to the broader debate over the critique of the liberal peace and the potential of the here 
proposed model to overcome the conceptual limits identified in Chapter 1.  
 The conclusions highlight that the struggles for interpretative authority that both the 
international and local political actors engage in would make it difficult to remove the 
power bias inherent in their relationship by encouraging a more open and inclusive 
dialogue. Enabling discourse in the context of an intervention society means 
intervening in discourse. The analysis further provides an impressive image of the way 
in which institution building and nation building are intertwined. This has 
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repercussions on the potential of international actors to create legitimate institutions: 
As all of their acts in this highly symbolically charged context are going to be perceived 
political by local actors, the negotiations over their place in the new political order are 
very difficult to control and will almost inevitably lead to new conflicts. In this regard 
the analysis can demonstrate the unexpected power of local knowledge, when it comes 
to counter the claims of international actors.  
This work further supports the recent trend to question the validity and the worth of 
established categories of analysis and the labels that come attached to them: local vs. 
international, liberal vs. non-liberal knowledge, actors and institutions. The observation 
of the ongoing struggles over the character of the new political order in Cambodia and 
the interpretative practice employed by those engaged in these decisive struggles show 
how both international and local actors defy these labels while negotiating the social 
reality of ‘liberal’ reforms. 
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2. State of the Art  
2.1. Intervening in States: Experts in State Building or Partners in Peace 
Building?  
International interventions are problematic but necessary.3 This conviction drives much 
of the studies in International Relations. The fact that scholars are tackling the issue 
from different angles and as part of their larger different ideological and political 
projects has still led to a rather dramatic evolution in the subfield of state-building. 
Originally focused on states, institutions and interests even those scholars that belong 
to the mainstream – that is more governance and policy oriented school of thought – 
are now ready to at least take note of the growing literature that aims at reconstructing 
and revalorizing the local perspective on the West’s intrusive and insistent offers to 
‘help’ (Andersen 2012, 208).  
Over the course of the last ten years in particular, the analytical lens applied to 
problems of state failure, civil wars, and international reconstruction efforts has 
zoomed in on the micro level. What has been termed the local or sociological turn in 
scholarship on state building is usually mapped out in reference to the huge increase in 
UN led peacebuilding missions throughout the 90’s and their questionable success 
(Brast 2013; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Few contributions on the matter go 
without the obligatory review of the past missions, not only citing the obvious failures 
such as Rwanda, Iraq or Afghanistan, but also increasingly questioning the substance 
of the peace in those countries that had been deemed a success earlier on like in 
Cambodia or East Timor. Grounded in the observations of such “real world events” 
and large scale human suffering several analyst have left the beaten path of policy 
reforms and aim their criticism more directly at the liberal consensus itself (Mac Ginty 
and Richmond 2013, 766). 
                                                 
3 I use a broad definition of interventions here: By interventions I mean all external interventions 
aimed at establishing domestic peace and stable institutions in countries that are considered to be 
weak, failing or collapsed states. This is also reflected in my use of the terms state building and 
peacebuilding.  
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For the better of two decades the implementation of a market economy, a 
democratic governance system and the establishment of the rule of law have been the 
uncontested formula for internationally led interventions aimed at state reconstruction. 
Even if one considers more recent examples such as the missions to Congo or Haiti it 
becomes evident that the peace Western interveners envisage for states that reemerge 
after long and brutal conflicts is modeled after the social contracts that govern relations 
in their own countries. The idea that liberal principles are universal and hence 
essentially non-negotiable has had a profound impact on these missions in both theory 
and practice.  
In cases of intrastate conflict the United Nations are nowadays already involved 
in the negotiation phases of peace agreements between warring faction, during which 
they do not only act as moderators of the process but often as third parties with a 
considerable say on the substance of the final document. As a result, most of these 
agreements oblige the factions to commit to reconstruction efforts that stay true to the 
norms contained in the liberal peacebuilding model (Bell 2006; Bell and O’Rourke 
2010). This contractual obligation is particularly problematic considering that large 
number of UN mandates for large scale peacebuilding missions originate in agreements 
that would not have been signed without extensive pressure of external actors (Putnam 
2002). The commitment to liberal norms and standards has turned into an 
internationally accepted currency to secure material and financial support for states’ 
reconstruction efforts. 
There has never been a shortage of criticism regarding the translation of these 
liberal visions and ideals into implementation strategies, but the substance of these 
contributions has only slowly shifted from management to politics. Throughout the 90s 
the academic debate remained confined to a rather exclusive club of mostly North 
American scholars, whose views on the matter had developed in a “political climate in 
which it was believed that improving knowledge of conflict and peace processes would 
enable a willing international community to resolve these problems” (Sabaratnam 
2011, 17).  
From the perspective taken on by such policy strategists local actors were not 
only part of but themselves constitutive for an ‘environment’ deemed more or less 
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difficult. Stedman’s much criticized typology of ‘spoilers’ and ‘spoiler behaviour’ has 
to be regarded as the logical consequence of the dominant management approach to 
state building with its assessment of risks, budget size and opportunity costs. When 
Stedman wrote that “limited or greedy spoilers can be addressed through inducements 
or socialization, total spoilers can only be managed with a coercive strategy” he had 
summarized his own concept as well as the attitude of many officials charged with the 
implementation of mandates (Stedman 2002, 12).  
The most prominent scholars in the field were actively engaged in international 
democracy promotion and entertained close links to the highest levels of government 
through assignments as foreign policy advisors or consultants – Stedman, Zartman or 
Paris are just some examples. By drawing valuable ‘lessons learned’ through their 
observations of past and ongoing missions they presented their work explicitly as a 
service to practitioners. Questioned were raised in regard to the modus operandi of 
these missions, their budget and timing, but the normative desirability and necessity of 
such missions and their larger aims was taken for granted. 
Overwhelmingly grounded in rational choice theory and institutionalism the 
more popular studies relied heavily on quantitative data and favored comparative 
approaches. From this perspective setbacks in state building projects and conflicts 
between international and local actors in the course of such missions were framed as 
resulting from either suboptimal strategies, unfavorable conditions, or willful sabotage 
by local actors (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Downs and Stedman 2002; Jones 2002; 
Zartman 1995). In other words: Both the design and the theoretical input of these 
studies assured that even the most dramatic failures did not threaten the state builders 
self-ascribed status as experts. 
The asymmetric relationship between international interveners and their local 
counterparts in economic terms and the conviction that evolving towards Western 
models of governance is tantamount to the development of a more stable and just order 
has unsurprisingly prompted critiques to draw parallels to the colonial missions of the 
past. As Chandler has pointed out, many of these contributions have to be regarded as 
critiques of economic and political liberalism and Western hegemony per se, while 
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state building and its practice are but a mere vehicle for these larger ideological 
arguments (Chandler 2010b). 
Other authors, most notably Chandler himself, have however been very adept 
in using the historic contextualization of state building missions to raise awareness for 
the naturalization of power structures and the detrimental effect this has on the overall 
goal to build a sustainable peace (Chandler 2010a, 143–187; Hughes and Pupavac 
2005; Paris 2002). The United Nation’s international administrations in East Timor, 
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been under particular scrutiny in this regard. 
During such operations international actors assume a wide range of powers and 
competences for a given period of time to supervise the creation of new administrative 
and political institutions. As the most encompassing of all peace operations, many of 
the issues that have already been pressing in other contexts present themselves with 
particular urgency here. Most notably the question of legitimacy (Caplan 2001). 
The UN mission to East Timor has gained notorious popularity for the conflict 
laden relationship between international and local political actors, culminating in the 
resignation of Jarat Chopra the head of UNTAET; frustrated, in his own words, with 
the “Stalinist” and “colonial” practice of other senior UN officials (Chopra 2002; 
Lemay-Hébert 2011, 204). Following authors like Caplan or Chesterman who had early 
on cautioned to respect local ownership, scholars have re-examined how to redistribute 
responsibilities in the reform process set in motion during such „neo-trusteeships“ 
(Berdal and Caplan 2004; Caplan 2001; Chesterman 2004).  
But despite a growing readiness to acknowledge the imbalance between local 
and international actors’ contributions in the course of these undertakings, scholars and 
practitioners alike are less keen to put their self-ascribed status as experts to the test. 
This is evident in both the many attempts to rationalize the necessity of strong 
international control and supervision, as well as the fact that the term ‘local’ continues 
to appear either in combination with ‘conditions’, or, as far as actors are concerned, 
while pondering how to ‘develop incentives for them’ (Butler 2012; Fearon and Laitin 
2004; Krasner 2005; Krasner 2004).  
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Notions that are reminiscent of the ones expressed in UN strategy papers.4 As 
Sending observed, the gap between the rhetoric and the practice of ownership is 
unlikely to close as long as strategies continue to be underpinned by assumptions of 
superiority: Universal knowledge and international sources of legitimacy continue to 
take precedent over local knowledge and local sources of legitimacy (Sending 2009; 
Sending 2010). It is thus in spite of the fact that scholars have critically analyzed and 
commented international peacebuilding missions for almost two decades that the 
predominant perception of local actors as either passive, disruptive, or teachable 
subjects of the reforms remains. 
The following subchapter will review recent publications in state building 
literature that have contributed to the aforementioned ‘local turn’. Together with most 
of their peers these authors share the conviction that new institutions cannot take root 
against the will of the key actors and the people in these countries. But instead of 
understanding acts of rejection and resistance as symptoms of failure or a confirmation 
of unfavorable assumptions about local actors’ mindsets they intend to valorize their 
perceptions. 
This project has two aspects: It involves an analytical reinvestigation of past 
missions’ mixed outcomes and the subsequent attempt to adjust the parameters of local-
international interaction in the context of such joined projects for the future. The long-
term aim of this academic venture is the transformation of the asymmetrical expert-
layman relationship into one between genuine partners in peacebuilding.  
2.2. Seeing like a Peace Builder: Adjusting the Relationship between 
Local and International Actors 
The authors under review here still do cover a wide range of positions and are far from 
agreeing with each other about the best way to proceed analytically or practically. All 
of them do however choose their point of departure based on the insight that it is 
necessary to adjust the mode of observation before changing the mode of action. It is 
                                                 
4 See exemplary: United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, August 23, 2004. 
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worthwhile mentioning that the circle of academics has broadened considerably to 
include a great number of European scholars, but continues to exclude scholars outside 
of the Northern hemisphere.  
According to Mac Ginty and Richmond this “partial ghettoization of the 
debate” is among others “related to the political economies of publishing and research” 
(2014, 13). The contributions can be broadly assigned to two groups, one being more 
concerned with the interaction between international and local political actors and the 
other one with a heightened interest in the communication between international actors 
and the local population. In contrast to the rather complacent character of earlier 
academic debates, the dialogue that has begun to evolve now is marked by a greater 
willingness to turn the mirror around and include the interveners’ own assumptions on 
the list of ‘objects’ to study (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012). 
Another characteristic of these contributions is a pronounced trend towards in-depth 
case studies based on empirical approaches, qualitative data and sociological theories. 
These choices correspond to the renewed interest in understanding how actors in post-
war contexts understand events and institutions and come to take their decisions. 
It is not only the lessons learned from past failures but also common sense that 
led observers and practitioners to posit that international peacebuilding missions cannot 
succeed without the cooperation of local actors. In order to secure their long-term 
commitment to the peace-process it inclusive approaches are now already called for in 
the planning stages of a mission. “Mandates” summarizes Ndulo, “must be guided by 
the understanding that peace making and peacebuilding are primarily the responsibility 
of local rather than foreign actors” (Ndulo 2011, 796).  
The working principle of ‘local ownership’, a term that started its career as the 
“new shibboleth of the development community in the late 90s”, quickly became a 
standard reference in UN strategy papers (Chesterman 2007, 4). The principle is 
deemed especially important in the context of so called ‘complex peace operations’ 
that are concerned with “the reconstruction of public institutions in failed and collapsed 
states” (Englebert and Tull 2008, 106). On the one side narrowly defined as “the extent 
to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of political 
processes” (Donais 2009, 3), the principle of ownership often takes on a more 
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emotional connotation, as the idea that local actors should become ‘attached’ to their 
institutions (Chesterman 2007). In academic circles the term has by now been mostly 
dismissed as a buzzword without much substance as local actors are still mostly 
excluded or sidelined during almost all phases of a mission.  
It is in the midst of this debate that several scholars have shifted their focus 
from the presumed qualities of local capacities and the management of their various 
deficiencies to the assumptions guiding the implementation strategies of interveners. 
The prevalence of preconceived ideas that international actors hold with regard to their 
local partners has in this regard been evoked as one important factor for the inconsistent 
inclusion of those concerned by the reforms. Missions are conducted as a response to 
a perceived problem with the administration of a country. International actors consider 
local politicians therefore often as incapable and untrustworthy as the very institutions 
they intend to reform (Baskin 2004; Wilde 2001). The fact that international officials 
can devise their strategies in a context that is relatively free from the social and political 
constraints, which determine the scope of action for their local counterparts has been 
identified as equally problematic. A case in point is the pronounced reluctance of UN 
officials to hand over authority over the countries’ new institutions during the missions 
to Kosovo and East Timor.  
As a counterbalance to the general trend of framing local political actors as 
immature and simply ill prepared to take over, some authors turned instead to the 
rationalities leading the interveners to take their decisions. According to Hehir 
interveners had developed their expectations based on illusionary ideas that regularly 
took precedent over the political, or socio-economic realities in the given country. They 
“desire to create political communities which mirror a vision of the Western state – 
democratic, pluralist, efficient, just, fair – which doesn’t actually equate with existing 
Western states but rather with an idealized composite image of Western democracies” 
(Hehir 2011, 1074).  
Measured against such an ideal idea local actors were thus in an impossible 
situation to prove their readiness. Lemay-Hebert’s study of UNTAET and UNMIK 
does insofar complement this analysis as it examined how the “mental image” 
interveners had of the two countries as “empty-shells” that had to be rebuilt from 
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scratch guided state building policies. According to Lemay-Hebert these attitudes 
contributed to a range of problems during the implementation phase, as they 
underestimated or misjudged the importance of existing local institutions and acted 
dismissively with regard to local concerns and input (Lemay-Hébert 2011).  
In order to reform the relationship between interveners and the local elite, 
contributions like this advocate implicitly to change the practice but also the mindset 
of the former. Something that is rather difficult to translate into clear cut peacebuilding 
guidelines. In policy circles the principle of local ownership had by and large been 
understood as an appeal to change hiring politics: Enhanced recruitment of local staff 
for higher positions, involvement of local advisors in the drafting phases of important 
projects etc. While this may have changed the management side of these missions it 
did certainly little to change interveners’ attitudes. In this regard it would be of the 
essence to change the way the international community perceives of their own role in 
the course of such missions. The keyword here, as drawn from the contributions, is 
‘contextualization’.  
Strategies should not be drawn from universal templates or blueprints, but 
instead developed in dialogue with the local authorities. Legitimacy and 
appropriateness of peacebuilding strategies should not be assumed, but considered 
dependent on a given social context and instead of perceiving of missions as part of a 
history of other missions, they should be evaluated in the historical context of the 
country in question (Donais 2009; Kurz 2010).  
Past studies have indeed shown that the eagerness to avoid a repetition of past 
negative experiences in other missions often impairs officials’ judgment with regard to 
the situation at hand, leading to the detriment of relations between international and 
local actors. Still under the impression of their problems in Kosovo the UN had for 
instance largely excluded East Timorese in both the negotiation and implementation 
phase of its mandate. There was a tendency, Caplan writes with regard to UNTAET, 
“to apply the wrong lessons from the UN’s operations in the Balkans” (Caplan 2001, 
54); while Chopra saw a “blind ambition borne of bitter experience in Somalia, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere” at fault (Chopra 2002, 981).  
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While there are certainly few scholars who would dismiss this long overdue 
demand to be more sensitive to the local perspective, some have raised important 
questions with regard to its practical implications. The suggestion to be more open to 
local input and ready to let go of preconceived ideas is not one that can be implemented 
on a purely individual level; as the hiring of anthropologists or other country based 
experts to accompany military personal may have suggested (Lemay-Hébert 2009, 37). 
In particular, if the concern for legitimacy applies not simply to the short-term goal of 
maintaining good relations between interveners and their local partners, but rather to 
the long-term goal of building a legitimate order.  
Amidst calls for a more inclusive approach with regard to the local elites at the height 
of the ownership debate Chesterman had already measured the gap between insight and 
results. According to him reports and strategy papers tiptoed around the “the central 
question”, namely how the often demanded ‘open and collaborative dialogue’ with 
local authorities “would be managed and how [its] objectives would be determined” 
(Chesterman 2007, 7). Several years later, Campbell takes a step in the same direction 
when she draws attention to the “high degree of organizational learning and adaption” 
that the necessity to identify, observe, and integrate ever new variables into 
peacebuilding strategies entails (Campbell 2011, 91). 
In regard of these prevailing issues some scholars have suggested an altogether 
different approach to intervention policies: Developing new modes of peacebuilding 
together with those, in whose name this reforms have always been initiated: The 
people. And while this debate proceeds loosely under the headline of a ‘post-liberal 
peace’ its contributions can be understood as an attempt to actively tackle the various 
problems that piled up as a result of the fruitless attempts to use the enhanced readiness 
to be more responsive to local demands as a currency for real changes on an 
implementation level.  
The reasoning behind the search for new modes of peace making and the 
decision to do so in partnership with the local population rather than the local elite, 
could be said to proceed along the following lines: Previous research has indicated that 
the exclusion of local actors and the disregard of their contributions delegitimizes state 
building policies and prevents the sustained support of the new institutions. The 
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importance of their inclusion has been successfully argued for, but standing in the way 
of true reforms are interveners assumptions of superiority.  
Intervention policies that present themselves as being predominantly concerned 
with institutions, enable – and will continue to do so – the preservation of the 
interveners’ conceptualization as being the ‘experts in charge of affairs’. Instead of 
focusing all the attention on the adaptation of foreign models and the local elite, a small 
group of people with an often “controversial claim to represent local constituencies “ 
(Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 764) it appears to be more promising to develop and 
implement new modes of social and political exchange ‘bottom-up’ with the support 
and input of the local population. Considering the works of Lederach, Pouligny, or 
Talentino, who have all delivered sound empirical material and arguments to 
demonstrate the crucial link between identity and legitimacy in conflict resolution and 
state building one can consider this to be a project that has been long in the making 
(Lederach 1997; Pouligny 2005; Talentino 2004; Talentino 2007). 
Unlike the earlier generations of state building literature that presented 
themselves as being written by and for experts and practitioners, this new debate can 
be characterized as a predominantly intellectual and academic venture with an explicit 
political aim: Creating a new partnership for peace. Many of the contributions relate to 
each other based on the tacit agreement that their suggestions and ideas are still a tough 
sell on the market of policy reforms. The demand to get rid of strategy templates and 
initiate a learning process that aims at developing policies on a case-by-case basis 
creates first and foremost a lot of insecurity.  
One of the first realms of activity that have been incited in the context of this 
new research agenda was thus centered around the attempt to show that the failing of 
former projects is actually a result of erroneous assumptions over the nature of state 
building. “Its crucial failure” wrote Wesley about the traditional technocratic top-down 
approach, “would appear to lie in its very conception of the state as an independent 
variable, ideally divorced from politics, economy, and society.” Drawing on 
sociological concepts the article argues further that “a legitimate, stable state can only 
emerge from the dominant understandings, compromises, and categories arising from 
within these spheres of human activity” (Wesley 2008, 380–381).  
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In its analysis of the conceptualization of state failure, the problem that external 
interveners both diagnose and treat, Lemay-Hebert likewise showed how most articles 
developed their arguments based on a Weberian understanding of the state. Its ‘failing’ 
can then be likened to its incapacity to provide certain goods. In an attempt to delineate 
the limits of the institutional approach the study argues with Durkheim that 
“institutionalization and the instrumental capacities of statehood are important” but “‘it 
is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the fate of states is primarily determined’” 
(Lemay-Hébert 2009, 24). This notion of statehood has two important consequences 
for the practice of statebuilding and peacebuilding. First of all it would mean that it is 
not by choice, but by its very nature a project “that does not only aim at rebuilding state 
institutions but the very organization of state-society relations” (Bellina et al. 2009; 
Sending 2009). And second, it is a project that can never succeed in spite of, but only 
because of the contributions of local actors. Accepting these premises means to 
acknowledge that interveners have never been in a position to truly manage 
peacebuilding; instead they themselves have been acting on erroneous assumptions 
over their own role, their realm of influence and the effect of the choices they took.  
For the sphere of analysis this perspective entails first and foremost the vast 
multiplication of factors to take into account, a dissolution of known categories, and 
the loss of established benchmarks against which to measure and evaluate observations. 
Seeing like a state builder meant to act upon the vision of a project with a clear 
beginning and end, it meant to see the formation of institutions and procedures, and, 
perhaps most importantly, it involved the conviction that these visible markers of 
change provided information about their content and substance.  
In comparison to the clear-cut shapes that mark the landscape of state building, 
the proponents of a new partnership in peacebuilding are for now faced with a rather 
blurry version of the objects they are approaching. “Engaging with local peacebuilding 
means to engage with the idea of resistance to liberal models and principles”, 
Richmond and Mac Ginty wrote. A useful starting point for research would therefore 
be the assumption of “humility and not-knowing” (2014, 14).  
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2.3. The Making of a New Political Order: Modes of Observation  
The rather unattractive prognosis of having to undertake the tedious task of exploring 
uncharted territory for the next years to come is mainly counterbalanced by the sound 
empirical evidence confirming its necessity, if not urgency. For virtually every mission 
the United Nations’ undertook in the past two decades, scholars (and journalists) have 
assembled multiple examples of problems that resulted from the dismissive attitudes 
of interveners or their disregard of local interests, culture and customs. “Why 
peacebuilders are blind and arrogant and what to do about it” is how Sending 
summarized this matter to chart a way forward (Sending 2009). Such reports do not 
only pertain to the short-term effects of international-local interaction, but more 
crucially to the long term-effects that this ignorance has on both the efficiency and 
effectivity of intervention projects. With regard to the UN’s efforts in East Timor Hohe 
criticized that the 
 “Transitional Administration built institutions on the assumptions that there were no 
strong concepts and ideas existing on the local level, and that the population just had to be 
‘taught’ democracy. This ignored the fact that human beings grow up in a social 
environment with powerful ideas of how to classify and understand their world. Local 
perception of practices was perceived as cultural ‘folklore’ and was not accorded much 
significance. Therefore, international attempts often failed or had marginal impact” (Hohe 
2002, 570).  
In a very similar argument Talentino remarks with regard to Bosnia that 
because “top-down and bottom-up processes work independently, the shape of the state 
envisioned by outside actors may not correspond to the identities developed by internal 
actors. [In Bosnia] many citizens oppose the federal structure mandated by the 
international community and resist attempts to make it stronger”(Talentino 2004, 561).  
According to Andersen, the central argument these authors derive from their 
analysis is the conviction that internal legitimacy is of primary importance in the 
making of a stable new order and that this legitimacy stems from understanding social 
dynamics and knowledge (Andersen 2012). One of the long term goals of this academic 
project is therefore – and this puts them again in agreement with the mainstream state 
building literature – to avoid the kind of institutions that have been described as 
“illusions”, “potemkin like” or in their entirety as “phantom states” (Bliesemann de 
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Guevara and Kühn 2010; Chandler 2006, 46): Superficial structures that serve mainly 
to uphold the appearance of a legitimate order in the interest of continued relations 
between foreign governments, but remain distant to and irrelevant for the lives of the 
people.  
After the successful promotion of internal legitimacy as a crucial principle in 
the making of any new order, the criticism of the liberal peace model is faced with its 
next big challenge. The new perspective proposed in the course of the local turn makes 
it necessary to develop analytical models that can meet the simultaneous demands of 
being flexible enough to capture country and case specific characteristics and still 
provide generalizable information regarding past and future missions of this kind. 
Certain, this is in essence a problem every theoretical model deals with. What 
renders this issue particularly difficult here, is the fact that established analytical 
categories are likewise under scrutiny: Authors have pointed out that seemingly 
descriptive terms like for instance local and international, external and internal are 
themselves loaded with assumptions that may hinder the development of a neutral 
observer position (Andersen 2012; Goodhand and Walton 2009; Kurz 2010; Mac Ginty 
2011). The highly politically charged nature of the studies’ focus, namely interventions 
that are conducted with the aim of changing the socio-political structure of foreign 
countries, adds a problematic normative dimension.  
In order to approach these issues authors depart from the understanding that 
there is a need for more dynamic models; that is models that can capture the evolving 
nature of policies, opinions and ideas and accept the newly postulated fluidity of 
categories and concepts. It is, in other words, the attempt to finally let go of the 
obsession with results and assume a more procedural perspective. Something that has 
been recommended early on (Baskin 2004, 125). As a response to these challenges 
scholars seem to converge on two themes: Negotiation and communication.  
The focus on negotiation caters the need for a deeper understanding regarding 
the limits of international strategies and the reasons for local opposition. More attention 
to the rules and dynamics of communication, on the other hand, may contribute to gain 
information on the decision making processes that precede such acts of resistance.  
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An analysis of the “complex negotiations that go on between exporters and 
importers of liberal peacebuilding” in the case of Sri Lanka for instance revealed how 
local actors “instrumentalize the interventions of external actors, and the ways in which 
they are ‘translated’ as they go through these multiple brokering arrangements.” The 
authors state that due to these interventions by local actors “liberal peacebuilding may 
look very different from how it was originally framed, once it ‘hits the ground’” 
(Goodhand and Walton 2009, 307).  
In order to capture systematically how such translations proceed and how 
strategic agendas are modified as a result of the interaction between interveners and 
local actors, Mac Ginty proposed the hybrid peace model. Devised as an analytical tool 
it probably represents the most comprehensive attempt to observe the dynamic of 
peacebuilding as a joint project of interveners and local actors. By placing his model 
in a “wider structural context” Mac Ginty acknowledges the power bias between them, 
but highlights the capacity and agency of local actors (Mac Ginty 2011, 212). With its 
emphasis on their ability to negotiate the substance and the impact of the liberal peace 
project this approach represents a move away from the subjectifying perspective on 
people in post-war societies. Additionally it addresses the normative problem by 
encouraging observers to approach the systems that emerge without deciding a-priori 
that non-liberal institutions are symptoms of an incomplete or deficient process of 
peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2011).  
Other examples for this trend to assess the limits of strategic intent and capture 
the evolving character of actors and institutions are Chandler’s suggestion to focus on 
the concrete social practice of interventionism or Andersen’s proposal to apply the 
theory and methodology of relational sociology to state building analysis (Andersen 
2012; Chandler 2015).  
What binds all of these studies together is the expressed need to understand the 
reasons for resistance. The newly found consensus here is that local actors may have 
good reasons to reject reforms: they can assess the socio-economic conditions much 
better than international actors and are thus in a better position to decide over the 
feasibility of a given project. This evidently represents a 180 degree turn away from 
the earlier generations of literature where local resistance was framed as pathological 
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and dangerous. But with their demand to be more open to the knowledge generated on 
a local level these authors go also a step further than scholars that have simply 
advocated the need to accept opposition: With a focus on the bargaining process 
between elites Barnett and Zürcher for instance propose a more pragmatic approach to 
peacebuilding. International actors should not insist on all-too progressive reforms that 
threaten the interests of elites, but scale down their expectations and settle for the “least 
bad state” (Barnett and Zuercher 2009). If one does, however, not understand resistance 
as an unavoidable nuisance but rather as a productive and necessary component of 
engaged and cooperative reform development, the need to learn more about the local 
perspective becomes imminent. 
Scholars have therefore begun to re-examine the possibilities for an ‘open and 
collaborative dialogue’ with local actors. Something akin to this had already been 
demanded during the ownership debate and, as noted earlier, largely failed. Taking a 
closer look at the conceptualization of the exchange between international and local 
actors now and then, in particular with regard to its intentions, one can note two main 
differences. The dialogue that was supposed to enhance local ownership was concerned 
with input, information, and participation: Interveners were asked to enhance the 
transparency of their decision making procedures and be more open to local 
suggestions.  
Likewise, it was recommended to integrate local actors more systematically in 
the process of translating given strategies into concrete policies. In other words: It was 
a dialogue that aimed at enhancing acceptance and support of internationally pre-
defined models. On the contrary, those scholars that intent to transform the relationship 
between interveners and local actors into one between true partners in peacebuilding 
depart from the understanding that a better peace can be constructed through 
communication and deliberation. In order to develop institutions that stay true to the 
structures of local politics and culture they highlight the necessity to question how 
interveners’ preconceived ideas continue to shape intervention policies. In this regard 
peace builders would therefore need to develop “discoursive understandings of peace 
and facilitate a negotiation of a discoursive practice of peace in which hegemony, 
domination, and oppression can be identified and resolved” (Richmond 2008, 462). 
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Such a negotiation should furthermore proceed without determining a priori what the 
new order will look like.  
“Donors5 often seek to either eradicate or transform traditional forms of rule and 
customary law in the context of state building. To harness and transfer the legitimacy of 
such practices onto the state, donors should focus not on specifying outcomes but on 
defining appropriate processes for debates and negotiations between different groups 
about the definition and implementation of state law and rule. Here, support for arenas 
and mechanisms for dialogue and negotiation between different actors representing 
different interests and bases of legitimacy seems important also for facilitating learning 
processes regarding the building of consensus, constructive partnerships between different 
types of actors, and a sense of mutuality and citizenship [highlight in original].” (Bellina 
et al. 2009, 37) 
It is this emphasis on mutual learning and understanding that now drives much of the 
scholarly activity concerned with conflict resolution and the building of stable and 
peaceful states. Research is encouraged to develop models that can ‘see’ politics 
outside of the established institutions and suggest ways to make local knowledge over 
these dynamics fruitful for the development of policy strategies. In the long term this 
approach is destined to contribute to a reform of the way in which peace builders 
approach countries at conflict. This means, first and foremost, to develop arguments 
and analytical tools that will allow them to put off the project of ‘constructing’ 
institutions and rather begin the joint project of peacebuilding by discerning the 
outlines of a new order with its limits and potentials as imagined by the people.  
2.4. Deliberating Ideas in the Making of a New Order: Conceptual 
Limits and a Way Forward 
The sketch of recent developments in peacebuilding research shows that the 
achievements of the liberal peace critique are quite substantial: It has been argued 
rather successfully that both practitioners and academics could profit from changing 
their expert status to self-declared amateurs of peacebuilding. And despite the shortage 
of coherent dynamic models to capture the local-international negotiation and 
communication procedures the available studies have already shed new light on the 
                                                 
5 The authors give no definition of the term donor, but imply in several paragraphs that this refers to 
international actors engaged in state building activities, including foreign governments, supranational 
organizations, or non-governmental agencies.  
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character of evolving practices and institutions. The following chapter will briefly 
describe the contribution this dissertation seeks to make to the current debate in its 
search for new empirical data and theoretical models. In order to do so it will first 
discuss the two main shortcomings of the current criticism. The argument is that the 
debate has not yet managed to escape the niche it developed in: It is through its self-
styled ‘opposition-character’ that the debate sets its own conceptual limits.  
This problem is first of all evident in the conceptualization of international and 
local actors as imposers and imposed upon. Attempts to prove earlier generations of 
scholars and state builders wrong, who had developed their policies and analytical 
models based on the understanding that foreign countries could, in fact, be pressured 
in the ‘right’ direction have not weakened but rather reinforced this notion. The 
introduction to the anthology A Liberal Peace? is exemplary in this regard (Campbell, 
Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011).  
As indicated by the question mark in the title it sets out to advance our 
“understanding of peacebuilding intervention”. The editors then proceed by presenting 
“empirical research that investigates the degree to which the liberal peace is, in fact, 
imposed on post-conflict and transitional states and societies.” With a focus on local 
actors and conditions in foreign countries some authors argue for instance that this 
project is doomed to fail because of reluctant elites and established bureaucratic 
routines.  
Others take on a more normative position and hold that economic superiority 
shouldn’t be abused as a free pass to proceed with ruthless interventions: “Respect for 
the ‘Other’ […] includes the reluctance to impose universal models” (Campbell, 
Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011, 1–3). With their studies the authors can indeed show 
that ‘imposition’ is neither feasible nor morally acceptable; but this does little to 
challenge the simplifying understanding of the power bias between them. The same 
dichotomy is applied when attempting to explain the deteriorating relationships 
between local and international actors on all institutional levels, from the elite to the 
sphere of the ‘everyday’.  
Autessere’s groundbreaking study on the subculture of international 
peacebuilders for instance showed how knowledge production, socialization and the 
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everyday routines in the circles of these interveners alienate them from the very society 
they intend to appease and reform. Instead of furthering the goal of building a true 
partnership for peace their presence in the country often led to additional conflicts. In 
this regard the study asks “why many of these people, who would in fact benefit from 
effective international efforts, reject or distort them”. The answer, she finds, lies in the 
“very act of imposition” (Autessere 2014, 108). “Intellectuals and authorities regularly 
complained that interveners tried to impose their ideas, values, and standard operation 
procedures with no respect for local knowledge and customs.” These results do confirm 
earlier works by Talentino, who likewise showed that “resentment [against imposition] 
results in obstructionism” (Autessere 2014, 109). 
While there is nothing to say against the demand to be more sensitive and 
respectful in dealing with one another it is clearly important not to equate the perception 
of imposition with the nature of power in the context of an intervention on an analytical 
level. Which leads to the second problem: Earlier generations of scholars have, as 
Autessere details, explained resistance with local actors’ “lack of understanding of 
international strategies, the presence of vested interests, the financial and logistical 
constraints of the projects, or the Western or liberal characters of the programs” 
(Autessere 2014, 108).  
In their attempts to demonstrate actors’ agency and frame their opposition as 
valid and rational behavior the reviewed analysis tend to attribute reforms with an 
almost material character. Mac Ginty’s hybrid peace model for instance had 
encouraged analysts to observe the realm of “peace processes and peace accord 
implementation” with an eye on the agency of local actors to negotiate the substance 
of externally imposed reforms (Mac Ginty 2011, 211). His article includes several 
example of hybrid structures that have formed as a result of local resistance, 
subversion, and their ability to uphold local alternatives to internationally crafted 
institutions: The informal economy in Iraq, or the new Bosnian state, which he 
describes as a “distortion of liberal ideas melded with nationalism, realism and a 
socialist legacy” (Mac Ginty 2011, 219). Despite the study’s acknowledgement of the 
non-linear character that preceded the creation of these structures, the ideas and 
assumptions that have driven acts of resistance or subversion remain in the dark. To 
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put it more bluntly: Instead of observing processes Mac Ginty actually observes results 
and explains them with processes. Other studies or analysis are equally silent on the 
matter: What are actors’ perceptions of the reforms? How do international actors 
convey their ideas of the changes to come? How do converging or contradicting ideas 
of the new political order affect the relationship between interveners and local actors?  
In order to find an answer to these questions it is neither helpful to further the 
distinction between liberal and non-liberal preferences, nor to trace all of the 
international actors’ claims back to their assumptions of superiority. Instead it would 
be important to advance our understanding of the concrete practice with which 
interveners seek to enforce, uphold, and confirm their vision of the new political order 
in the course of a mission and under what circumstances local actors are likely to react 
to these interpretations of their future.  
In other words: It would important to account for the symbolic character of 
local-international exchanges and negotiations regarding the future political order. It is 
in regard of these prevailing issues that this work intends to make the following 
contribution: It will 1.) Provide an analytical model to observe the symbolic dimension 
of international-local negotiations over the new political order and 2.) Provide 
empirical data that can demonstrate the importance to account for this dimension while 
advancing the debate over alternative models of peacebuilding.  
 
With its focus on Cambodia’s public political discourse and the ideas presented by the 
20 newly founded Cambodian parties prior to the UNTAC organized elections in 1993 
the intended analysis seems to go against the here described trend in state building 
literature: It observes politics in traditional institutional structures and is interested in 
interaction on the level of political elites. The following chapter will discuss the 
theoretical framework used to capture the dynamic of their interaction. It will become 
evident that it is possible to learn a lot about the nature of power in the context of an 
intervention if we focus our attention on the ongoing deliberations of the different 
visions for a peaceful new order that become an option in transitional times. Instead of 
turning towards the ‘everyday’ in an attempt to discover hidden forms of agency and 
knowledge, the analysis of the public political discourse in the context of an 
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intervention society intends to determine more precisely what kind of knowledge is 
mobilized under what circumstances to defend contesting claims over legitimate 
political reforms. Such ongoing deliberations are not taking place in a sphere 
completely removed from the population, but are very much embedded in the 
reconstruction efforts that encompass both the state and the nation.  
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3. Theoretical Framework  
3.1. Introduction  
The previous literature analysis showed a trend towards a more positive assessment of 
the integrative effects of local-international interaction: Instead of fixing on the 
institutional ideal state builders may have had when devising their strategies, the new 
modes of observation intend to account for the ideas that drive the decision making 
processes of their local counterparts in the joint project of making a new political order. 
How do interveners try to enforce and uphold their vision of the new political order 
and what are the practices employed by local actors to confirm or counter these ideas? 
How can we capture this symbolic dimension of negotiations in the context of a state 
building mission? 
In order to develop an analytical model that can account for this particular 
dynamic this chapter will proceed as follows: In a first step it will discuss the theoretical 
assumptions guiding this work. The research interest with its suggested perspective on 
local-international interaction is grounded in a specific understanding of the state: 
Institutions and ideas are considered mutually constitutive. The chapter presents the 
relevant elements of this perspective and discusses the theoretical implications for the 
analysis. In a second part the chapter introduces the theory of interpretative authority: 
This theory allows us to access the symbolic dimension of local and international 
interaction and still account for the power bias inherent in their relationship.  
With regard to the case at hand a concluding chapter will further detail the 
theoretical implications of the proposed approach and devise an analytical model. In 
preparation of the operationalization this chapter also reflects on the potential of an 
analysis based on this theoretical perspective to overcome the conceptual limits 
identified in Chapter 2. The final research question will reflect these considerations. 
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3.2. The State as a Result of Ongoing Negotiations and Struggles: 
Theoretical Implications  
There are two distinct understandings of how to conceptualize the state in current 
statebuilding literature. The first one considers the state to be separate from society and 
the second one assumes that state and society are in a mutually constitutive relation. 
This work will build on the second assumption. In order to clarify the theoretical 
implications this understanding has for approaching the analysis I will briefly recall the 
debate over the nature of the state as presented in current publications. As the central 
category of all analysis its evolvement provides a good indicator for the evolvement of 
the state building debate at large.  
As Foucault phrased it there is “no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault 1995, 27). The powerful nature 
of perceiving the state as an entity that hovers over its subjects is therefore first and 
foremost evident in the silence of state building literature on this central category. 
Rather than a concept it represented a truth in the Foucauldian sense. Autesserre 
remarks in this regard:  
“Consider for instance the dominant collective understanding that interveners should 
approach their roles in a top-down manner through regular interactions with national and 
international elites. This understanding originated in the practice of diplomacy in classical 
antiquity, and each critical historical juncture – such as the 1648 treaty of Westphalia and 
the rise of international organizations in the twentieth century – has reinforced it” 
(Autessere 2014, 34). 
While the perceived redundancy to elaborate on ones’ understanding of the state proved 
the hegemonic character of this definition, the recent trend to trace the production of 
knowledge back to this assumption indicates the greater shift in the field of state 
building research. The most comprehensive effort in this regard is the edited volume 
The semantics of statebuilding and nationbuilding: looking beyond neo-Weberian 
approaches. In the introduction the editors outline the intentions of this publication as 
follows: By engaging with “philosophical, sociological, historical and economic 
perspectives” the contributors will shift attention from “statebuilding as a professional 
practice to the meanings associated with it”. And further: “Central to the process is our 
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understanding that language is both the most important tool for building anything of 
social significance and the primary repository of meaning in any social setting.” 
Departing from this understanding they present analysis that are concerned with the 
perceptions of scholars and interveners: How have they conceptualized central 
categories such as “state, state fragility and statebuilding” and what kind of 
repercussions does this have on “’good practices’ for statebuilding, demonstrating how 
the semantics of statebuilding construct, reproduce and maintain particular visions of 
order” (Lemay-Hébert, Onuf, and Racik 2014, 1).  
Of particular relevance for the present work are Lemay-Hébert’s two 
contributions, as they revolve directly around the question of how the so-called 
Weberian or neo-Weberian approach to statehood has been challenged by other 
conceptualizations.6 Weber’s dominant understanding of the ‘state as government’7 
had provided the rational for interventions aimed at reconstructing state institutions. As 
already outlined in Chapter 2 the related technocratic top-down approach allowed 
interveners to understand themselves as experts charged with treating various 
institutional deficiencies. ‘State structures and societal forces’ were conceptualized as 
two separate spheres.  
Scholars and practitioners alike subsequently drafted their strategies and 
recommendations based on the assumption that there is a “distinction between 
statebuilding and nationbuilding” and hence “that it is possible to conduct statebuilding 
operations from the outside without entering into the contested sphere of 
nationbuilding. […] In other words, it is possible to target the institutions of a given 
state, to strengthen state capabilities, without engaging in the dreaded realm of identity-
building” (Lemay-Hébert 2014, 92). Applying a reverse reading of these postulations 
the question is hence, what are the analytical consequences of understanding the ‘state 
                                                 
6 The following paragraph paraphrases his findings unless indicated through other citations. In a slightly 
different form, Lemay-Hebert’s chapter had already been published in 2009 under the title “Statebuilding 
without Nation-Building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach.” 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3 (1): 21–45. Findings here may be based on both his article 
and his book chapter.  
7 Lemay-Hebert quotes a number of scholars that have underlined that Weber’s definition of statehood 
ought to be seen in connection with his concept of the nation. 
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as social system’? If we turn our attention towards the context of a statebuilding or 
peacebuilding mission, three aspects will gain particular importance: 
1. Interveners always engage in nation building 
The first one is obvious: Whether or not interveners intend to, their activities will 
always have an impact on the constitution of the collective identity of the intervened 
society. In building this argument Lemay-Hébert describes in depth how different 
sociological thinkers have shown that state and nation have to be perceived of as 
mutually constitutive. Defined as a “sociological process subject to alteration, 
modification, reinterpretation, or even wholesale creation bypolitics […] the nation is 
a social entity, a social reality, only insofar as it relates to the modern state” (Lemay-
Hebert 2014, 96). The design and implementation of intervention policies with the 
corresponding attempts to reconstruct or create institutions are therefore bound to have 
concrete “repercussions on socio-political cohesion (Lemay-Hebert 2009, 41). Hence, 
no conclusions can be drawn from the strategic conceptualizations of mission as 
‘statebuilding’ or ‘nationbuilding-missions’ as regards the actual engagement of 
interveners in the realm of the ideas.  
2. All practice is political in nature 
The fact that even the most technocratic reforms have political consequences is a 
common reminder in current literature. Bellina et al. for instance point out that “any 
intervention by external actors, however technical it may be, will affect the relative 
position of different local groups and is thus inherently political” (Bellina et al. 2009, 
36). In a similar vein Wesley argued that “however technocratic their intention, state-
building missions inevitably find themselves factored into local rivalries. As agents of 
reform, interventions cannot fail to incur the opposition of those in the political elite 
that were benefiting from the previous system” (Wesley 2008, 380). With the focus on 
elite conflicts and power structures the political nature of interventions is here framed 
in terms of interests and benefits. Linking this argument more directly to the postulated 
interrelatedness of state and society allows us to also see the symbolic dimension of 
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interveners’ decisions and their political consequences. In implementing their mandate 
international actors derive their authority “in no small part from [their] claim to know 
what needs to be done to prevent future conflicts, and to help build a liberal democratic 
state” (Sending 2009, 2).  
This claim of knowledge has to be regarded as inherent to every practice and 
every decisions interveners present as legitimate. By understanding society and the 
state as mutually constitutive this also means that such a claim is not only concerned 
with the way institutions are supposed to look like, but, by extension, also with the way 
society and the state should relate. Interventions are therefore not only irreducibly 
political because the affect actors’ positions and their power. They are political because 
all of the interveners’ actions represent an attempt to influence how the people may 
perceive, comprehend, and interpret the new order. 
3. Interveners are in a competitive relationship with other political actors 
The fact that the local political actors have to respond to the values and principles 
propagated by interveners has of course long been acknowledged. It is, however, 
usually conceptualized as an activity to which the interveners remain strangely 
external: Manning for instance criticizes that international actors often fail to take the 
important challenges into account that the local political elite faces when attempting to 
balance the expectations of now two ‘constituencies’: their voters and the international 
community (Manning 2004; Manning 2007). 
The presence and influence of an international authority pressures these actors 
to conform to the new rules and regulations of the game and to prove their commitment 
to liberal norms. This might further the need to modify “the collective identity the party 
offers to its followers” (Manning 2004, 60). Other authors presuppose the same 
possibility to neatly separate communication spheres in a post-conflict setting when 
they define actors as ‘importers’ and ‘exporters’ of liberal ideas, or describe the 
different language politicians use in their attempts to please international and local 
expectations (Goodhand and Walton 2009; Limani-Beqa 2011). Just like the earlier 
conceptualization of state and society that underpinned statebuilding analysis, these 
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descriptions evoke the image of a liberal dictate that hovers somewhat ominously over 
local actors heads. Such a perspective simultaneously overemphasizes the strategic 
intent and control local actors have over questions of collective identity and de-
emphasizes the active role international actors have in its creation.  
With a focus on the social dynamics set in motion in a post-conflict setting it 
has been argued elsewhere that the society in question should be perceived of as an 
intervention society, that is a society that encompasses interveners and local actors 
(Bonacker et al. 2010). The concept removes the analytically unhelpful separation 
between interveners and the local society and draws attention to the concrete practice 
that constitute ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ (Andersen 2012; Bonacker et al. 2010).  
With regard to the here developed theoretical argument it allows us to further 
clarify the relationship between interveners and local political actors. An intervention 
society, just like any society, is engaged in continuous struggles and negotiations over 
the nature of the state. But unlike every other society it is marked by a heightened 
importance of the political realm. In paraphrasing Grenier the authors Goodhand and 
Walton describe interventions as “charismatic moments”8 (2009, 314); that is a time 
during which “the autonomy of the political dynamic as a whole seems to be enhanced” 
and political actors and ideas “shape politics in a dramatic way” (Grenier 1996, 12). 
According to them, the “peace process then is best seen an intensified political 
environment providing a range of opportunities for different actors to generate 
legitimacy in different ways” (Goodhand and Walton 2009, 316).  
By embedding this postulation in the concept of an intervention society the 
relationship between interveners and local political actors can no longer be adequately 
described in terms of imposers and imposed upon. Rather, they have to be understood 
as competitors that engage in the realm of ideas, where they struggle over the meaning 
of the new institutions and their role in reforming the relationship between society and 
the state.  
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking they do not define the intervention as constituting the charismatic moment, but 
argue that interventions take place in charismatic moments and are hence always political. Given their 
definition of the peace process I consider this slight adaptation to be a valid one.  
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3.3. Summary: Consequences for the Analytical Model 
The theoretical implications of understanding the state as a social system enhanced the 
understanding of the intended observation target: The struggles and negotiations 
between interveners and local political actors over the meaning of the reforms. It allows 
us to argue that the sphere of institution building and the realm of ideas are not two 
separate spheres but connected. Furthermore, we can perceive local and international 
actors as competitors, which puts the latter’s self-ascribed role as uninvolved conflict 
moderators to the test.  
To observe this symbolic dimension of their interactions it is now necessary to 
devise an analytical model that is able to capture this particular dynamic. Such a model 
needs to address two problems: First of all, it needs to account for the power bias 
between interveners and local political actors. Even if one does not want to base the 
analysis on the distinction between ‘strong universal, liberal principles’ and ‘weak, 
local, non-liberal principles’, the fact remains that interveners do still have a 
considerable advantage in transforming their “material into moral power” (Mac Ginty 
2011, 213). The second problem relates to the ‘location’ of this negotiation. The realm 
of ideas is not exactly a precisely limited space. The fact that it is by definition subject 
to continuous alteration and re-interpretation adds a problematic temporal dimension. 
To summarize: While the theoretical conceptualization of the state as a social system 
and the related implications for the process of statebuilding denotes what we intend to 
observe, the questions of how and where this observation may take place is still open.  
The following subchapter will therefore introduce the theory of interpretative 
authority. After presenting the general concepts of this theory and its leading 
assumptions it will consider its implications for the case at hand and finally present an 
analytical model that integrates the results of the foregoing discussion: This model can 
capture the competitive aspect in the relationship between interveners and local 
political actors and the techniques they employ to ensure that their respective vision of 
the new political order may have an impact on society’s realm of ideas.  
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3.4. The Theory of Interpretative Authority  
At this point it is necessary to describe the larger context of this work. The dissertation 
is part of a comprehensive research project, funded by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), entitled: The Institutionalization of Interpretative 
Authority in Post-Conflict Societies. An Analysis of the Transitional Authority in 
Kosovo and Cambodia. The project aimed at developing an adaptation of the theory of 
interpretative authority to analyze the transition from conflict to peace in the context 
of a UN transitional authority. It focuses on processes of authority building.  
The original theoretical model has been developed by Andre Brodocz to 
describe the particular type of power exercised by the constitutional court in Germany 
– and thus the constitutional court in an established democracy (2003, 2009). Not 
endowed with the power to sanction when challenged and yet highly respected by all 
other institutions its interplay with the different levels of government and this particular 
type of power says something about the way the political society as a whole functions 
and its members communicate with one another.  
The analysis describes the symbolic character of this exchange, tied to 
categories of understanding that have to be communicated and constantly reinterpreted 
to serve as shared categories of understanding. One of the key assumptions the theory 
builds on is the idea that political communities are created around the interpretation of 
certain symbols. These symbols have to remain highly ambiguous in order to incite and 
regulate the constant re-negotiation of the fundamental terms characterizing a given 
society.  
The power of the German constitutional court thus rests in part on the important 
status the German constitution has in inciting an ongoing conversation between the 
members of this particular political community. In this discussion the community 
constantly reaffirms and recreates notions of the shared understanding that constitutes 
its common ground.  
In its adaptation for the post-conflict setting the theory focuses on international 
administrations. International administrations constitute the most encompassing of all 
interventions. To this date the United Nations have been mandated to set-up such a 
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structure six times: in Namibia (UNTAG 1989-1990), in Cambodia (UNTAC 1992-
1993), in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH 1995-2002), in Eastern Slavonia 
(UNTAES 1996-1998), in East Timor (UNTAET 1999-2002) and in Kosovo (UNMIK, 
since 1999). In all of these cases the United Nations’ Security Council provided 
extensive mandates to rebuild a legitimate state. To this end, the UN were thus entitled 
to take over the state’s government and assume its main responsibilities. 
As the previous chapter showed, questions of legitimacy present themselves 
with particular urgency in the context of such extensive missions. The amount of 
available studies that describe and explain the conflicts between local and international 
actors during UNMIBH, UNTAET and UNMIK testifies to this problematic. With a 
hint of sarcasm one could thus say that these missions are quite useful from a 
researcher’s point of view.  
Scholars interested in the study of legitimacy in state building find in them an 
incredibly rich source of case studies. And maybe even more importantly: The 
particular institutional structure of these administrations makes them especially 
approachable from an analytical point of view. Interveners do not establish themselves 
as one authority amongst others, but they claim to represent the state’s authority for the 
duration of the mission. As such, they need to assure that all actions can be traced back 
to the mandate that establishes them as such an authority. The international legitimacy 
is thus enshrined in the mandate and it is in reference to this source that interveners 
need to publicly defend their actions as legitimate. This generic structure facilitates the 
operationalization of observations concerned with legitimacy development. 
The theory of interpretative authority builds on an understanding of legitimacy 
that is grounded in social dynamics. Legitimacy is not considered something that is 
given. Instead it is tied to actors’ ability to constantly reproduce a belief in their 
legitimacy (and hence the legitimacy of their actions) in the realm of political discourse. 
For the analysis legitimacy thereby becomes “important in its own right as ongoing 
public contestation” (Andersen 2012, 206). The theory stipulates that this process of 
public contestation cannot be regarded as open-ended from the interveners’ point of 
view. Rather, they have to assure that notions of legitimacy converge on the particular 
political order they represent in the course of a state-building mission. The 
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establishment of such a discourse serves two distinct goals: First of all it will enable 
interveners to implement their mandate with the support of their local counterparts. 
After the mission ends, this is the second aim, such an established political discourse 
is vital to guarantee the stability of the new order because it ensures that legitimacy 
continues to converge on the state.  
The theoretical argument is therefore that state builders need to establish 
themselves as the interpretative authorities in order to further both their short- and long-
term goals with regard to the order they envision for the intervened society. 
Interpretative authority is defined as follows: It is the recognition that is accorded to an 
institution for its status as the authoritative interpreter of a political order and its 
symbols. In a situation of dissenting interpretations, this institution has the authority to 
decide what constitutes the common ground of a society without having to rely on the 
threat or the execution of sanctions (Bonacker et. al. 2014).  
3.5. Three Analytical Dimensions  
The theory distinguishes between three analytical dimensions in order to capture the 
attempts of actors and institutions to establish themselves as interpretative authorities: 
The symbolic conditions, the opportunities, and the interpretative practice.9  
Symbolic Conditions 
The first analytical dimension is concerned with the existence and the status of the 
collective ideas that create a political community. According to the theoretical 
framework societies integrate as political communities around the interpretation of 
such symbols. The collective identity of a community can then be described in regard 
to both its symbols and the status of these symbols in relation to each other. In an 
established democracy like Germany or the United States for instance, the collective 
identity of the political community tends to evolve around the constitution. As an 
                                                 
9 This chapter draws on Bonacker, Thorsten; Brodocz, André; Distler, Werner; Travouillon, Katrin. 
2014. Deutungsmacht in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Zur politischen Autorität internationaler 
Administrationen in Kambodscha und im Kosovo. 
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expression of the mutual promise people give each other to act together10, political 
communities integrate by giving this symbol the central position in public political 
discourse. The superior status of the constitution as a symbol of collective identity in 
the United States is evident in the fact that the two questions ‘is this constitutional’ and 
‘is this who we are as a people’ are deeply intertwined. Other societies may integrate 
around symbols like national myths, a traditional leadership figure like the king, or 
other founding texts.  
Because of their ambiguity these symbols can incite and regulate a discourse 
over categories of shared understanding. An institution that is accorded with the status 
to legitimately decide what constitutes an appropriate interpretation in cases of 
unresolved issues constitutes an interpretative authority. It is in the act of issuing such 
an interpretation that political authority as interpretative authority is exercised. Strong 
symbolic conditions do thus describe a situation where one symbol for a society’s 
common ground is safely established and conflicts arise only in regard to its 
interpretation.  
Approaching the analysis of a post-conflict society through this theoretical 
framework, means to first establish what kind of symbols public discourse evolves 
around. The difference between an established, peaceful society and a society divided 
by war can then be described with regard to the status these symbols have: Most often 
they stand for conflicting interpretations over society’s common ground. In absence of 
a symbol that is considered representative for the entire political community, no 
institution can claim interpretative authority. The symbolic conditions are hence 
uncertain. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Paraphrasing Arendt, as quoted in (Brodocz 2014, 43). 
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 Opportunities 
The second analytical dimension is concerned with the opportunities for institutions to 
present themselves as authoritative interpreters. As an institution is dependent on the 
repeated public acknowledgement of its superior status in order to exercise 
interpretative authority, it needs to have opportunities to this end. In established 
democracies these are for instance the political functions an institution is entitled to 
perform. The determination of the Higher Court as the institution entitled to 
legitimately interpret the constitution, and the status of the constitution as a symbol for 
society’s common ground are in this regard mutually reinforcing.  
In societies torn apart by conflict all actors that strive to establish political 
authority would therefore first of all need to make use of temporary structures to 
deliberate the substance of a new common ground. Peace agreements can in this regard 
be perceived as temporary symbols that provide the formerly warring factions with 
such opportunities for public deliberation. International interventions that are based on 
Security Council mandates (which are often part of peace agreements) create a situation 
in which both local and international actors are provided with opportunities to 
deliberate the new political order. Unlike international actors who can only participate 
legitimately in this deliberation through opportunities directly tied to the mandate, local 
actors may also make use of already established institutions such as parties or the local 
media.  
Interpretative Practice 
The third analytical dimension is concerned with the interpretative practice of an 
institution. In the context of the theory of interpretative authority this practice is defined 
as the use an institution makes of an opportunity to generate authority by articulating 
an interpretation of society’s common ground. The practice is therefore strategic, but 
also limited in this intend as the interpretations are grounded in a knowledge over 
collective identity and social order that is not simply accessible to rational choice. As 
these interpretations are ‘public’ by definition, the practice is not only concerned with 
verbal statements, but also with actions that can be interpreted as statements by others.  
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Symbolic conditions, opportunities and interpretative practice are in a mutually 
constitutive relationship. The particular challenges actors in a post-conflict situation 
are faced with can again best be described by juxtaposing it with the dynamic as it 
presents itself in an established democracy: The symbol and its authoritative interpreter 
are already established in political discourse. In these strong symbolic conditions the 
interpretative practice serves to confirm and uphold this situation: In order to intervene 
in interpretative conflicts and issue an authoritative interpretation the institution can 
make use of established opportunities. 
In a post-conflict situation actors would first need to promote the status of a 
symbol as representative for society’s common ground. In order to change the symbolic 
conditions for the potential establishment of interpretative authority from uncertain to 
strong actors need to a) establish appropriate opportunities and b) engage in an 
interpretative practice that can demonstrate the superior integrative power of the 
symbol they seek to represent. They succeed in creating stronger symbolic conditions 
when their interpretative practice is being repeatedly and increasingly acknowledged 
in public. Analytically the dynamic between the three dimensions is thus that of a 
circular reinforcement.  
3.6. Summary: Consequences for the Analytical Model  
Based on the previous discussion of the theoretical assumptions and models guiding 
the analysis it is possible to argue that international and local political actors engage in 
continuous struggles over the meaning of the new institutions. These struggles evolve 
around their respective attempts to promote symbols that can serve as symbols for 
society’s common ground. In order to be acknowledged as an interpretative authority 
institutions are dependent on repeated public acknowledgement of their symbols’ 
superior status. An analysis that seeks to advance our understanding of the concrete 
practice with which interveners seek to enforce, uphold, and confirm their vision of the 
new political order in the course of a mission thus needs to depart from the symbol they 
attempt to establish at the center of the intervention society’s political discourse.  
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The Peace Agreement as a Symbol of the New Political Order 
Just like the rise of United Nations interventions in peacebuilding, the increasing 
proliferation of peace-agreements as part of the settlement of violent conflict is a 
phenomenon of the post-Cold War period (Bell 2006, 373). Bell described how these 
developments are intertwined and can be attributed to the growing internationalization 
of local conflict resolution and the resulting emphasis on building a ‘positive peace’: 
“Peace agreements have become relevant to attempts to reconstruct societies in the 
wake of interstate conflict” (Bell 2006, 373). The international interest in the settlement 
of these conflicts has also contributed to the trend of involving actors other than the 
affected parties in fixing their terms. The United Nations for instance is in many 
instances directly involved “as some type of third party to the agreement”, that is “the 
UN, a UN agency, or a UN representative was party or signatory, mediator or 
facilitator, observer, witness or negotiator to the agreement” (Bell and O’Rourke 2010, 
953).  
In the case of Cambodia the UN had been a signatory to the Paris Peace 
agreements. These agreements included a mandate that would endow the UN with all 
powers necessary to oversee their implementation. It has often been remarked that 
mandates serve as constitutions of such international state building or peacebuilding 
missions. Ndulo specifies in this regard that a mandate, defined as the “broad objectives 
and specific instructions that define, limit, and guide” such a mission determines what 
interveners “are authorized, obligated, inclined, and equipped” to do (Ndulo 2011, 
784–785).  
The conceptualization of implementation mandates as ‘guides for action’ 
depoliticizes the intervention and reduces the character of peace agreements to a list of 
unambiguous goals. Constitutions are certainly a way to organize authority, but, as 
quoted earlier, they are also a formalized way of promising each other to act together. 
Peace agreements and its related mandates do therefore establish international and local 
actors as participants in the joint project of rebuilding a political order. Rather than 
‘solving’ a conflict they alter the character of ongoing negotiations over the political 
future. As such they are guides of encompassing social changes.  
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In order to capture the dynamic of these changes in Cambodia and further our 
understanding of the impact that local and international actors had on this process the 
analysis will therefore highlight the symbolic dimension of the Paris Peace 
Agreements. As the temporary symbol of Cambodia’s new political order it took center 
stage in the country’s public political discourse for the duration of the United Nations’ 
intervention from 1992-1993. 
The International Administration as an Interpretative Authority 
International missions that are officially sanctioned by the United Nations derive their 
authority from a Security Council mandate. The procedures preceding its approval are 
designed to assure that the goals of such missions are considered to be drafted in the 
interest of the affected people and not in the interest of the foreign governments entitled 
to take these decisions. A mandate is considered to give international actors the 
authority to legitimately intervene in the internal political affairs of another country. 
The theory of interpretative authority conceives the relationship between a 
mandate and the authority of interveners in a less linear manner. Instead of 
understanding authority as something that is ‘given’ and ‘used’ in order to implement 
a mandate, it stipulates that the mandate provides interveners with the opportunity to 
generate political authority. As the theory will be applied to the UNTAC mission in 
Cambodia it is useful to briefly recall the definition of ‘symbolic conditions’. For the 
duration of the mission the Paris Peace Agreements (this includes the implementation 
mandate) symbolized Cambodia’s new political order.  
It was legitimized through the signatures of all Cambodian conflict factions and 
the support of the international community. For the duration of the mission it 
determined the international administration as its authoritative interpreter: This means 
that only UNTAC representatives were in a position to intervene legitimately in 
conflicts over the interpretation of the mandate.  
It is still not possible to speak of strong symbolic conditions for the Paris Peace 
Agreements as their validity was limited in time. Rather they entered the discourse over 
Cambodia’s new political order with a strong competitive advantage. Instead of seeing 
the power bias between international and local political actors originate in their 
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respective status as representing ‘international’ or ‘local’ knowledge, it can thus be 
described as a function of the agreements symbolic status: As long as the international 
actors succeeded in keeping the Paris Peace Agreements at the center of society’s 
deliberation over the future political order they would contribute to strengthen the 
PPA’s superior status. With regard to this strong symbol local political actors were not 
in a position to legitimately intervene in conflicts over its meaning. To establish 
themselves as potential interpretative authorities over the future political order they 
could either challenge the interveners’ interpretations of the PPA or attempt to build 
up an entirely different symbol as representative for society’s new common ground.  
The Public of an Intervention Society 
Reviews of UN interventions include almost inevitably a discussion of the missions’ 
mandate. As guides for legitimate action the individual goals mandates circumscribe 
take on the function of benchmarks: Successes and failures of a mission are evaluated 
by comparing the results to the intended outcomes, and future mission will be provided 
with an improved version that allows a wider scope of action or foresees more and 
better personnel and equipment.  
In contrast to the traditional definition of the mandate the here proposed 
function as the ‘symbol of the new political order’ encourages a more holistic view on 
mandates. The legitimacy of a mission does then not only depend on the correct and 
successful implementation of individual goals. Rather, interveners also need to succeed 
in keeping the mandate at the center of the political discourse over the future to develop 
and maintain political authority as interpretative authority. 
This conceptualization opens up two main possibilities to approach the analysis. 
In order to observe the symbolic dimension of the negotiations over the new political 
order one could attempt to observe how the different actors intervene in public 
discourse in order to strengthen their interpretative authority: This would entail the 
need to find a way to compare the respective strengths of given symbols based on the 
support they can garner. For the operationalization such an approach holds a number 
of difficulties, the main one being the availability of empirical data: ‘Support’ of a 
given symbol can only be measured in the repeated public acknowledgement of its 
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superior status. The analysis would therefore have to trace the transformation of 
societal norms and link these changes to the public deliberation of state-society 
relations during the intervention. In order to allow for a more focused approach the 
analysis builds on the second possibility: It will observe how interveners attempt to 
maintain their competitive advantage by keeping their mandate at the center of 
society’s discourse over the new political order.  
In terms of the theoretical framework this means that we will focus only on the 
public of the intervention society as constituted through the opportunities the 
interveners take or create to invite acknowledgement of the mandates superior status 
as the country’s symbol of the new political order. Because of the institutionalized 
power bias local political actors cannot simply reject or ignore such invitations: As the 
mandate has been established as the temporary symbol of society’s new common 
ground they will have to make use of given opportunities to make their own voices 
heard and present their interpretations of the future and their role in it.  
 
The discussion of the theories and theoretical assumptions allows us to argue the 
following with regard to the case at hand: With the creation of UNTAC the Paris Peace 
Agreements were institutionalized as Cambodia’s temporary symbol of the new 
political order. The Transitional Authority was given the status of its interpretative 
authority: Only they were in a position to issue legitimate statements regarding the 
nature of the new common ground as enshrined in this symbol. In order to keep the 
PPA at the center of the intervention society’s public political discourse the transitional 
authority needed to create opportunities for the local political actors to confirm its 
interpretative practice.  
Because of the radical changes in the institutional structure and the related insecurity 
over the validity and meaning of existing norms and values intervention societies are 
highly politicized: The public discourse in such a tense political atmosphere is 
relentlessly concerned with the production of knowledge over the substance and 
borders of common identity. This implies a heightened awareness for the symbolic 
dimension of political acts and engagement. Local actors that intend to obtain a position 
of power after the end of the intervention can thus not simply ignore interveners’ 
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interpretations. Rather, they have to engage with them publicly to consolidate their 
claim for interpretative authority over the new political order once the mission 
terminates. It is in these public struggles that we can discern how the Paris Peace 
Agreements shaped ideas over the new political order in Cambodia.  
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4. Methodology  
4.1. Introduction 
After decades of a debate that revolved around institutional design and best practice 
current state building literature now recognizes the benefits of integrating local actors 
and local knowledge into their strategies for a more durable peace. This has led scholars 
to approach emerging ‘non-liberal’ institutions differently: Instead of denouncing them 
as faulty or problematic they are interested in the synergetic effect of local-international 
interaction and its potential for the production of internal legitimacy.  
The literature review showed that publications that offer such alternative 
concepts are marked by two characteristics that may conceptually limit the evolving 
analytical models: They describe the power bias between international and local actors 
as one between imposers and imposed upon and they show a tendency to define ‘objects 
of negotiation’ in order to give local actors the ‘agency’ to negotiate their substance. 
In order to overcome these limits the concluding part suggested to focus on the 
symbolic dimension of their negotiations: How do actors try to enforce their visions of 
the new political order? If, as quoted earlier, anything meaningful is devised in 
language first, it merits closer attention how people come to think about the new 
institutions and what shapes their ideas and expectations of them.  
The theory part established how to limit and define the parameters of the 
intended analysis: It described the symbolic dimension as one that is concerned with 
the meaning of society-state relations. Understood as part of an intervention society 
interveners and local political actors struggle and negotiate over these meanings as they 
reform or build institutions. With the theory of interpretative authority it was further 
possible to describe an analytical model that accounts for the power bias between 
international and local actors. It draws attention to the negotiations as they take place 
in the public of an intervention society.  
As a result of the theory discussion it has been argued that in Cambodia this 
public has been created and upheld through the International Administration’s 
interpretations of the Paris Peace Agreements and the related occasions for other 
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political actors to confirm them. The research question that will guide the analysis is 
therefore: How did the Paris Peace Agreements shape ideas of the new political order 
in Cambodia? The introductory ‘how’ of the question refers to two distinct elements of 
the research project: For once, it refers to an interest in the role the agreements had in 
the process of devising an imaginary of the country’s future. In this regard, the question 
asks for the mechanisms driving this process and the possibility to capture and describe 
them with a theoretical model. And secondly, it asks for results: What kind of ideas 
developed in the context of the mission?  
Designed as a single case study the intention of the analysis is therefore to 
contribute to the discussion with a vivid example of a negotiation over the meaning of 
state-society relations as it took place in the context of the United Nations’ Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia. It proceeds inductively with the aim to refine the preliminary 
theoretical framework through observation and interpretation of the empirical material. 
The shortest way to defend this decision would be in reference to Kuhn’s statement 
that “a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a 
discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without 
exemplars is an ineffective one.”11 
As the analysis involves many more decisions taken on my part the following 
chapter will further explain and defend the case design, the operationalization of the 
analysis, and the organization of the different chapters including a detailed description 
of the empirical material each chapter is based on.  
In total the analysis draws on seven semi-structured expert interviews with 
former members of UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit (InfoEd), four 
interviews with Cambodian politicians that have participated in the UNTAC sponsored 
elections in 1993, the English translation of 10.5 hours of video recording of a Khmer 
UNTAC TV program entitled Political Roundtable Discussions produced by InfoEd in 
preparation of the elections, and internal as well as public documents related to InfoEd 
stored in two different archives: The Radio UNTAC Archive at the University of 
                                                 
11 As paraphrased an quoted by (Flyvbjerg 2006, 27) 
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Madison-Wisconsin, the collection Cambodian Election Materials, 1992-1993 stored 
at the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago.  
4.2. Case Design 
In order to denote the conceptual limits of rational choice theory Bates, Figueiredo and 
Weingast describe the difficulties its proponents have in making sense of ‘transitional 
times’. In moments of transitions  
“rules are ill-defined and symbols, emotions, and rhetoric seem to count for more than do 
interest, calculations, and guile. […] moments of transition constitute moments of 
maximal uncertainty; in moments of transition, people may therefore ‘not know’ where 
their interests lie. (1998, 605)”  
The authors argue that cases like these are best approached in an interpretative manner. 
Given that their description of a transitional moment perfectly fits the focus of my 
research, this quote provides an excellent starting point for the following debate of the 
chosen methodology. 
Andrade details that interpretative research is a subcategory of qualitative 
research. All interpretative approaches belong to this category, but not all qualitative 
research is also interpretative. Whether or not this definition applies is based on the 
researchers “ontological assumptions”. Interpretative researchers assume that “social 
reality is locally and specifically constructed ‘by humans through their action and 
interaction’” (Andrade 2009, 43)12. Epistemologically this approach therefore 
postulates that “understanding social reality requires understanding how practices and 
meanings are formed and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans 
working towards some shared goal”(Andrade 2009, 44).13 
This conceptualization of reality has consequences for the role of the 
researcher. The latter assumes that “action and events do not speak for themselves but 
instead must be interpreted” (Bates, Figueiredo, and Weingast 1998, 628). It almost 
goes without saying that this characteristic has prompted critiques to accuse the method 
                                                 
12 The author quotes several studies in each sentence to verify her statements. For better readability 
these quotes have been omitted here.  
13 Andrade quotes Orlikowski, W. J., & Baroudi, J. J. (1991). Studying information technology in 
organizations: Research approaches and assumptions. Information Systems Research, 2(1), 1-2.  
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of being unscientific in lacking “sufficient precision, objectivity, and rigour” (Andrade 
2009, 42). Even more so when the analysis is developed in a non-comparative manner, 
focusing on the dynamics of a single case.  
There is a vivid debate between a variety of ‘schools of thought’ over the limits 
of a given methodology or preference for quantitative over qualitative, constructivist 
versus rational choice etc. The intention of this chapter is not to weigh in on this subject. 
Rather it recognizes that a researcher that follows an interpretative approach has a 
particular obligation to identify the theoretical assumptions the work is based on and 
to present “the chain of evidence” (Andrade 2009, 50).  
As part of such a presentation it is necessary to make the reader aware of the 
general mode operatoire behind the design: Studies that follow an inductive, 
interpretative approach and aim at building theory proceed in a heuristic manner. “The 
theory is emergent in the sense that it is situated in and developed by recognizing 
patterns of relationships among constructs within and across cases and their underlying 
logical arguments” (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 25). Literature review, the drafting 
of the preliminary question, the preliminary theory development, data collection, and 
data analysis are followed by one or several turns during which the results of all 
previous steps are reviewed, refined and the subsequent steps adjusted. All chapters are 
therefore to a certain degree already saturated with the results of previous analysis.  
The theory chapter also constitutes part of the evidence: It laid open the general 
theoretical assumptions this work is based on. As a “sensitivizing device” it will later 
guide the analysis (Andrade 2009, 50). Social constructivism can by definition not aim 
for the establishment of a single truth. These studies are better described as the attempts 
to make a compelling argument for a different or new theoretical perspective. It should 
encourage and enable the reader to apply the same perspective to other cases. In 
defending the usefulness of single case studies, Eysenck therefore remarked that 
“sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual 
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cases – not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning 
something” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 6).14  
The case of UNTAC provides us with this opportunity for a variety of reasons: 
As the first large scale joint operation UNTAC did not have any blueprint to follow up 
on. Officers were encouraged to be creative and given quite some leeway in the 
implementation of their tasks. This was in particular the case for the Information and 
Education Unit, responsible for the management of UNTAC’s public communication. 
In almost all of the reports that followed the Transitional Authority’s withdrawal from 
Cambodia the work of this unit has been praised as outstanding. Particularly 
noteworthy is the fact that the members of InfoEd succeeded in establishing a direct 
link with the Cambodian population via Radio UNTAC – the missions very own radio 
station, broadcasting in Khmer only.  
Headed by two directors that were both fluent in Khmer InfoEd’s team equally 
included a group of young Khmer scholars, knowledgeable in the country’s troubled 
history and its political landscape. It is thanks to their personal engagement that the 
records of their work are still accessible. Stored in several archives around the world 
the documents and recordings make it possible to observe the making of a Transitional 
Authority’s public communication that is unique in its comprehensiveness and 
authenticity. 
Before presenting the operationalization of the questions that guided each 
chapter of the analysis I will now introduce the two archives that provided the main 
source for the empirical material. Included in the presentation of the results of this 
archival research is a description of the TV program Political Roundtable Discussions. 
This particular program has been broadcasted on TV and Radio UNTAC in the five 
month prior to the 1993 election with the intention to inform voters about the 20 newly 
formed political parties. The translation of this program forms the main corpus for the 
analysis of the public that UNTAC created. Thereafter, I will describe the methodology 
behind the interviews conducted with former members of the responsible Information 
                                                 
14 Quoting Eysenck, H. J. (1976) ‘Introduction’, in Eysenck (ed.), Case Studies in Behaviour Therapy. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
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and Education Unit and Cambodian politicians who competed in the UNTAC 
sponsored elections – three of which have also participated in the televised Political 
Roundtable Discussions.  
4.3. Collection of Data 
4.3.1. The Archives in the Research Process 
The work with the archives lies at the very heart of the entire research process: From 
familiarizing myself with the situation in Cambodia during the transitional year, to 
formulating my own research questions and searching for answers – the archives made 
it possible to reconstruct and interpret this decisive time of Cambodia’s political 
history.  
For almost three years I collected, catalogued, watched, read, translated, 
discussed and analyzed hundreds of records. In the process a clear picture of the 
internal politics of one particular unit of UNTAC emerged, the Information and 
Education Unit, short InfoEd: Its staff members, their role during the transitional year, 
their individual projects and the difficulties they encountered; it was even possible to 
get a sense of the professional and personal conflicts between them. Sharing and 
discussing what I had learned with others, allowed me to get in touch with several of 
the former key members and to conduct interviews with them. Finally, I was able to 
trace down members of the local political elite that these people had dealt with on a 
daily basis and hear their side of the story. 
In a social-constructivist interpretation of the work process one could therefore 
say that the archives enabled me to both ‘find’ and ‘create’ the public of UNTAC’s 
intervention society.  
Access to the Archives 
According to a popular quote of Derrida there is “no political power without control of 
the archive, if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by 
this essential criterion: the participation and the access to the archive, its constitution, 
and its interpretation” (Derrida 1996: 4). Archives are political because they allow for 
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a meaningful and critical engagement with the present, where ideas and demands for 
the future are devised. The importance of archives in the process of nation building has 
hence long been acknowledged in the field of information and archival studies and 
numerous authors have inquired into their function as loci for the formation of a 
common identity (Bastian 2001; Caswell 2011; Cunningham and Philips 2005; Onuoha 
2013).15  
The access I had to these archives can be described as exclusive. From a 
researcher’s point of view the possibility to do this type of pioneer work with records 
that had hitherto been unused in an academic context is certainly exciting. But set in 
the larger context of Cambodia’s ongoing painful efforts of nation-building in the wake 
of two decades of war this privilege of mine has to be regarded as highly problematic. 
Most UN peacekeeping mission are conducted with the explicit aim to introduce or 
stabilize democracy and give the people a meaningful role in the making of their 
country’s history. In this context, the principle of ownership is central to all UN 
activities.  
The records of this activity are not created by the UN and are hence their 
property. They are created within the intervened society and it is in this evolving society 
that they should remain.16 It is more than just a contradiction in terms that the UN 
effectively denied the same people in Cambodia they promised democracy access to 
the records documenting this decisive time in their history. Interviews and 
conversations with former UNTAC officers indicate that the UN lacked a coherent 
strategy regarding the future management of their records. While some have apparently 
been chosen to become part of the larger UN archives situated in New York, the 
majority of available documents has been saved by individual UNTAC staff members, 
                                                 
15 I am grateful to Michelle Caswell for this information and insightful discussions on the topic. 
16 With this argument I present a version of the one archival scholars have made to defend the custody 
claims of descendants of former colonial societies. With regard to the colonial archives of the British 
Virgin Islands that had been seized by the Danish and US government, Bastian argued that “although 
public records were physically created by Danish clerks and other Danish officials […] the 
functioning of those offices, as in any administrative office, indirectly reflected the transactions and 
serviced the needs of the whole society. In this respect, therefore, the records were created by and 
within the entire colonial milieu” (Bastian 2001: 111). Consequently, the descendants of this 
community can claim custody of the records. 
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who recognized and appreciated their value. In the course of my research I came across 
five important UNTAC archives, with only one of them situated in Cambodia. Two are 
in the US, and the other two in Australia and France.  
The fact that it is so easy for the political parties in Cambodia today to toy with different 
interpretations of the country’s past and to exploit the symbolic value of the Paris Peace 
Agreements according to their own needs is not simply the fault of Cambodia’s current 
regime as Western observers would often like to have it. As an organization the UN 
has certainly failed the country, when it introduced an array of new ideas but left the 
population with nothing to work with. My work with the UNTAC records should be 
evaluated in light of these arguments.  
4.3.2. The UNTAC Archives in the United States 
The archival research in both archives situation in the United States has been conducted 
in two phases. I first worked in the archives in August and September of 2011 and 
continued my research in the United States in June and July of 2012. Phase I has been 
financed as part of the DFG research project on the Institutionalization of Interpretative 
Authority in Post-Conflict Societies. The initial focus lay on the identification of non-
violent interpretative conflicts between members of the local political elite and UN 
members. In the development and the solution of these conflicts, this was the 
theoretical assumption, the actors involved were likely to voice and justify their 
respective claims for interpretative authority.  
After a preliminary analysis of the material in Germany and the subsequent 
formulation of the research question guiding this work, I returned to the US. This 
second stay was thankfully financed with the help of a grant-in-aid by the institution 
Friends of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries. This time I gathered data 
with a much narrower focus on the Political Roundtable Discussions, including the 
identification of its participants, the background of the newly founded political parties, 
their programs and relationship with UNTAC. 
 
Methodology 
 
 
59 
 
4.3.3. The Radio UNTAC Archive at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
In September 1993 the United Nations presented the University of Madison-Wisconsin 
with the complete archive of the world’s first peacekeeping radio-station: Radio 
UNTAC. To inform the Cambodian public about the work of UNTAC, and to 
encourage their participation in the making of the country’s new political order, Radio 
UNTAC had been on air for one year and broadcasted a total of 232 shows. Initially 
their audience could only listen to them for a half hour news segment each day, but the 
airtime was continuously increased. In the ‘hot phase’ before the elections they 
broadcasted non-stop for up to nine hours a day.  
After the end of the mission, the radio’s ‘complete history’, as one official 
called it in an accompanying letter, had taken on the form of 2462 paper documents, 
10 VHS tapes, 13 audio packs, 333 audio cassettes, 350 reels and 1417 digital audio 
tapes (DAT). The collection filled several huge shipping boxes. Although they arrived 
in the US only weeks after the end of the mission it would take 14 years before these 
boxes were opened and the content inventoried. In 2011 I was the first researcher, who 
visited the university in order to explore its contents with an academic interest in the 
material. Based on information given by Larry Ashmun, the head librarian for the 
Southeast Asian materials at the library, and archived documents it was possible to 
reconstruct the brief history of the archive and find a likely explanation for the long 
delay between its arrival in 1993 and its rediscovery in 2007.  
According to archived letters and faxes that had been exchanged in the days 
prior to the shipment in September 1993, John Davis, a Research Associate at the East 
Asian Legal Studies Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UWM), had 
contacted the UN and expressed interest in acquiring a series of UNTAC videos.17 
These programs had been produced in order to teach and inform the Cambodian public 
about the proceedings of the peace process as laid out in the Paris Peace Agreement. 
Davis received a positive reply and was asked if there was “the possibility of the 
University's acting as a sole repository for the archives of Radio UNTAC.” In this letter 
the archive is described as a series of DAT tapes that “will fill a standard filing 
                                                 
17 UNTAC Letter: Mr. Schotter to Mr. Davis, 1993 
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cabinet.”18 Only two days later, on August 4, 1993, the Associate Director for 
Collection Development confirmed that the UWM would accept the “offer of both the 
UNTAC video series and the audio tapes produced by Radio UNTAC.”19 This 
confirmation was followed by another fax with reference to a telephone conversation 
with Tim Carney, the Director of the Information and Education Unit, who had 
apparently “indicated that it would also be possible to get the scripts/transcripts of the 
programs.”20 The reply noted that everything that would serve to make it easier to 
understand the video’s contents would be welcome. 
As promised and arranged for, the boxes containing all the above cited material 
arrived at the Memorial Library only one month later. In the accompanying letter 
Jeffrey Heyman, Radio UNTAC's controller and a former librarian, expressed his 
happiness upon the fact that “the materials will be made available for scholarly 
research.”21 The combined material, as he put it “...represents the holdings of the radio's 
archive, and thus are a complete history of not only the United Nations' first 
peacekeeping radio station, but also of the UN-organized electoral process in 
Cambodia.” The thousands of audio and paper documents evidently demanded a much 
bigger storage room than the ‘standard filing cabinet’ originally referred to. 
Though only speculation on my part, the letter exchange seem to indicate that 
the university had postponed the question of how to adequately store and catalogue the 
archive. The opportunity of receiving more and more material presented itself in the 
course of only a few days and none of the letters describe the volume of the complete 
archive. In October 1993 the huge shipping boxes arrived in Madison. According to 
Larry Ashmun only two of the boxes had been opened in an apparent attempt to get a 
glimpse at the content while the others remained closed. Surely with the intention of 
this being a temporary solution, they were safely stored in a dark vault in the Memorial 
Library; and this is where the boxes, due to a lack of funding, resources, or interest 
stayed: Unpacked, uncatalogued and finally forgotten.  
                                                 
18 UNTAC Letter: Mr. Schotter to Mr. Davis, 1993 
19 UNTAC Fax: Mr. Pitchman to Mr. Schotter, 02. 08. 1993 
20 UNTAC Fax: Mr. Wells to Mr. Schotter, 04. 08. 1993 
21 UNTAC Letter: Mr. Heyman to Mr. Pitchman September 1993 
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In 2007, fourteen years after the boxes had been shipped over all the way from 
Cambodia, a colleague contacted Ashmun as the new head librarian of Southeast Asian 
Studies and asked him how he wished to proceed with ‘the boxes up there’. After the 
rediscovery of the forgotten archive Ashmun hired Dacil Keo, a student at the UWM, 
to compile an inventory of the huge amount of material that still sat in the original UN 
shipping boxes.  
Months of work resulted in the ‘Complete Inventory of the Radio UNTAC 
Material’, which detailed the content of the archive. As already indicated earlier, the 
UNTAC collection consists of 2462 paper documents and a total of 2100 different 
sound recording media. In the course of Keo’s work the audio and paper documents 
had been taken out of the original boxes, classified and organized and were then 
repacked in a total of 44 cardboard boxes. In its renewed form the Radio UNTAC 
Archive was once again locked in the vault of the Memorial Library.  
4.3.3.1. Organization of Research 
At the time of my research the archive was still located in the vault at the Memorial 
Library and remained uncatalogued. Keo’s inventory listed the types of paper and audio 
documents stored in the different boxes. The majority of paper documents are program 
scripts for the moderators of Radio UNTAC, which have been organized according to 
their dates of broadcast. In a first step it was therefore necessary to establish how the 
inventory related to the stored material. Given the very limited timeframe and the huge 
amount of uncatalogued material, I then conducted a brief literature research to gather 
information on Radio UNTAC and noteworthy events during the transitional period.  
Radio UNTAC was on air from 9 November 1992 until 22 September 1993. 
After identifying three possible events of conflict that coincided with this timeframe, I 
reviewed the scripts for the related programs and wrote a detailed content description 
of five boxes and 367 files. Between the end of Phase I and the start of Phase II (seven 
month later) I partially translated a Khmer transcript of the program ‘Political 
Roundtable Discussions’ into English. In Phase II I reviewed the Khmer language 
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documents and parts of the available audio material for specific information on the 
political parties competing in the first elections.  
4.3.3.2. Results 
Overall, the quality of the archived documents can be described as very good. As the 
programs had to be intensely vetted before going on air, there are several slightly 
different versions of each script. Radio UNTAC broadcasted in Khmer only. Especially 
in the start-up phase of the radio station, the scripts were nevertheless prepared in 
English and sometimes French before being translated into Khmer. Most of the scripts 
are therefore written in two languages, while the audio and video material is mainly in 
Khmer, with the exception of some interviews or other sound material gathered in 
preparation of the broadcasts.  
Radio UNTAC had been established to provide the Cambodian people with 
reliable information on the ongoing peace process. The detailed review of the program 
scripts confirmed that the daily news section was focused on the political developments 
in the country and included interviews with UN key personnel, as well as official UN 
statements and announcements. As already mentioned, the mission was unprecedented 
in many regards, one being the extensive powers accorded to UNTAC in the holding 
of the country’s elections. Unlike in previous international missions, the UN was 
mandated to organize and conduct the nationwide elections instead of only supervising 
them.  
It was one of Radio UNTAC’s most important tasks to motivate the Cambodian 
people to cast their vote despite ongoing fights between the four conflict factions. The 
program scripts reflect these efforts: the listeners are given detailed instructions on how 
to register and participate, there are statements aimed at reassuring the people of the 
secrecy of their vote, while educational programs inform them about their new rights 
and responsibilities as voters. In accordance with the United Nation’s mandated task 
of establishing a neutral political environment prior to the elections Radio UNTAC 
provided the representatives of the newly registered political parties with a forum to 
present themselves to their electorate.  
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Apart from these programs dedicated to the mission and its tasks, Radio UNTAC also 
broadcasted reports on the overall development in Cambodia and the lives of its people. 
These particular program scripts include interviews with Cambodian entrepreneurs, 
reports about schools, hospitals or health organizations and a section dedicated to arts 
and culture in Cambodia. Several educational programs present mine-awareness 
campaigns, or provide the listeners with information on how to prevent common 
diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and dengue fever.  
With regard to the project’s objective to analyze authority building processes 
the program scripts were of great interest as they clearly reflected UNTAC’s efforts to 
establish a ‘neutral voice’ in order to intervene in the political discourse. They did 
however, not contain any information that would have allowed to draw conclusions 
regarding the authority building strategies of the local political actors. Interviews with 
Cambodian officials or representatives of the new parties, as well as programs that gave 
them a forum to express their political agenda were simply announced in the script by 
means of a brief headline but not transcribed. The search for original statements by 
Cambodian politicians became therefore quickly a priority.  
Through the literature research and document review I identified two programs 
that had been designed with the intention to give the representatives of the new parties 
an opportunity to present themselves: Equal time, Equal Access and The Political 
Roundtable Discussions. Radio UNTAC recorded all of its life broadcasts on digital 
audio tapes (DAT). With the program scripts it was possible to identify the dates on 
which these programs had been broadcasted, as well as the respective time slots. 
Unfortunately, a DAT player was unavailable at this and other contacted universities, 
so that I could neither listen to, nor digitize this audio material.  
In response to my account of these problems Ashmun made me aware of a 
collection of UNTAC videotapes at the UWM (the very tapes, as I would find out later, 
which had initially been requested and were thus responsible for the new home of the 
entire radio station). Unlike the paper and audio material, these videotapes had been 
cataloged and integrated in one of the libraries main collection. The titles of two sets 
of recordings turned out to be ‘Equal Time, Equal Access’ and ‘Political Roundtable 
Discussions’. On our request, the Digital Media Center at the UWM began to digitize 
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these videotapes and provided me with a digital copy upon my return to Germany after 
Phase I. 
Due to the limited time frame it had not been possible to review a collection of 
Khmer documents in a box marked ‘Miscellaneous’ on site. It included among others 
Khmer newspapers, UN information material on the electoral process, a Khmer version 
of the Paris Peace Agreements and what appeared to be a small collection of programs 
and information material prepared by the new Cambodian parties.  
During the review of this material in Germany, I discovered the complete 
Khmer transcript of the first Political Roundtable Discussions. The topic of this 
particular program was National Reconciliation. Phase II of the archival research was 
conducted with the aim to gather material that would complement this transcript. 
Because of the video material, I already knew that UNTAC had organized four rounds 
of roundtable discussions. A search for transcripts of the remaining three roundtables 
in the archive remained unsuccessful. As the UNTAC literature centers on the former 
conflict factions and mentions the other parties only in passing, it was of particular 
importance to collect material with information on those new contenders. For this 
purpose I focused on the open reel and audio tapes in the collection.  
These record mediums mostly contain sound material gathered in preparation 
of the programs, including the recordings of interviews with UN officials or 
Cambodian party representatives, programs of foreign broadcast stations, such as VOA 
or BBC, as well as jingles. The audio material had been organized according to the type 
of the recording medium, as the labels contain only scarce information on the content 
of the individual tapes. In all of the tapes I chose and listened to the sound quality had 
significantly suffered, probably due to the long storage time. Only 45 tapes contained 
statements by Cambodian politicians in an acceptable sound quality.  
During Phase I and Phase II a total of 367 files, 45 audiotapes and 8 videotapes had 
been chosen for further analysis and transformed into pdf files and digital audio and 
video formats.  
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4.3.4. Stephen Heder Collection. Cambodian Election Materials 1992-1993 at the 
Center for Research Libraries, Chicago 
Among Cambodian scholars Stephen Heder is well known for his extensive knowledge 
on the Khmer Rouge. In the wake of the war he conducted hundreds of interviews with 
refugees, defectors and soldiers. Based on his findings he authored the influential study 
‘Seven Candidates for Prosecution’ together with Brian Tittermore (Heder and 
Tittemore 2001). Due to his expertise on the matter he had also been called as a witness 
during the Khmer Rouge trial at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia 
(ECCC). During UNTAC, he served as the Deputy Director for the Information and 
Education Unit.  
His collection entitled ‘Cambodian Election Materials, 1992-1993’ includes 
analysis reports on the political development in Cambodia’s different provinces, 
documents with background information on the central institutions of the transitional 
authority, such as the Supreme National Council (SNC) and the political parties, letter 
exchanges between UNTAC’s key personnel and Cambodia’s political elite and UN 
strategy documents. In total this collection represents important topics of InfoEd’s 
internal communication during the year of the intervention.  
The scanned documents were saved on 595 microfiches, with each of these 
fiches containing up to 24 individual pages. Currently, the fiches are in the possession 
of the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago. Member organizations can consult the 
online catalogue of the collection to order the fiches. The catalogue lists the content of 
the archive as organized in five boxes and gives the titles of individual fiches or 
thematic sets, such as ‘Sihanouk’, ‘Media Reports’ or ‘UNTAC Unfair’ of up to 13 
fiches in alphabetic order. The research library also provides microfiche reader for 
researchers who wish to work with its collections in Chicago. In this case, the fiches 
have to be ordered in advance.  
4.3.4.1. Organization of Research  
I chose and secured files of Heder’s collection in two phases. Once at the Center for 
Research Libraries in Chicago during a two week stay following the archival research 
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at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The second time, Ashmun ordered a subset 
of fiches to the UWM. In order to save the data on the microfiches the individual 
documents have to be marked, scanned and saved in a picture format. This process 
requires a special microfiche reader and is extremely time consuming.  
The research during Phase I was still tentative in nature and mainly geared 
towards finding reports on non-violent conflicts between UN members and Cambodian 
actors. Most of the documents I scanned at the Center for Research Libraries are 
therefore UNTAC Analysis Reports or belonged to thematic sets, such as ‘UNTAC 
Unfair’, or ‘Constitution’.  
During Phase II I reviewed the online catalogue for documents that would 
complement my work with the roundtable videos. These were in particular fiches with 
background information on the new parties and the electoral process. Instead of 
scanning the individual pages with a reader, all ordered microfiche were copied with a 
special copy machine at Memorial Library.  
The process of scanning and converting the saved data was postponed in order 
to save time for the work with the Radio UNTAC Archive while in Madison. Due to 
the time restraints the work with the Heder Archive was focused on securing as much 
of the chosen data as possible. All of the material had to be converted and reviewed in 
Germany.  
4.3.4.2. Results  
While the Radio UNTAC Archive is by and large a collection of work results, the Heder 
Archive represents UN policy strategies in the making. The Information and Education 
Unit was responsible for the supervision of the media sector. It monitored the 
Cambodian media and its members conducted field research to obtain a broader picture 
of the perception the Cambodian people and political actors had of the peace process. 
Based on their findings they produced their own media coverage of the mission and 
informed all other units about perceived problems related to UNTAC’s image and 
work. By means of the circulated memos, reports, letters, drafts and discussion papers 
it is possible to reconstruct important decision making processes. 
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Through mediums like Radio UNTAC the United Nations tried to present 
themselves as exactly this, namely a united actor with a coherent strategy and one 
voice. With Heder’s collection this impression can be deconstructed as the documents 
reveal the heterogenic nature of the policy making processes within the units and the 
different ideas and interests driving the strategies behind the scenes.  
For the research at hand this material is of particular importance as it became 
evident that the internal communication is clearly guided and structured by diverse 
interpretations of the UN mandate as formulated in the Paris Peace Agreements. The 
reactions of Cambodian officials regarding the different measures taken by the UN are 
conveyed through various letter exchanges between the UN and the local political elite. 
In the majority of these letters the Cambodian actors criticize UNTAC and challenge 
their authority. Equally important for the analysis are several files that compile detailed 
information on the new parties and their representatives, as well as preparatory 
documents for the roundtables with a commented draft of the topics and questions. 
All of these documents could only be identified after converting and cataloging 
the data. This work has been done by my research assistant Laura Vollmann. The first 
set of material, secured during the work at the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago, 
consisted of tif-files. These individual pages had to be first converted into one-page 
pdf-files and then remerged to complete documents. The second set of material 
consisted of microfiches, which had to be subjected to the complete process of scanning 
and converting. The pdf documents were then catalogued, by assigning a number to 
each fiche and each document. The fiches kept the title as listed in the original 
catalogue and additionally the new catalogue listed the title of each document and, if 
possible, a date indicating when the respective document had been created. In total, the 
work with the Heder Archive resulted in 1551 documents and a corresponding 92 page 
catalogue.  
4.3.5. The Transcript of the Political Roundtable Discussions  
The Political Roundtable Discussions are an UNTAC produced TV program that aired 
from late December to early May 1993 – and thus during the five months of the 
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transitional year that has been described as the most intense ones by many observers. 
Cambodia’s first democratic elections took place in May 1993. The Information and 
Education Unit had produced the program to inform the voters about the new political 
parties. Each week an UNTAC representative welcomed four party representatives that 
were invited to present the audience with two minute answers to a set of three prepared 
questions. All 20 newly registered party participated in the program. Altogether 
UNTAC produced a set of four Roundtables dedicated to different subjects: National 
Reconciliation, Human Rights, Economy and National Constitution.  
The half-hour recordings of these shows were broadcasted via TV and Radio 
UNTAC. Only very few people in Cambodia had access to a TV set, but thanks to a 
concerted donation campaign initiated by the Japanese government a huge number of 
radios had been distributed all over the country. Notes in the archived program script 
indicate that the roundtables have been replayed at least twice a week. Additionally the 
Electoral and the Human Rights Unit were provided with video tapes to show the 
recordings at village gatherings throughout the country. The videotapes of the Political 
Roundtable Discussions archived at the University of Wisconsin-Madison contained 
10.5 hours of recording. A complete Khmer transcript of the program existed only for 
the first series of roundtables. According to the introduction of this transcript it had 
been prepared with the intention to be distributed. I could not establish if this has ever 
been the case.  
The translation process was therefore preceded by cataloging and transcribing 
the available video material with the help of Hang Chan Sophea, my Cambodian 
research assistant during two field research trips to Cambodia. Based on the videos we 
had to establish the title of each recording, in which order the individual sessions had 
been broadcasted and who participated in each session.  
The individual roundtables were always introduced by a brief jingle and the generic 
title of the program ‘Political Roundtable Discussions’. Neither the subject of the 
roundtable (Human Rights, Economy etc.) nor the number of the session to each of 
these subjects (discussion of group number 1, 2, 3 etc.) were given in the title. These 
information had were derived from the brief introduction by the moderator representing 
UNTAC at the beginning of each session. During the introduction, the camera zoomed 
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in on the nametags in front of each representative, including the symbol of the party. 
These information were used to allocate the names and symbols of all 20 competing 
parties. Hang Chan Sophea then wrote the full Khmer transcript of the remaining three 
roundtable sessions. 
Chapter 6.4 of the analysis is based on my translation of these transcripts. The 
text comprises a total of 226 pages. To my knowledge this translation represents the 
only available non-Khmer language record of the programs and ideas that the 
representatives of all 20 competing parties voiced during UNTAC. 
 
4.3.6. Interviews 
The focus of my research lay on the attempts of the international administration to 
strengthen the symbolic status of the Paris Peace Agreements. As such it was important 
to understand the reasoning behind a given interpretative practice. The interviews with 
the former InfoEd members were conducted to this end. To better understand the effects 
that the international actors’ claims had on their relationship with the local political 
actors it was, however, important to reduce the bias inherent in the available material: 
The majority of archived materials represent intervention policies through the lens of 
international actors. In order to obtain a more unfiltered perspective interviews with 
the former Cambodian election competitors were included in the research. The 
following pages documents the methodology behind the contact strategies and the 
design of the interviews.  
4.3.6.1. Type of Interview Partners and Contact Strategies 
The choice of interview partners was determined through selective sampling. Here, 
interview partners are chosen on the basis of preliminary research that identified them 
as people with a specific, thematic expertise. For the purpose of the analysis it was 
important to conduct interviews with members of two different groups: 1) Former 
members of UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit, preferably those actively 
involved in the making and the distribution of the Political Roundtable Discussions and 
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2) Cambodian representatives of the parties, who participated in the UNTAC sponsored 
elections; again preferably those, who had also participated in the Political Roundtable 
Discussions. The members of the two groups have been approached with different 
strategies, taking into account the political development and the personal careers of the 
prospective interview partners. Both the preparation and the actual conduct of the 
interviews took place during the two field research trips to Cambodia in 2011 and 2012. 
Annex III provides a table with all statistical details of the interviews, i.e. the dates, 
type, length, language and place of these interviews.  
 
Establishment of Contact to Former Members of UNTAC 
In order to maximize the response rate from potential interview partners it is always 
helpful to be introduced by a mutual acquaintance. This all the more so, if the topic of 
the interview is considered controversial and the interviewer can’t offer the partner 
anything in return for the risk he or she may take. In the context of my field research 
the necessity to build trust through a viable third party occurred mainly when 
attempting to contact the former Cambodian politicians. But this two-step-strategy 
proved also helpful when contacting the former UNTAC personnel. I was either 
introduced via email or contacted potential interview partner with reference to these 
mutually known colleagues or friends. All seven contacted former UN members agreed 
to an interview. The success of this contact strategy was likely also due to the fact that 
none of the prospective interview partners continued to work in a crucial position in 
the UN apparatus, or in any other positions that might have restricted their willingness 
to discuss their experiences during UNTAC. The time in between the establishment of 
the first mutual contact to the day of the actual interview averaged six month.  
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Establishment of Contact to Former Competitors in the UNTAC Elections 
As might be expected it was far more demanding and time consuming to establish the 
contact to the former Cambodian representatives who participated in the UNTAC 
elections. These difficulties can be mainly assigned to two reasons:  
1. Incoherent representation of names  
Potential interview partners were first identified because of their participation in the 
Political Roundtable Discussions. A considerable number of these representatives did 
not continue their political career. As the recorded program was in Khmer only, the 
names of the representatives were also only featured in Khmer writing. There is no 
standard system for the Romanization of the Khmer alphabet, and names are usually 
romanized according to the sound of the consonant and vowels when pronounced. It 
adds to the problem that roman letters represent different sounds in different languages. 
22 To give an example: The letter J represents the same sound for a German native 
speaker, as the letter Y or the letter combination IE does for an English or French native 
speaker.  
Therefore, even the sound of a simple name like អ ៀង មូលី can be represented 
by a vast number of different spellings and combinations of the first and last name: 
Ieng / Jeng / Iang / Yeng // Muli / Muly / Mulie / Mouli etc. This greatly complicated 
the research of the whereabouts of those representatives that had not pursued a political 
or otherwise public career successfully. Most of the relevant information was therefore 
found by searching the original name on the homepages of Khmer language 
newspapers or blogs.  
2. Current position and political affiliation of the prospective interview 
partner 
To successfully formulate interview requests it was of great importance to not only 
research the current position of the prospective interview partner, but also the career 
                                                 
22  The transliteration system developed by Huffman (1970) has acquired the status of a standard 
reference among English speaking Khmer scholars. The majority of them work with their own slight 
adaptations of Huffman’s design though. 
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steps leading up to this position. The interviews were to be conducted with the specific 
aim to learn more about the experiences of the former representatives in the 1993 
elections. As the changes that came with the intervention continue to determine the 
political situation in the country today, it was likely that the professional and political 
biography of the former party representatives would influence their readiness to talk 
about their past statements due to:  
Changing Party Affiliations 
Party affiliations have a very short durability in Cambodia. Since the UN sponsored 
elections in 1993 the career of most successful politicians involved a position in two or 
more different parties. This is either due to their individual decisions (often because of 
inner party quarrels), or a result of their forced re-orientation after parties’ dissolution. 
A case in point is the career of Pol Ham, who participated in the 1993 Roundtable 
Discussions as a representative for the Buddhist Liberal Democracy Party (BLDP). 
This party was dissolved in 1997. The above mentioned Ieng Mouly (this being the 
standard spelling of his name) had served as the vice president of this party. Subsequent 
to the dissolution of the BLDP he founded a new party – the Buddhist Liberal Party 
(BLP) – and was hence the leader of those members loyal to him. The supporters of the 
former BLDP leader Son Sann, among them Pol Ham, became members of the newly 
created Son Sann Party (SSP).  
Both the BLP and the SSP failed in the 1998 elections. Over the course of the 
next 14 years Pol Ham became a UN official, held the position of the speaker for the 
Human Rights Party (HRP), founded in 2009, and is now the Second Vice Chairman 
of the National Salvation Party – product of a merger between the HRP and the Sam 
Rainsy Party in 2012. The difficult career paths of the prospective interview partners 
had to be reconstructed as they influenced the decision on whether or not it was 
worthwhile to invest time in the establishment of contact. In the case of Pol Ham the 
decision was taken in favor of contacting him.  
Though he held different positions in different parties, his affiliation with the 
BLDP in 1993 and his current position are still the expression of a somewhat coherent 
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political stance: His political messages then and now are rather consistent. Ieng Mouly 
on the other hand, would not have liked to be reminded of his past representative 
function for the BLDP. His actions in 1997 were widely regarded as a betrayal of his 
fellow party members, leading to the break-up of this party.23 In his case the decision 
thus fell against the attempt to contact him.  
A considerable number of politicians who represented a party other than the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in 1993 have since joined the ruling party or became 
otherwise affiliated with the government. Given the tense political situation in the 
country and the strong party control it was rather difficult to contact those former 
roundtable participants: They don’t have anything to gain from an interview, but a lot 
to lose. They might also not be inclined to put themselves in a situation that might lead 
to questions about their decisions behind joining the ruling party.  
No Viable First-Contact Person  
Unsurprisingly, the careers of the two representatives for the Cambodian People’s 
Party in 1993, who is governing the country since the UN sponsored elections, were 
comparatively easy to reconstruct: Sok An has steadily climbed up the CPP’s career 
ladder. In 2012 he held the position of Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia. Sar Kheng, 
who also participated in the Roundtable Discussions, had since become the Minister of 
Interior and was also among the six CPP cadres who held the position of Deputy Prime 
Minister in 2012. In both cases their stable political affiliation would allow for an 
interview centered on their experiences in the 1993 election, but in order to contact 
them with a request such it would have been necessary to be introduced by an equally 
high-ranking politician or other close acquaintance. This was not possible in the rather 
short time frame of the field research.  
 
                                                 
23 Barber, Jason. 1995. “Mouly’s History: The Disputes That Split a Party.” Phnom Penh Post, 
September 22. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/moulys-history-disputes-split-party. Last 
accessed on 4th February, 2015 
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Turnout of Contacts with Members of Group 2 
This first review of prospective Cambodian interview-partner was followed by the 
establishment of a list with five possible interview partners and as many different 
contacting strategies. In all cases a letter was prepared and sent via email to the 
prospective interview partner: Either through the personal first-contact person, or, if an 
email address was available, directly to the respective person. The letter outlined the 
research interest and the focus of the interview. It highlighted that the person would be 
interviewed in its role as a former participant in the UNTAC elections. It further 
indicated that I was particularly interested in his motivation to participate in the first 
elections and his experiences during the campaign in 1993. Of the five former 
representatives two declined and three agreed to an interview. Additionally, I was 
provided with the contact details of another potential interview partner, who agreed. 
 As a general rule the strategy to establish contact through another first-contact 
person, who introduced or recommended me, proved to be the most successful strategy.  
4.3.6.2. Methodology of Interviews  
Based on the preliminary research and the selective sampling strategy all interviews 
were prepared as semi-structured expert interviews. The interview partners were 
therefore not predominantly addressed in their function as representatives of a given 
group. Rather, it was the aim of the questions to learn more about their perspectives on 
a specific matter and benefit from their thematic expertise. All interviews relied on a 
combination of communication strategies:  
“Strategies which generate story-telling: entering into a conversation, general explorations 
and ad-hoc questions; and [strategies] which generate understanding: specific explorations 
with elements of references to previous answers, questions directed toward understanding 
and confrontation” (Witzel 2000)  
These strategies translate into different types of questions. The interviews were guided 
by a set of approximately twelve leading questions and a subset of ten follow-up 
questions. With one exception the interview partners were not provided with these 
questions in advance. In order to prepare for the interview they were, however, given 
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an overview on the topics I intended to address; either via email or during brief 
preparatory conversations.  
Interviews with former members of UNTAC’s InfoEd 
The preparation of these interviews was greatly facilitated by the fact that many of the 
former InfoEd members had written articles or even books about their experiences 
during UNTAC. In them they detail their impressions of the peace process and describe 
a number of incidents and observations that were deemed useful for the analysis. 
Strategy-wise these interviews were therefore predominantly geared towards 
‘understanding’. I attempted to build a coherent picture of the considerations behind 
the design of the Political Roundtable Discussions and the interaction between 
international and local actors during these events. As such the questions were mostly 
procedural and factual oriented and contained a number of cross-references. Heder, 
Marston and Roberts provided information on the translation of the neutrality principle 
in communication strategies, Guillou described the perspective of the UNTAC 
moderator, Heyman gave an account of the difficulties in getting TV and Radio 
UNTAC on air, and Abric provided me with details on the writing of the program script 
and the setting of the scene.  
Interviews with former participants in the UNTAC elections 
The available literature on the transitional year in Cambodia contains next to no 
information on the perceptions of the local political actors. The design of the interviews 
with former participants in the elections has therefore been adapted to learn more about 
the motivation of the contenders and their experience of this decisive year. Instead of 
focusing on factual details or technicalities the questions were therefore developed with 
the intent to generate story-telling. This means the leading questions allowed the 
interview partners to talk freely about his experiences and express his perspective on a 
given issue.  
The fact that the events of interest lay 20 years in the past had to be considered 
in the formulation of the questions. Allowing the interview partner to connect to his or 
Methodology 
 
 
76 
 
her emotions and to revive vivid memories of the past is of particular importance during 
in-depth interviews. Some of the techniques used in this type of interview were 
therefore integrated in the design, for instance the ‘trigger-function’ of the opening 
question. The opening question is considered crucial when conducting in-depth 
interviews. It is supposed to set the frame for the following questions, allow the 
interview partners to ‘travel back in time’, visualize the situation and relate to their 
emotions at the time. A good opening question can thereby provide the interviewer 
with hints regarding the interview partners’ attitude towards the described events, 
rather than just a description of the events themselves.  
In the time leading up to the UN mission Cambodia was divided between the 
four different conflict factions and the fighting between them continued. Many people 
had sought refuge at the border to Thailand and Vietnam because they did not agree 
with the Vietnam backed State of Cambodia (SoC) under Hun Sen. His government 
was also referred to as the ‘Phnom Penh side’, while the leaders of the three opposition 
parties were often abroad, pleading for the support of the international community in 
order to end what they perceived of as a foreign occupation of the country. In addition 
many Cambodians, who had fled the country during or shortly after the Pol Pot regime, 
had closely observed the fate of Cambodia from abroad, ready to go back if the time 
proved right.  
The registration documents of the newly founded parties in 1992 confirm that 
the majority of them had been established by Cambodians with French or American 
citizenship. In other words: The whereabouts of a Cambodian politicians in the early 
90s sheds light on his political affiliation and memories of this particular time period 
are bound to be a trigger for emotions, as it was then that those people were 
reconstituting their lives in the light of the political developments in Cambodia. Based 
on these considerations the opening question for the Cambodian interview partners 
was: The mission and everything that followed was determined by the Paris Peace 
Agreement, which is being referred to as fundament, basis or formula [in Khmer] 
throughout the mission. What did you do, the day the Paris Peace Agreements were 
signed? As expected all interview partners did indeed remember clearly what they did 
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or where they were at this moment and the information contained in their answer paved 
the way for further focused inquiries.  
To help the interview partners to remember specific situations or details of a 
certain issue they were presented with archive material during the interview – original 
quotes from politicians, excerpts from letters or documents, as well as the transcripts 
and excerpts from the roundtable videos etc. This proved to be very helpful. Pol Ham 
for instance was only able to give a more precise account of his participation in the 
1993 Political Roundtable Discussions, after we had watched an outtake of his 
performance on video.  
The interview was conducted in two parts: The first part was concerned with 
their experiences during the mission, while the second part focused on the roundtable 
discussions itself. In order to ‘thicken the plot’ the second part did therefore contain a 
number of cross-references. Guillou for instance had described the situation during the 
roundtable discussion as “tense” and stated that the organization of these roundtables 
constituted the “breaking of a taboo”. Her statements were repeated and the interview 
partners asked, whether or not they agreed with this description.  
In order to uphold a dialogue throughout the interview and create the atmosphere of a 
deep and engaged conversation rather than an interview in which questions are ticked 
off, all other questions were also formulated with the intention to provoke emotions 
and memories and keep the interview partner talking.  
Questions were discarded when the interview partner had already given enough 
information on a specific subject. Technical details were clarified with short questions 
during the interview, and all statistical questions regarding the position and the 
interview partners’ careers were posed at the end in order to not disrupt the narrative 
character of the interview. To establish if the respective person also qualified as a first-
contact to other prospective interview partners they were usually provided with the 
Khmer name list of Cambodian representatives who had participated in the Roundtable 
Discussions (in many cases the whereabouts of them could not be established via 
internet research, due to the above described problems.) Additionally they were directly 
asked for the details of one or two specific persons when the preliminary research had 
Methodology 
 
 
78 
 
already revealed a professional or personal relationship of another participant to the 
interview partner. 
The interview was designed for the time period of one hour. A number of short 
notes and back-up questions had been prepared to facilitate the continuation of the 
interview in case it would become clear that the interview partner was willing to stay 
longer. After two hours maximum the interview was always closed: Previous 
experience shows that the professional atmosphere and framework of an expert 
interview is hard to maintain after this time limit and that the statements – because the 
partners tend to censor themselves less carefully – become increasingly difficult to use 
as quotes without making the interview partner feel as if he or she was caught ‘off 
guard’. This is also evidenced by the fact that the number of statements introduced as 
‘off record’ by the interview partner increases significantly after 1.5 hours.  
 
Securing of Data 
The securing of data was greatly facilitated by the fact that all interview partners agreed 
to have their statements recorded with an audio-device. Only in one case no recording 
device was used because he background noise was too severe. Here, notes were taken 
during the interview and formed the basis of a detailed protocol that was written with 
no delay directly after the interview so as to remember the statements she made as 
genuinely as possible. All other interviews were secured as transcripts.  
4.3.6.3. Brief Evaluation of the Chosen Strategy and Methodology 
In hindsight both, the strategy for the establishment of contact and the chosen 
methodology for the interview, can be considered very successful. Given the 
difficulties resulting from the tense political situation in the country prior to 
Cambodia’s 2013 parliamentarian elections, the time-consuming pre-research that was 
necessary to establish contact, and the limited time frame for field research in 
Cambodia the number of Cambodian representatives that agreed to an interview on this 
sensitive topic turned out to be much higher than expected. The same holds true for the 
interviews with the international members of the UN mission. Here, the turnout had a 
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100% success rate, and the interview partners continued to provide me with useful 
information on further archives or interview partners. Taken together the interviews 
did not only help to clarify all the contextual details required for an in depth analysis 
of the Political Roundtable Discussions, but they also allowed for the assemblage of a 
vivid picture of the hopes and expectations that fueled the preparation of Cambodia’s 
1993 elections for both sides – the international community and the new Cambodian 
political elite. 
4.3.7. Analysis and Organization of Chapters  
The theoretical framework stipulates an interdependence between three different 
dimensions: The symbolic conditions, the opportunities, and the interpretative practice. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 the analysis intends to focus on the attempts of the 
international authority to strengthen the status of the Paris Peace Agreements as the 
country’s symbol of the new political order. The translation of UNTAC’s Political 
Roundtable Discussion forms the main corpus of analysis. Additionally the analysis 
draws on the results of the archival and field research to evaluate and contextualize the 
interpretative practice of the Transitional Authority and the local political actors. 
Chapter 6.1 will provide the reader with a brief evaluation of the Paris Peace 
Agreements’ status as a symbol of Cambodia’s new political order. The focus of the 
analysis will lie on the competition between the Transitional Authority and the political 
parties over the meaning of the new institutions. This competition is geared towards 
the Cambodian people as their decisive audience. Designed as a background chapter to 
the main analysis Chapter 6.1 will therefore evaluate the structure of public political 
discourse in Cambodia and assess how the wider population could perceive of the 
PPA’s central promise, namely to establish a ‘liberal, pluralist democracy’. 
Based on the theoretical framework the categories of the main analysis are 
defined as opportunities and interpretative practice. The research interest further 
determined that the interaction between international and local actors will be assessed 
with a focus on the efforts of the Transitional Authority to use its competitive advantage 
as the Agreements’ authoritative interpreter to promote a particular vision of the new 
political order. Following an interpretative approach the analysis of the Political 
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Roundtable Discussions faced the following challenges: The main categories 
(opportunity, interpretative practice) used to approach the analysis are themselves 
already the result of an interpretation. It was therefore necessary to further determine 
the categories as an expression of this foregoing interpretative process. The challenge 
here was to obtain categories that are precise enough to structure the material, but still 
open enough to guide the subsequent analysis. As all of the TA’s practice has to be 
relatable to the PPA to present itself as legitimate, Chapter 6.3 establishes how the 
Information and Education Unit interpreted its mandate to define its policy strategies. 
This preliminary analysis allows us to argue that the Roundtables are an opportunity 
for the TA to promote their vision by establishing rules of procedural and discursive 
neutrality aimed at focusing the debate over the new political order on the PPA. The 
theory stipulates that UNTAC is dependent on others’ expressed acknowledgement. 
All of the procedures and rules that UNTAC set in place are thus analyzed with regard 
to their potential to incite such acknowledgement by the local political actors. In its 
entirety the program reflects UNTAC’s efforts to discipline the political discourse over 
the new political order.  
The expressed aim of the analysis is to understand how the Paris Peace 
Agreements shaped ideas of the new political order. It is based on the theoretical 
assumption that the state is a social product. That means, it is the result of continuous 
societal struggles over the meaning of its institutions and their role in defining the 
relationship between society and the state. Set in the context of an intervention society 
the Transitional Authority is considered to be involved in these struggles. This in turn 
implies a competitive relationship with the local political actors, who are bound to react 
to the TA’s implicit entitlement to define their political future. In order to capture this 
symbolic dimension of their engagement, it was necessary to establish how the 
interpretative practice of international and local actors relate. This analysis proceeds in 
two parts: Chapter 6.4.1 will focus on the struggles over the rules of procedural 
neutrality, while Chapter 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 will analyze the local political actors’ 
discursive behavior under the restrictions of discursive neutrality.  
Both chapters are based on the same basic pattern to guide the analysis: 
Procedures and rules set in place by UNTAC are defined in their relation to the PPA. 
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In a second step the analysis evaluates them as a statement on the proposed nature of 
the new political order. Finally, the analysis evaluates the attempts of local political 
actors to confirm, reject or re-interpret the validity of a given statement. As expressions 
of the local actors’ own attempts to develop interpretative authority it is in the 
justifications of their decision to confirm, reject, or reinterpret the claims of the 
Transitional Authority that we can discern the symbolic dimension of the ongoing 
negotiation over the meaning of the political reforms. 
The following Chapter 5 will review the Cambodian conflict history. This 
chapter and the analysis in Chapter 6.1 show that the intended establishment of a 
‘liberal, multiparty democracy’ triggered the greatest insecurity in regard to the 
relations between the people and their government, between the political actors 
competing for power, and between Cambodia and foreign states. Promoting a vision of 
the new political order and developing interpretative authority was therefore very much 
dependent on the political actors’ potential to present a convincing image of the way 
in which these groups of actors and the people relate. The individual cases presented 
in Chapter 6.4.3 all follow this basic structure and contain brief concluding remarks 
that relate the results to the larger theoretic framework.  
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5. History  
“This 30th of July 1989 is, for the Cambodian people who have suffered 
for many years, a historical day, because it marks without doubt the 
beginning of the genuine peace and freedom process for itself and the 
return of Cambodia to full and complete independence, in its territorial 
integrity.” 
Norodom Sihanouk  
”Le conflit au Cambodge a duré déjà presque vingt ans, provoquant des 
pertes considérables en vies humaines, des souffrances inimaginables, des 
séparations déchirantes de plusieurs millions de familles et des 
destructions qui ont plongé le pays dans la ruine totale, plus 
particulièrement quand le Cambodge tombait sous le régime génocide de 
Pol Pot. C’est là l’essence même et la nature du problème cambodgien.”  
Hun Sen  
5.1. Introduction 
Anybody familiar with the devastating conflict in Cambodia will immediately 
recognize that the contentious issue keeping it alive for so many years is very well 
captured in these two quotes above – both of them opening lines of the respective 
speeches at the 1989 Paris Peace Conference (Acharya et al. 1991). The issue being: 
Has Cambodia been invaded and occupied by Vietnam, or are the Vietnamese troops 
supporting the incumbent Cambodian government against the threat of yet another 
bloody Khmer Rouge revolution?  
Though many actors and nations had their share of responsibility in the 
longevity of Cambodia’s conflict, as with every other war there were only two sides to 
choose from. As a result, those, who called each other allies, had often little more in 
common than their contempt for the other side. Shifting geopolitical and local ties had 
fostered the peculiar alliance between the royalist Front Uni National pour un 
Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) under Prince 
Sihanouk, the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) headed 
by their charismatic leader Son Sann and the infamous communist Khmer Rouge, 
responsible for the death of millions of Cambodians during their few years of reign 
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from 1975 until 1979. United in an exile government, they had declared it their goal to 
oust the ruling People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime under Heng Samrin 
and Hun Sen, which had been installed with the support of Vietnam. Together with 
their Cambodian allies Vietnam had led the joint invasion of Cambodia that 
successfully toppled the Khmer Rouge on January 7, 1979 – the day that would 
alternatively come to be referred to as the day of Cambodia’s liberation, or the 
beginning of Vietnamese occupation.  
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1989 representatives of all four Cambodian 
factions and 18 other nations met in Paris under the auspices of the United Nations to 
find a durable solution to the conflict in Cambodia. The conference lasted a month and 
is well documented by a collection of the actors’ opening addresses, final statements, 
and the written communication that had been circulated within the four committees 
dealing with the different elements of the peace process. On October 23rd 1991 the 
actors’ compromise was finally codified in the Paris Peace Agreements. With their 
signature the Cambodian actors committed themselves to transition peacefully to a 
pluralist, liberal democracy under the guidance of a United Nations Transitional 
Authority. The large-scale intervention, culminating in the county’s first nationwide 
free, democratic elections, would take place from February 1992 until September 1993. 
After 20 years of an ongoing war, fought with heavy international involvement and 
resulting in an immense loss of lives the signing of the agreements was considered a 
great historic moment. When the representatives of the four Cambodian factions, the 
United Nations and 18 other nations put down their names on October 23rd in Paris, 
relieved commentators around the world expressed their hopes that this may finally 
constitute the end of the long war and the beginning of a peaceful, prosperous and more 
just future.  
As Cambodian history has proven to be a great disappointment for most of the 
population and international onlookers alike, today only few will assert that 1991 
marked a significant change in the life of the Cambodian people. More often the Paris 
Agreements are being referred to as a broken promise or a great chance that was missed. 
It is of course not the event itself that has changed, but the place and its significance 
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for Cambodian history it is being attributed with by the Cambodian people and the 
international community.  
Looking back from present times, one can see that the international perception 
of Cambodia is very much determined by two apparent ‘breaks’ in its history: The 
Khmer Rouge genocide and the UN international intervention with its promise of 
democracy. This selective interested is evidenced by the amount of literature that has 
been produced to explain what is ultimately presented as the never-ending ‘tragedy of 
Cambodian history’.  
There are on one hand, the books written by academics and survivors in their 
very own attempts to come to terms with the complete destruction of the small South 
East Asian country in the years 1975-1979; and on the other hand, the contributions 
written by political scientists and former members of the large scale mission in the 
early 90s: Their early accounts describe their observations and the challenges of 
organizing the elections, while the later ones analyze why the Cambodian 
democratization process has utterly failed to meet the expectations of its international 
observers. So much do these two events determine international perception that the 
author herself has many times heard people express the conviction that the primary aim 
of the UN intervention was to stop the Khmer Rouge genocide.  
The following chapter will make the reader familiar with the complicated conflict 
history, the time leading up to the Paris Peace Conference and the following United 
Nations’ intervention from 1992-93. In only 50 years Cambodia went through a series 
of fast paced regime changes. Domestic policies and international interests and 
alliances were at all times deeply interwoven, and amongst each other Cambodia’s 
leaders continued to adjust their status from enemy to partner in quick succession. 
The narratives of liberation and oppression they spun to justify their reach for 
power during this time form the main repertoire used by the political actors in their bid 
for a leading position ahead of the elections in 1993. While the reports on UNTAC tend 
to take the UN’s neutrality for granted and focused on the factions expressed 
commitment to peace and reconciliation, this chapter will highlight what it means to 
bring history back into the equation: It will become evident that the interaction between 
international and local actors in the course of the mission was very much determined 
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by their conflicting interpretations of the past and conflicting ideals for Cambodia’s 
future.  
The Paris Peace Agreements may have temporarily ended the discussion over 
the institutional design of the new political order and the modes of its implementation, 
but during the intervention the agreements continued to structure and guide an ongoing 
debate over the character of the changing relationships between the local and 
international actors and the Cambodian people. Creating a new political order means 
to challenge established structures of political authority with its notions of hierarchy 
and the rights and obligations derived from it. These notions cannot be prescribed, but 
they have to be interpreted, justified and integrated into existing frameworks of 
meaning.  
Understood as the representation of an undecided past and an unknown future 
the peace agreements both created and managed the conflicting visions for Cambodia’s 
future pursued by local and international actors involved in UNTAC’s mission. 
Departing from this historic knowledge an inquiry into the rules and dynamics of this 
ongoing negotiation can show how the Paris Peace Agreements shaped not only the 
institutions but also the ideas of Cambodia’s new political order.  
5.2. Internal Dimension  
Sihanouk and the Left. Between oppression…  
Though justified with ideology and true convictions on the part of all those involved, 
observers seem united in their assessment that the confrontations and struggles between 
Cambodia’s main political protagonists are more coherently explained when focusing 
on their desire to gain and uphold power.  
While the Cambodian people publicly express nothing but their highest 
appreciation for the late king Sihanouk and seem to remember the years of his reign 
from 1955-1970 as a period marked by relative wealth and peace, historians and other 
international observers of Cambodia’s political scene describe the same times in 
everything but admiring or apologetic terms. His policy-style is judged contradictory, 
brutal and vain and his inconsistent stand towards the left, constantly wavering between 
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oppression and integration, is identified as one of the main factors destabilizing the 
country in the 1960s and 70s (Becker 1998; Chandler 1999; Chandler 2000a; Kiernan 
1997). “Sihanouk’s relations with the left”, summarizes the historian David P. 
Chandler, “were subject to his volatile moods and to his tactic of playing radicals and 
conservatives against each other” (Chandler 2000a, 58). 
The political scene of Cambodia in 1955 was dominated by left-leaning 
intellectuals, who had built their party profile and constituency based on their demand 
for independence from France. It was in particular the urban elite that also took on an 
increasingly firm anti-American stand After his unexpected abdication of the throne in 
order to compete in the elections stipulated by the 1954 Geneva Agreements, Sihanouk 
campaigned aggressively by integrating his competitors core demands into his own 
program, whilst at the same time using his powers over Cambodia’s administration to 
establish what might be termed a level-playing field for his ambitions (Chandler 1999, 
49).  
Notwithstanding the presence of the International Control Commission 
assigned to supervise the elections, members of the opposition were arrested, 
threatened, and killed (Kiernan 1997, 159–162; Vickery 1982, 89–99) and “because of 
violence and fraud” all of the National Assembly’s 91 seats would go to the members 
of Sihanouk’s newly created Sangkum Reastr Niyum movement (Chandler 2000a, 49). 
Within months of becoming a private citizen Sihanouk effectively ended pluralism in 
Cambodia: “After this election the Sankgum never again had any real challengers” 
(Vickery 1982, 99). The majority of the Sangkum’s political posts were assigned to 
conservative members, but Sihanouk als o sought to secure himself the support of the 
left by integrating popular, left-wing intellectuals in his government. His policy tactics 
contributed to a division of the left in moderates, who could operate in the open, and 
more radical communist activists, who were forced to conceal their political agenda 
and build their movement underground (Kiernan 1982b).  
One of the last organized political groups that openly opposed Sihanouk’s 
politics prior to the 1962 elections, the communist Pracheachon, was dissolved after 
many of its key-members were arrested and jailed on trumped up charges. In the same 
year the secretary of the communist Worker’s Party of Kampuchea disappeared; an 
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event that left its members terrified and strengthened their conviction that any open 
display of opposition to Sihanouk was suicidal (Chandler 2000a, 60).  
In the aftermath of the 1967 Samlaut uprising Cambodia’s Royal Government 
finally also turned against its more moderate government members. The “military tried 
to link the Phnom Penh intellectual left to [the protests]” and shortly after these 
accusations were voiced, Hu Youn and Khieu Samphan, two of the most popular left-
wing members of Sihanouk’s government, fled the city – many would follow them 
(Vickery 1982, 108). Students took to the street, protesting the politicians’ apparent 
execution through the government.  
Though slightly different in their judgments as regards Sihanouk’s actual level 
of influence on his government members and his role as a driving force behind the 
growing divide between left and right in the 1960s that would ultimately result in the 
civil war, scholars seem to agree that Sihanouk’s action contributed to strengthen and 
radicalize the left (Becker 1998, 101; Kiernan 1997, 206, 304). As resistance was met 
with oppression, more and more people had to fear for their lives and were “driven 
underground and into the maquis, where peasant unrest was increasing” (Kiernan 
1982b, 167) 
… and integration 
The keyword explaining Sihanouk’s policy approach throughout the years of his 
Sangkum reign is ‘balance’. Initially he proved to be quite successful and cunning in 
appeasing and accommodating the right and the left, the conservatives, moderates and 
socialists, the US and Vietnam. Starting in the mid-sixties, however, amidst the 
growing internal divide between the political opponents in Cambodia and faced with 
the simultaneous escalation of the war in neighboring Vietnam, decisions of his that 
were intended to appease one side, could only be read as a declaration of war by the 
other.  
In the late 50s and early 60s it was in particular Sihanouk’s outspoken anti-
Americanism that provided those “Communists operating in the open” with an 
“opportunity to form a united front and operate with Sihanouk’s protection” (Chandler 
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2000a, 57). Among the actors who initially profited from this integrative policy 
approach are three men, who will later become most prominent for the stories of their 
rise and fall in Democratic Kampuchea: Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hou Nim. 
They all climb to high positions of power within the Khmer Rouge regime, but only 
Samphan will survive the internal purges and maintain his rank, while the other two 
are executed after a period of incarceration at the infamous Toul Sleng prison in Phnom 
Penh. Young and talented intellectuals were not only used to balance demands from 
the left and right, but apparently also because Sihanouk hoped to profit from their 
foreign policy and economic expertise (Kiernan 1997, 202; Vickery 1984). 
In 1959 Samphan had successfully defended his doctoral thesis entitled 
Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development and Kiernan quotes Laura 
Summer’s suggestion that Sihanouk kept the left in his government against the 
expressed wishes of its conservative members, “partly out of continuing conviction that 
the young progressives held the key to sorting out the country’s economic mess” 
(Kiernan 1997, 202). The hopes both sides put in each other’s support were soon 
dashed; Sihanouk’s “socialist experiment” failed and the left-wing was first side-lined 
by the governments’ traditional elite and later repeatedly publicly humiliated and 
threatened whenever Sihanouk deemed it useful to his own causes (Becker 1998, 101). 
Despite massive vote buying by the well-endowed conservative candidates continued 
harassment, and the fact that “…Sihanouk campaigned actively and specifically against 
them” a great number of Communists gained seats in the 1966 elections, most 
prominently Samphan, Youn and Nim (Kiernan 1997, 233). The government still 
remained heavily dominated by the right led by Lon Nol. The National Assembly 
designated him, “the Communists’ archenemy”, as prime minister right after the 
election (Chandler 2000a, 75).  
Under his leadership any type of cooperation between the opposing factions 
became illusionary. While the 1967 Samlaut uprising and the governments brutal 
oppression of it cemented the enmity between the opposing factions inside of 
Cambodia, it was Sihanouk’s failed foreign policy strategy that provided the rational 
for his removal from power (Becker 1998, 115; Kiernan 1997, 19). Essentially, he had 
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only succeeded in drawing Cambodia ever deeper into the conflict between Vietnam 
and the United States.  
The conservatives had observed both his rapprochement with the Vietnamese 
communists and his alienation from the US with dismay. When Sihanouk was on a trip 
abroad, they too action. Upon his arrival in China, he was delivered with a letter that 
informed him about his dismissal from office (Chandler 1999, 199). Observers agree 
that the only surprise about the coup-de-etat against Sihanouk was that it came so late. 
It was the declared anti-Americanism of both Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge 
that again provided the two enemies with a pretext behind which they could mask their 
own ambitions and present themselves as acting in the nation’s best interest. Cambodia 
– that was their message to the people – had to be liberated from yet another imperialist 
(Becker 1998, 139). The putsch meant that Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists 
could act together in the open, while Sihanouk was left to give them his blessing, 
hoping to be reinstated to full power should they succeed (Chandler 1999: 85).  
With the roles reversed it was now Sihanouk, who was “at [his enemies] mercy” 
(Chandler 2000a, 99). The Khmer Rouge used him to secure international support and 
recruit soldiers, but soon after their victory over the Lon Nol regime the prince was of 
no use to them anymore. Throughout the years of his captivity in Phnom Penh, he had 
to fear for his life. Chandler aptly characterizes the first widely publicized propaganda 
meeting between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge in 1973 – two years before the 
‘liberation’ of Phnom Penh – as “eerie”:  
“Nothing was as it appeared; no one could speak his mind. Everyone, except a handful of 
unidentified leaders was being observed, suspected, and used. The visit, in this sense, 
foreshadowed the political atmosphere of Democratic Kampuchea.” (Chandler 2000a, 99) 
Democratic Kampuchea and the Enemies of the Party’s Glorious Revolution  
In view of the UN’s propagation of democratic principles such as accountability, 
transparency, equality and participation during the intervention in the early 90s, it is of 
great importance to recall the policy style of Democratic Kampuchea’s rulers and the 
political atmosphere it created. Madness and paranoia are the words most often used to 
describe what motivated the Khmer Rouge leadership to order the killing of their fellow 
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people, but the accounts of observers and analysts show that even the greatest insanities 
follow an internal logic.  
During the years of Sihanouk’s Sangkum reign, the Communist Party had 
adopted a survival strategy. Apart from the few members openly working for his 
Sangkum government Cambodia’s communists had advanced their agenda 
underground and “built their party in secret for more than a decade” (Becker 1998, 73). 
Anonymity and secrecy were paramount in preparing the revolution and continued to 
be highly valued principles even after the Khmer Rouge had declared victory. With 
few exceptions, neither the Cambodian people nor the world’s leaders knew who 
governed Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot revealed his identity to the world as late as 
1977 together with the declaration that DK is a communist country – that too had 
remained the object of speculation until then.  
Even Sihanouk, when rallying for support for the Khmer Rouge, was oblivious 
as to who his new allies were (Vickery 1982, 109). At the occasion of his first visit in 
1973 he was presented with the so-called ‘Three Ghosts’, who falsely claimed that 
“they were in charge of the resistance”: Nim, Youn and Samphan (Chandler 2000a, 
97). Sihanouk’s former government partners, the ones he had driven underground and 
who were believed dead for a long time before resurfacing again, now shaking hands 
with their former enemy (Chandler 1999, 228–229). Just like these three, all other 
members of the Communist Party, who would later emerge as its leaders, had also taken 
to the jungles between 1963 and 1967 to escape Norodom Sihanouk’s “witch hunt” 
(Becker 1998, 3; Carney 1989b, 18). Now these same people were able to use their 
former self-declared ‘enemy number one’ as the nominal head of the FUNK to conceal 
their social agenda and true identities and steer the country’s affairs from behind the 
curtains (Kiernan 1982a).  
Immediately after the ‘revolutionary victory’ of April 17th, 1975 the Khmer 
Rouge began to implement their radical social agenda. Khmer society was to be 
purified through re-education and re-organization in near complete isolation from the 
world. With the borders sealed off, and the fax and telephone lines cut, news of the 
extreme transformation the country underwent traveled extremely slowly. And even 
when it reached their audience, it was unlikely to be believed: A successful but 
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undeclared communist revolution, led by Cambodians hostile to communist Vietnam, 
free to violently overturn Khmer society under the oversight of the well-known prince 
Sihanouk as Head of State – in sum, these accounts didn’t fit anybody’s’ interest and 
ran counter to most of the firm beliefs the West held over the nature of communism.24  
Today, even those who have only fleeting knowledge about Cambodian politics 
from 1975-79 are able to recite the core elements of the Khmer Rouge’s transformation 
program: Public and private life as the people knew it ended when markets and money 
were abolished, religion was banned and education replaced by political propaganda. 
The cities were evacuated, the people forced out into the countryside, separated from 
their families and assigned to work for the realization of a communist utopia. Eating 
was communalized, simple black peasant clothes became the peoples’ uniform and 
women had to wear their hair short.  
In order to ensure that these visible markers of equality and modesty were 
matched by true revolutionary spirit, the Khmer Rouge relied on a variety of 
mechanisms to decide who was in need of re-education or had to be eradicated: People 
underwent basic political training, had to reveal their biography and criticize 
themselves or others for their perceived revolutionary shortcomings. The peasantry was 
labeled ‘old’ or ‘base’ people and accorded a higher status than the ‘new people’, 
coming from the cities or abroad.25 As such these ‘new people’ were under much closer 
scrutiny than those belonging to the other category and much more likely to be killed 
as counterrevolutionaries during the first year under the new regime.  
While the Communist Party hid behind Norodom Sihanouk and the FUNK 
when engaging with the world beyond Cambodia’s borders, the people inside of the 
country learned to fear an omnipresent but faceless Angkar. The word translates into 
the neutral term ‘organization’ and did not hint at the political or ideological ideas at 
the source of the drastic changes that uprooted everybody’s lives. A peasant demeanor 
and lifestyle was officially hailed as the new ideal one had to strive for, people of higher 
                                                 
24 Becker notes that early reports from the former Khmer Rouge soldier Ith Sarin about the Communist 
Party had been discredited because they already hinted at problems between Vietnam and Cambodia. It 
was believed that the communist side was a uniform block (Becker 1998, 151) 
25 Carney provides a more detailed description of the class system under the Khmer Rouge including the 
official ranks of individual party members (Carney 1989a, 82–84, 99). 
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education were suspicious and among the first to disappear. Those who wanted to 
survive quickly learned to conceal their true identities. Scholars are not entirely in 
agreement, when it comes to judge the coherence and depth of the Khmer Rouge’s 
ideological commitment. Kiernan prominently considers race to be the most important 
driving force behind the movement. According to him it, “a political worldview […] 
of national and racial grandiosity [became] the dominant strand of Khmer communism 
under the leadership of Saloth Sar” (Kiernan 1997, 32). 
Other authors have either openly rejected this interpretation or put considerably 
more emphasis on their class analysis: The majority of the highest ranking CPK 
members knew each other from their years in Paris in the early 50’s, where they studies 
were financed by government scholarships. There, they engaged with the Communist 
movement and regularly met in reading groups, studying Marx’ theories. Samphan’s 
doctoral thesis draws on Marxist and Maoist categories when analyzing Cambodia’s 
socioeconomic situation and Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Hou Youn and others regularly defined 
the revolutionaries as ‘members of the working class’, who have to engage in ‘class 
struggle’ to overcome Cambodia’s ‘class contradictions’ (Chandler 2000a, 39; Hinton 
2005, 53, 54). According to Thion, “[c]ommunism certainly appeared to be the most 
sophisticated tool” when the revolution was still in its preparatory phase, but it was just 
as evident that the “objective conditions were not favorable to it” (Thion 1983, 20). In 
other words: There was little evidence of ‘class contradictions’, but a lot of proof that 
the applicability of Communism itself was full of contradictions when it came to 
Cambodia. The country was at best in its earliest stages of industrialization – 
necessarily preceding communism according to theory – and had by no definition a 
vast working class. After 1975 the CPK cited these obvious theoretical misfits as 
evidence for the superiority of the Cambodian revolution: Under their supervision 
Khmer society had mastered a ‘very spectacular great leap forward’ bypassing all other 
phases (Jackson 1989a).  
References to Maoist China soon became more commonplace. Asserting the 
status of China as an important partner (and mentor) was essential in overcoming 
another contradiction inherent to the Khmer Rouge’s revolution: Their nationalism was 
much greater than any Marxist inspired internationalism – together with a strong anti-
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imperialism this has been called the most defining characteristic of their ideology 
(Chandler 2000a). In this regard it became one of the party’s greatest obsessions to 
deny any ties to the Vietnamese communist movement.  
The party’s history was in a constant review process and the object of an 
increasingly paranoid (and deadly) discourse (Chandler 1983). Nothing, neither the 
past, nor the present, nor one’s own background continued to be the source of a truth 
one could safely talk about. Even among each other the cadres were encouraged to 
conceal their true identity, use ‘revolutionary names’ instead of their real ones, and 
never question Angkar’s orders. Essentially the Khmer Rouge controlled the country 
by keeping the people in a terrorized state of greatest uncertainty: The past world and 
the past self had to disappear in thought and appearance to dissolute in a new, yet 
unspecified collective.  
Even with extensive research at hand, there is no definite explanation for the 
speed with which the revolution so violently turned against its own makers and started 
to consume itself. Starting as early as 1976 the party began to examine its own ranks 
for traitors and enemies – all of whom had to be neutralized in purges throughout the 
country. In search for answers scholars have closely examined under which conditions 
the core members of the Communist Party or the Angkar have been socialized under 
and how this has affected the psychological mindset of the organizations as such. The 
years under Sihanouk have doubtlessly been defining in many ways. Becker described 
his early tactics aimed at crushing the communist movement as “psychological 
warfare” and Chandler suggests that Pol Pot adopted his withdrawn leadership style 
“partly in reaction to Sihanouk’s flamboyance” (Becker 1998, 82; Chandler 2000a, 49).  
Many authors point out that the Khmer Rouge elite was thoroughly convinced 
of their revolution’s superiority. Their goal was to create a truly economically 
independent country (Twining 1989, 110). Complacent and arrogant the leaders did not 
accept that the misfit between their high expectations – as superficially laid out in the 
so called ‘Four Year Plan’ – and the disappointing reality of the country’s productivity 
and economic development was the result of their own miscalculations. Instead they 
suspected treason. Democratic Kampuchea was divided into different administrative 
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entities, the largest being the zones.26 The economic plan foresaw certain results for 
each of them. Expectations as formulated by the leadership were particularly high for 
the Northwestern Zone. Overpopulated with starving, sick people who were assigned 
to produce not only rice but also build complicated irrigation systems, the rice 
production in 1977 fell way below the established marks (Becker 1998, 238, 239; 
Chandler 2000a, 68). In the system of terror, those in charge were anxious to please the 
leadership, which is why they “sent in reports of a good harvest” and provided the 
Center with so much rice that the people under their supervision had to survive on gruel 
(Becker 1998, 239). Once discovered, the devastating state of the zone was blamed on 
lower ranking cadre, who were quickly found and eliminated together with “tens of 
thousands of citizens” (Chandler 2000b, 70).  
Purges in other regions soon followed. Though the initial accusations varied – 
treason, manipulation and betrayal of the revolution due to individualism, collaboration 
with Vietnam, the KGB or CIA, plotting to overthrow the party etc. – the solution was 
always the same: Cleansing of the zones, by killing the alleged suspects, perpetrators, 
their families,27 and allies.  
The records of forced confessions, written down by the victims and their interrogators 
in DK’s secret political prison Toul Sleng in the capital Phnom Penh, can offer hints as 
regards “the party’s new obsessions” (Becker 1998, 267). The prison, also known as 
S-21, was vital to the regime: It provided the leadership with a rationale for their radical 
actions and gave them culprits to pay for their own failures. Chandler termed the place, 
who’s primary objective was to produce false evidence for the party’s paranoid fears, 
an “ante-room to death” (Chandler 2000b, 15).  
Becker finds that the categories of people imprisoned and later executed here, 
is consistent with the party’s changing directives. At first it is primarily the ‘new 
people’, who are subject to Angkar’s special and deadly attention, later workers, whose 
loyalty is being examined in the course of the organizations “decision to move ahead 
with industrialization”, and in 1978 former communist officials – that is people from 
                                                 
26 For a detailed description of the administrative system under the Khmer Rouge, see (Carney 1989a). 
27 Quinn (1989) indicates that the families were targeted from 1977 and 1978 onwards.  
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the Khmer Rouge’s own ranks – form the majority of victims (Becker 1998, 266). 
Orders to kill always came only after the prisoner had fully confessed to the torturers’ 
accusation. After the Vietnamese had invaded Cambodia, they found a huge archive in 
the compounds of S-21 with thousands of pages of written confessions alongside the 
now infamous mug shots of former prisoners (Chandler 2000b).  
Nic Dunlop quotes from an interrogators handbook that “[torture] is not 
something we do for fun. We must hurt them so that they respond quickly” (Dunlop 
2006, 127). In the end, everybody gave the expected answers, including lists with 
names of other ‘traitors’ to feed the prison’s killing machine. Secrecy had initially been 
the fundament for the party’s success, but the S21 records give testimony as to how 
this approach later contributed to its quick decline.  
The leadership was engaged in a frantic self-dialogue: as those who spoke for 
themselves were immediately silenced the elite would only hear the confirming echoes 
of their own suspicions. Once a path of action was chosen, nothing could function as a 
corrective anymore. This is probably why so many authors evoke the expression ‘irony’ 
in their observations of the party’s decisions and the results they created. In 1978 these 
new allies would invade the country and end the Khmer Rouge’s reign.  
The New Revolution in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
After the FUNSK and the supporting Vietnamese troops had launched their invasion 
on December 25, 1978 it took them two weeks to force their way to Phnom Penh and 
declare victory. Under Heng Samrin a new government was formed (Chea Sim was 
appointed Minister of Interior and Hun Sen got the position of Foreign Minister) and 
until 1989 Cambodia would be known under the name of People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea. 
In contrast to the huge attention that scholars have devoted to the time leading 
up to the regime of the Khmer Rouge, the time in between their fall in 1979 and the 
United Nation’s mission in 1992 has remained a white spot on the map of Cambodia’s 
recent history for a rather long time. There are only two extensive (English language) 
studies on the inner workings of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the 
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difficulties its leaders were faced with in their attempt to consolidate their power and 
rebuild the state amidst an ongoing war and severe international sanctions. Slocomb’s 
study draws on Marxist theories and has been rebuked by many for its alleged uncritical 
stance towards the new communist regime. Gottesman’s work appeared only little later 
and has since become a standard reference for Cambodian scholars. Like Slocomb’s 
work it relies in large parts on internal PRK documents, mainly the minutes of the 
Council of Minister and Council of State meetings (Gottesman 2003; Slocomb 2003). 
These records shed some light on the factors responsible for the rise of the leadership 
trio that will remain in power long after Cambodia has made its next transition to a 
constitutional monarchy and the effects of continued international pressure on the 
country’s internal affairs throughout the 80’s.  
In order to gain stability and legitimacy the new regime was faced with a huge 
number of difficult choices and decisions. Gottesman and Slocomb deliver an 
impressive account of the PRK’s efforts to bring the shattered country back on track. 
The descriptions of individual reforms like the reintegration of the Riel, five years after 
the complete abolition of money, show how deeply institutional and societal factors are 
intertwined: The success of this project was as dependent on the authorities’ ability to 
organize pricing and the distribution of money as it was on the people’s ability and 
willingness to trust the state (Gottesman 2003, 97–100).  
Like the PRK’s predecessors a part of the endeavor to build domestic 
legitimacy involved the rewriting of Cambodia’s recent past. The new rulers had to 
establish a narrative that would render the renewed change in leadership, concept of 
enemy and the political system plausible. A matter that was certainly expected to be a 
great challenge as the majority of the new leadership were themselves former Khmer 
Rouge, now collaborating with Cambodia’s historic enemy Vietnam, fiercely opposed 
by the peoples’ beloved Norodom Sihanouk, in a political system that propagated the 
same communist ideology as the genocidal regime the people were now taught to hate.  
Initially the people were mainly grateful for the end of the terrible regime they 
had lived through. The newly founded People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
continued to adhere to a communist ideology, but abandoned the radical visions and 
policies of their predecessors. The dire state of the state economy and the ongoing war 
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made it still difficult for Cambodians to find a way back into a life one could describe 
as normal or stable. In order to enhance the people’s commitment to the new state the 
authorities were eager to prove that the change of leadership was tantamount to a clean 
break with the past. The Khmer Rouge trials that took place in Phnom Penh from 
August 15th to 19th 1979 were very much set up to this end.  
Accused of the crime of genocide Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were sentenced to 
death. As both of them lived safely in their refuges along the Thai border, this verdict 
would never be enforced. Of greater importance was the opportunity to present 
Cambodia and the world with a narrative that would endow the new regime with 
legitimacy: The violence and death in the country, this was the new party line, was the 
result of Sary’s and Pot’s reactionary policies and their personal betrayal of the 
Cambodian people; the achievements of the communist revolution were hence left 
intact. “Domestically, the trial helped the PRK define its enemies while reassuring the 
population” (Gottesman 2003, 64–66).  
The new status of Norodom Sihanouk as an enemy was a much harder sell. In 
December 1981 the Prince had released a statement together with Son Sann, the leader 
of the KPNLF and Samphan that informed the world about the creation of a coalition 
government for Democratic Kampuchea (Sihanouk, Sann, and Samphan 1981). After 
three years of war he discussed his military strategy and long term goals in an interview. 
Engaged in guerilla fights throughout the country, Sihanouk admitted that the exile 
government gained territory during the rainy season, only to lose it again during the 
dry season. The situation appeared to be in a deadlock and their fight for liberation, as 
he put it, was as dependent on the weather as it was on international aid. Asked about 
his reasons to once again team up with his former enemies, the Prince urged his 
audience to put off the Khmer Rouge question and focus on the Vietnamese danger.  
“We are good patriots, but it seems that the Communists are better soldiers and better 
fighters. Therefore, the Vietnamese mainly fear the Khmer Rouge because the Khmer 
Rouge are very cruel people and they are very tough. The Nationalists, however, are not 
cruel and they are not so tough.” (Schier and Sihanouk 1984) 
The PRK leadership was indeed under a lot of pressure due to the relentless attacks that 
resulted in many casualties and used up precious resources. In 1984, some “230,000 
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Cambodian civilians and several thousand resistance fighters controlled by the Khmer 
Rouge, KPNLF and FUNCINPEC” lived in camps along the border with Thailand 
(Slocomb 2001, 196). The notorious K5 plan was supposed to put an end to their 
insurgencies. Its initial objective was to defend Cambodia with a huge wall and a 700 
km long canal.  
This would never be realized. Instead thousands of civilians were drafted to 
build roads, cut down forest and establish a long line of defense that consisted mainly 
of stretches with clear terrain, a fence and a wide and deadly minefield (Slocomb 2001, 
198). Work on K5 became a dreaded duty, as the forcefully drafted workers fell prey 
to diseases and accidents in huge number. The parallels to the situation under the 
Khmer Rouge were thus almost compelling.  
Ironically the construction was quite effective in keeping the declared enemies 
from entering the country, but the recruitment and forced labor used to build it drove 
people in huge numbers out of Cambodia. With them these refugees brought tales of 
exploitation that the opposition was quick to use for their own propaganda. Slocomb 
concludes her account of these events by pointing out that despite the “very real 
achievements of the PRK in terms of the reconstruction of Cambodia after the horrors 
of the preceding decade, the people have judged the history of that period primarily by 
their memories of what happened in the course of the implementation of the K5 Plan” 
(Slocomb 2001, 210).  
5.3. The International Dimension of the Cambodia Conflict  
The Prince on the International Scene  
In his memoires, heroically entitled, ‘My war with the CIA’, Norodom Sihanouk recalls 
his decision to collaborate with the Khmer Rouge as follows: 
 “All my life I have dreamed and fought for my country’s independence. I did not win it 
from France in order to abandon it now. The monarchy must not now stand aside. It is 
certain that US imperialism will be beaten in Indochina and we must participate in that 
struggle. The Americans will be beaten by the Vietnamese and our own Khmer Rouge, 
together with us.” (Sihanouk 1972, 29) 
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 Had he known how ‘his Khmer Rouge’ would treat Cambodia and its people, Sihanouk 
might have left us with less weighty words. But as his memoires were already published 
in 1972 this remains his description of how he allegedly refused to leave his people and 
retire to France as suggested by his wife, when hearing about the news of the coup 
against him in 1970.28  
Sihanouk’s relation to the US had been extremely strained long before these 
events. It was in particular the war in neighboring Vietnam that led him to make a 
number of policy choices with far reaching consequences for himself and Cambodia’s 
internal affairs. From 1963 on the tension between the two countries intensified: In 
August Sihanouk had severed diplomatic ties with South Vietnam, which also sent a 
strong message to their ally the United States. Notwithstanding the oppression of his 
domestic communist movement, Sihanouk had thereby signaled “a shift to the left and 
an escalation of his regime’s hostility to the US” on the international scene (Kiernan 
1997, 205). It also meant the end of his strict policy of neutrality. His move was 
followed by the implementation of various measures destined to create Sihanouk’s very 
own version of socialism. Against the expressed wishes of his right-wing government 
he announced the nationalization of trade, major businesses and banks. Most of these 
policies had been laid out in Samphan’s doctoral thesis on the Cambodian economy – 
only one of the reasons, why the CPK party leadership could later claim that they had 
forced Sihanouk’s government into the ‘internal contradictions’ that eventually led to 
its collapse (Becker 1998, 101).  
Building the same argument Kiernan observes that the war between the United 
States and Vietnam did indeed force him to “lean towards Hanoi and Beijing in foreign 
policy while taking ever more repressive measures against the grassroots and rural 
domestic left” (Kiernan 1997, 16). In case of a communist victory North Vietnam was 
to respect Cambodia’s independence, while China had the means and the interest to act 
                                                 
28 In one of the many descriptions by historians regarding Sihanouk’s actions that immediately 
preceded and followed the coup, David Chandler notes that “one of the first things he did on landing in 
Beijing was to ask the French ambassador about the possibility of being granted political asylum in 
France.” (Chandler 1991: 197). 
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as his powerful patron, providing him with financial and (later) militarily support. In 
1963 these contributions were urgently needed, as Sihanouk took yet another decision 
that was widely unpopular with his government: Despite Cambodia’s dependence on 
foreign support he renounced US aid: Based on an agreement from 1955, the US had 
been Cambodia’s military “chief supplier” (Vickery 1983, 103).  
Rather than appeasing the conservatives their concerns were exasperated when 
China and the Soviet Republic (clearly motivated by their very own global political 
considerations) quickly stepped in to fill at least parts of the gaping financial hole the 
decision of their Head of State had ripped into the national budget. While Lon Nol, 
Sirik Matak and other high ranking officials of his government moved closer towards 
the United States behind Sihanouk’s back to plot his fall, the prince himself did little 
to defuse existing tensions between the two countries: Based on a “secret agreement” 
the Vietnamese Communists started to move men and arms through Cambodian 
territory in 1964; a fact that did not remain hidden from the Americans for very long 
(Chandler 2000a, 67). Starting on October 4th 1965 the United States pursuit an illegal 
bombing campaign of Cambodia to target ‘Vietcong insurgents’. Though the public 
overseas became aware of the illegal targeting of Cambodia in 1970 and large student 
protests erupted all over the States, it would last until August 15th 1973 before Congress 
put an end to it. Owen and Kiernan write that the unimaginable weight of 2.756,941 
tons of bombs had been dropped on a country slightly smaller than the US state of 
Oklahoma, demanding a devastating toll (Owen and Kiernan 2007).29 Also in 1965 
Sihanouk hosted a conference attended by representatives of the communist and 
neutralist oriented ‘Indo-Chinese’ movements. Among others it called for “the 
withdrawal of the US from Vietnam and for the “liberation of the South” (Kiernan 
1997, 218).  
                                                 
29 They add: „To put 2.756.941 tons into perspective, the Allies dropped just over 2 million tons of 
bombs during all of World War II. Cambodia may be the most heavily bombed country in history.“ Their 
numbers are based on Air Force data released by President Bill Clinton in 2000 after his visit to Vietnam. 
The data was „intended to assist in the search for unexploded ordnance left behind during the carpet 
bombing of the region.“ The finding corrected beginning of the bombing campaign to 1965 not 1969 as 
previously held (Owen and Kiernan 2007). 
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After all these symbolic gestures of opposition on Sihanouk’s part it took no 
one by surprise when he finally broke off diplomatic relations with the US in November 
1965. Late in the 60’s, clearly prompted by increasing US military engagement in 
Vietnam, Sihanouk’s demeanor – at least rhetorically – showed signs of renewed 
appreciation of the West and the state media started to express a bias towards anti-
communist propaganda (Vickery 1983, 108). As far as relations with the US were 
concerned, this was too little too late. From their point of view the conservative 
members of the Lon Nol government were by far the better candidates to secure 
American interests in the region.  
In the end Sihanouk’s strategic alignment with North Vietnam did him more 
harm than good. The heavy US bombing did not decimate but increase the presence of 
Vietcong on Cambodian territory and came with a horrible death toll among his own 
people in addition to the devastating economic effects. In sum, these facts provided 
sufficient justification for his long prepared removal from power by Nol and Matak. It 
also provided the two putschists with the support of many that had been disenchanted 
with the prince’s foreign policies for a long time, in particular the conservative urban 
elite and those who had been politically side lined by the prince in the previous decade 
(Kiernan 1997, 303). According to Timothy Carney “enthusiasm in Phnom Penh was 
high when Sihanouk was deposed in 1970, at least partly because it gave Cambodia an 
opportunity to fight the Vietnamese” (Carney 1989b, 30). Indirectly his rapprochement 
with Hanoi had also adversely affected the relations between the Khmer and 
Vietnamese Communists. The latter where eager to keep the situation in the country 
stable as to not endanger their own policy goals, while the Khmer Rouge pressed for a 
change of government (Kiernan 1997, 267, 275).  
After the conservatives had taken over power in Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese 
still undertook propaganda efforts in Sihanouk’s favor, “distributed leaflets and 
broadcast [his] appeals from sound trucks” (Carney 1989b, 22). The prince did little in 
return for the received support and whatever his strategic considerations in crafting 
relationships between the two governments may have been, they certainly did not 
change his traditionally hostile perception of the Vietnamese.  
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The Khmer Rouge began to purge Hanoi trained Khmer communists as well as 
people from Vietnamese background in their ‘liberated zones’ several years before 
their overthrow of the Lon Nol government (Chandler 1999, 210). Jackson points out 
that Sihanouk (then their ally and head of the FUNK) knew about the killings of the 
ethnic Vietnamese and, if the tone of the Prince’s own comments is any indication, did 
likely approve of them:  
“In 1969 there were more than 400.000 [of them] in Kampuchea. After their coup, Lon 
Nol and his supporters eliminated or banished to South Vietnam at least half of these 
Yuons [a derogatory word in the Khmer language for referring to Vietnamese]. The Khmer 
Rouge finished the job between 1973 and 1975, as I had it from Khieu Samphan.” (Jackson 
1989b, 45–46) 
It is probably fair to say that it was not Norodom Sihanouk’s political will that crafted 
the relationship between Cambodia and China. Before the 1970’s coup the prince’s 
attitude towards the powerful People’s Republic was mainly determined by his 
perception of the Khmer communist movement’s strength and the chances of a North 
Vietnamese victory. As a rule of thumb, any step away from the United States brought 
him closer to China: Though the effects of both communism and US imperialism were 
of greatest concern to him, he decided that the communist threat was easier to control 
and compromise with. China did its best to support him in this illusion. In 1965, after 
Sihanouk’s open rejection of the States, “relations between the two countries reached 
their peak” (Kiernan 1997, 219). Kiernan writes that the declared friendship between 
him and China’s leaders, as well as their generous military and financial support, led 
Sihanouk to grossly misinterpret the strategic alignments chosen by the Khmer 
communists. After the peasant uprising in Samlaut in 1968, that marked the beginning 
of the communists’ armed struggle against his government, Sihanouk blamed Vietnam 
not China “for inspiring [the] rebellion”(Kiernan 1997, 281). 
Unknown to him, Vietnam had not only actively discouraged an armed struggle 
against Sihanouk and refused to provide the Khmer Rouge with weapons, but, more 
importantly, China had grown extremely close to the CPK Center since the mid-sixties 
and was privy to the otherwise secret identity of its highest ranking members (Kiernan 
1997, 280). For China and the Khmer Rouge alike it was vital to hide this fact from 
Sihanouk and lead him to believe that Hanoi was the driving force behind the 
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Cambodian communist movement. Only then would he perceive of China as a partner 
able to counterbalance the communist forces in his country and maintain the delicate 
balance between his desire to support Vietnam against the US, but keep them off 
Cambodian territory (Chandler 1999, 195).  
After the 1970 coup against him, China became Sihanouk’s most important 
foreign ally, though he downplayed the significance of their contributions in public. 
Chandler points out that his call to oppose the new government, broadcasted via Beijing 
Radio, made no mentioning of China (Chandler 1999, 201). Contrary to Sihanouk’s 
own recollection, historic evidence thus seems to point to the Chinese as the main 
architects behind the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK).  
The awkward alliance between him and his long-time enemies, the Khmer 
Rouge, was very much in China’s interest: The region was safeguarded against a US 
takeover by proxy, while the Khmer communists, their partners, had to fear no 
international condemnation as the Prince was officially the leader in charge (Mertha 
2014). Without the Chinese as the powerful patrons of both sides it is also unlikely that 
the Khmer Rouge would have welcomed Sihanouk back in Phnom Penh after their 
victorious take-over of Phnom Penh and the authors agree that it is only thanks to them, 
that they kept him alive.  
 
The International Orientation of the Lon Nol Government  
Sihanouk’s powerful Sangkum government member Lon Nol had himself earned the 
reputation as the communists’ archenemy. In his position as chief of police he had 
overseen and organized the violent repression of the nascent Cambodian communist 
movement, and incarcerated and killed its members in the late 50s and 60s. As he was 
declared president of the Khmer Republic, immediately set in place after the coup, the 
new regime came to be identified with his name. Especially in the preparatory phases, 
however, the former deputy Prince Sisovath Sirk Matak was one of the main driving 
forces behind the putsch.  
The coup was surrounded by many rumors as regards the role of the CIA – 
Prince Sihanouk was convinced that they were the masterminds behind the events and 
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ultimately targeted him for assassination (Sihanouk 1972). Historians do in fact 
corroborate some of his suspicions: Based on interviews with high ranking officials 
from the US and former members of the Lon Nol regime, Kiernan concludes that 
accusations against the CIA are unfounded, but that “a good deal of evidence points to 
a role played by sections of the US military intelligence establishment and the Army 
Special Forces” (Kiernan 1997, 300). His interviewees also confirm the existence of a 
plan to assassinate Sihanouk, possibly even drafted by US officials. 
While the exact dimension of US involvement in the change of government in 
1970 remains an issue of speculation, it is a matter of fact that the regime received 
generous financial aid from Washington and cooperated closely with their American 
allies – to the point of sacrificing thousands of Cambodian lives for their cause. Carney 
lists the combined financial and military support supplied to the Khmer Republic by 
the United States as more than 1.5 billion dollars – help that was crucial to the regimes 
five year long survival (Carney 1989b, 31; Kiernan 1982a, 285).  
This aid, however, came with many strings attached and the country paid a steep 
price in return. Without informing the new government, the US invaded Cambodia 
together with South Vietnamese troops early in 1970, essentially abusing Cambodian 
territory to fight their own war (Chandler 1999, 204). In the years from 1970 to 1973 
Cambodia also experienced the heaviest US bombing since the beginning of the illegal 
campaigns. Many of the millions of internally displaced people found refuge in the 
cities after their villages had been leveled to the ground (only to be forcibly evacuated 
from there some years later by the Khmer Rouge). Officially these campaigns were 
justified with the presence of Vietcong insurgents inside of the country. Despite the 
massive destruction of the Cambodian countryside and the devastation caused among 
the Cambodian people, Vickery therefore reports that the bombing “produced no 
reaction in Phnom Penh other than relief” (Vickery 1982, 111).  
The years of the Khmer Republic saw a huge increase in open violence and 
hostility towards ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. International interests – that 
is the interests of the United States – dictated internal politics. Cambodians traditionally 
perceive of the Vietnamese as their hereditary enemies and the Lon Nol regime, eager 
to please their powerful ally, either stirred up these emotions or did nothing to appease 
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them. Directly after taking over power, his executive “rounded up and killed thousands 
of Vietnamese civilians in Phnom Penh and its environs”(Chandler 1999, 203). As 
might be expected, the murder of civilians put a considerable strain on the Republic’s 
relation to their South Vietnamese ‘partners’. 
Public opinion in Cambodia had already shifted as early as 1973 when people 
began to openly voice their dismay with the crumbling government. In military matters 
the Lon Nol regime relied on US strength and arms to the point that “government 
newspapers expressed the hope that the bombing would continue indefinitely” 
(Chandler 2000a, 225). Additionally the internal relations of the leadership showed 
serious frictions and popular members like In Tam were sidelined or dismissed, leaving 
matters to Lon Nol, whose abilities as a commander in chief were questionable at best: 
Reports about his strong beliefs in the power of Buddhism, spirits and ghosts and the 
resulting bizarre policies became more frequent and concerned his domestic as well as 
his international partners (Chandler 1999, 205). 
Chandler quotes the US embassy’s chief of the political section in Cambodia as 
noting in his diary in March 1973 that “US policy has been unwittingly to increase the 
chance for a Communist victory” (Chandler 1999, 226) – an observation that would 
soon prove to be true.  
International Influence on the Khmer Rouge 
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) held self-reliance and complete 
independence higher than any other principle. Adherence to these dogmas drove 
internal and foreign policy decisions. While their predecessors had fostered strategic 
relations with either Vietnam or the United States, the Khmer Rouge rejected any 
formal alliances with both of them. In one of the earliest declarations after taking power 
they announced that no military bases of foreign powers would be tolerated in 
Cambodia: A message that was addressed to both the United States and Vietnam 
(Jackson 1989b, 41). In his discussion of the influence the ideal of total sovereignty 
had on Democratic Kampuchea’s policies, Jackson quotes Samphan’s doctoral thesis 
as a likely source of inspiration. In it he identified “international economic integration” 
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as the “root cause” for Cambodia’s low productivity and economic underdevelopment 
(Jackson 1989b, 42).  
Denying ties with North Vietnam and presenting the history of their party and 
the communist revolution as completely separated from their neighbor’s struggle, could 
of course not be achieved by means of a simple statement. In his Pol Pot Biography, 
Chandler traces the success of the Cambodian communist movement back to the 1950 
decision of the Vietnamese led Indochinese Communist Party to form independent 
armies in Laos and Cambodia. Back then, the most important goal was to achieve 
independence from France, which is why Vietnamese leadership was tolerated 
(Chandler 2000a, 29–31).  
Much later, as the war between Vietnam and the US developed, the relations 
between the two communist parties were increasingly strained due to contradicting 
domestic policy aims: The Cambodian communists saw no benefit in a purely ‘political 
struggle’ against the Royal Government, while Hanoi needed the prince’s support and 
did thus refrain from encouraging the Cambodian communists to take up arms: “The 
North Vietnamese tactical concern in Cambodia lay in assuring supplies, transit of men 
and material, and sanctuary for their war to conquer South Vietnam. Major help to the 
local communist movement was not part of their aims” (Carney 1989b, 20). Rather, 
they urged them to wait for a revolutionary success in Vietnam. In order to adequately 
prepare for this event, many Khmer Communists had received extensive political and 
military training in Hanoi since the mid-50s (Kiernan 1997, 178, 279).  
Given the devastating state of the Cambodian economy after long years of war 
and heavy dependence on foreign aid, the conviction that complete self-reliance could 
in fact be achieved on such short notice was based on little else but the Khmer Rouge’s 
firm belief in the superiority of their revolution. Notwithstanding (or possibly precisely 
because of) the blatantly obvious better grade of organization, training and financial 
resources of the Vietnamese Communists, the Cambodian side was early on concerned 
with the symbolic reassurance of their party’s higher standing: The decision to rename 
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the party from Workers’ Party to Communist Party of Kampuchea in 196630 implied 
that “the Kampuchean communist movement was, in historical and ideological terms, 
more ‘advanced’ than the Vietnam Workers’ Party” (Kiernan 1997, 220).  
Once in power and content with the success of having bypassed Vietnam in 
their quest for a full revolutionary victory, the rewriting of the party’s history as one 
that had evolved independently from the Vietnamese communists became one of the 
new regime’s biggest obsessions. Changing the birthday of the Party from 1951 to 1960 
was of particular importance in this context, as the later date would deny Vietnam’s 
crucial role in nurturing the nascent movement: “[It would allow Pol Pot] to embark, 
as he probably had planned to do for some time, on a full-scale war against Vietnam, 
as well as a radical program of collectivization inside Cambodia which owed nothing 
to Vietnamese models and advice” (Chandler 1983, 290). The leadership wanted to 
prove that they had invented a true Khmer version of communism; foreign guidance or 
international models were consequently denied or downplayed.31  
It is important to note that the attitude of the Party Center with regard to Vietnam does 
by no means reflect the convictions of all Khmer Rouge. Early on the communists split 
into two groups, with one being described as the more moderate, pro-Sihanouk, pro 
Vietnamese. According to Kiernan, this position reflects the foreign policy approach 
of Hanoi (Kiernan 1997, 68). Many of those considered moderate and rather Vietnam 
friendly rose to higher ranks in the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea. This Zone, 
bordering South Vietnam, would later become infamous for being the scene of 
extremely brutal purges during which hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants were 
killed and for three of its leading cadre: Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and Hun Sen, who 
would all flee to Vietnam and later return, oust Pol Pol from power, and become the 
leaders of the new People’s Republic of Kampuchea. It is described as a zone with 
                                                 
30 Elisabeth Becker states that the name of the Party was changed in 1971 (Becker 1998: 93, 557).  She 
does not quote any sources to support this date and no other historian corroborates this claim.  
31 There is significant disagreement between scholars regarding the open acknowledgement of foreign 
influence by the Khmer Rouge. This can be exemplified by the contradicting statements regarding 
China’s role. While Becker writes “Only once did Pol Pot say that the thought of Mao Zedong had been 
an inspiration” Becker 1998: 185) Quinn states Pol Pot „acknowledged the key role of Mao’s thought“ 
at multiple occasions in public statements (Quinn 1989, 220). 
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comparably good conditions – that means less frequent executions and laxer 
implementation of the communalization policies ordered by the Center. Vickery details 
that  
the East Zone Communists, more than those of any other zone, represented the tradition 
of the Indochina Communist Party and the first Cambodian Communist group which 
emerged from it. […] They had therefore grown up politically in close contact with 
Vietnamese Communism [and] they maintained […] close relations with Vietnam. 
(Vickery 1983, 107) 
Between 1975 and 1977 Cambodia and Vietnam had intermittently attacked each other 
along the border over territorial claims. After border talks between the Vietnamese and 
Cambodian leadership had failed in 1978, the Center ordered the East to attack 
Vietnam, thereby sparking the 3rd Indochinese War (Slocomb 2003, 32). Their early 
cross border raids were widely unsuccessful, which quickly led to accusations of 
treason against the cadres in charge (instead of facing the fact that the Vietnamese army 
was simply better equipped and trained) (Becker 1998, 299). 
In 1978 the people of the Eastern Zone became caught up in a vicious circle of 
arrests, torture and executions: By April a total of 409 of their cadres had been brought 
to Toul Sleng. Their ‘confessions’ then led to the arrest of further Eastern Zone 
commanders and commissars who were all arrested and executed on the spot or brought 
to Phnom Penh (Kiernan 1997, 393–394). Only weeks later the Center sent loyal troops 
into the Zone: Until the end of the year an estimated 100.000 to 250.000 of the 
inhabitants in the Eastern Zone were dead.32 Pol Pot’s troops carried out mass 
executions on a daily basis, and there are hundreds of disturbing testimonies to entire 
villages being wiped out by soldiers. At the same time an estimated third of the Eastern 
Zone population was forcibly transferred to the West, only to become the preferred 
targets of further ‘purification campaigns’ there (Kiernan 1997, 403–411; Slocomb 
2003, 335).  
In the midst of the first purge Heng Samrin, a commander in the Eastern Zone, 
led troops loyal to him into the jungle from where he fought the troops send by the 
Center. His troops were joined by district chief Chea Sim and around “3000 armed men 
                                                 
32 Kiernan (1997: 404) writes that “a total death toll of 100,000 among easterners in 1978 […] can 
safely be regarded as a conservative estimate. The real figure is probably around 250,000 dead.”   
History 
 
 
109 
 
and 30.000 civilians” in his followership (Slocomb 2003, 34). When they ran out of 
supplies they contacted the Vietnamese for help. After Sim had guided his people 
across the border in October, Vietnamese launched a rescue mission in order to find 
Samrin and his men and bring them back to Vietnam. The operation was successful 
and once in safety the dissident troops began to plan a joint attack against Democratic 
Kampuchea. Such a possibility had been prepared since 1977, when the Vietnamese 
drafted plans “to recruit an army and a political front from among the Cambodian 
refugees in southern Vietnam” (Slocomb 2003, 33).  
Already waiting in Vietnam was Hun Sen, who would later become 
Cambodia’s declared ‘strong-man’. He graduated from of the military schools in the 
Eastern Zone set up by the Vietnamese, which were closed by the Party Center in 1971. 
According to Kiernan it was these schools that “made the Eastern Zone forces the most 
effective CPK combat units”(Kiernan 1997, 310–311). In Democratic Kampuchea Hun 
Sen rose to the rank of commander, before defecting to the Vietnamese in 1977. He 
claims his decision was based on both his dismay with the destruction of Cambodia 
under Pol Pot and fear for his own life (Becker 1998: 440). Together, the defectors and 
their men formed the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (FUNSK) in 
order to launch a final attack on Cambodia together with their Vietnamese allies. This 
time the aim was not to establish a new system, but to overturn the ruling government 
in order to install a ‘true’ version of socialism instead of the faulty one already in 
place33:  
The ideological, political and military struggle with Vietnam was certainly the 
most defining relation Democratic Kampuchea had with another country. Also to be 
considered are, however, the United States and in particular China. US foreign policy 
interests in South East Asia had a deep impact on Cambodia in the 60s and early 70s; 
Kiernan holds that the “revolution would not have won power without US economic 
and military destabilization”, which he calls the “most important single factor in Pol 
Pot’s rise”(Kiernan 1997, 16). But from 1975-1979 the United States took on a largely 
                                                 
33 For a description of the FUNSK 11 point program as declared to followers on December 2, 1978 
see (Gottesman 2003; Slocomb 2003). 
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symbolic significance: They became the antonym for everything the DK wanted to 
stand for, the personification of a destructive force more than an actual adversary. 
“[W]ords like CIA and KGB [in the S-21 confessions] became generic descriptions of 
enemies” (Chandler 2000b, 93). 
Very real, on the contrary, were the contributions and the interference by China 
when it came to DK’s government affairs. Mertha details the extent of Chinese aid to 
Cambodia: The Chinese government did not only provide the government with billions 
of dollars in financial aid. DK also profited from Chinese efforts to rebuild the 
country’s infrastructure and economy. Chinese experts, technicians and engineers 
oversaw the reconstruction of roads, railways and production sites and Cambodians 
were supported by Chinese workers in the course of realizing these projects (Mertha 
2014). “Without Chinese support, the DK regime would almost certainly have 
collapsed” (Mertha 2014, 15). But the same propaganda machine that preached 
independence and self-reliance downplayed this relationship too (Jackson 1989b, 41). 
China’s interest in Cambodia arouse out of geopolitical considerations: 
Supporting the coalition between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge (the FUNK) against 
the Lon Nol regime, was to prevent a US take-over by proxy, and, once they had 
succeeded, China wanted to keep them in place to safeguard the region. Pol Pot and 
other members of the CPK had paid several visits to China throughout the 60s and were 
able to observe the country’s transformation under Mao Zedong. From 1970 until 1973 
the then exiled Royal Government had its ministries formally installed in Beijing, 
where Sihanouk resided as the Head of State. As a “symbolic reduction” of Sihnaouk’s 
role in their movement, the Khmer Rouge transferred these ministries to Cambodia in 
November 1973, a decision for which they had China’s blessing (Carney 1989b, 29).  
With financial and military support China continued to build its role as a 
generous patron of the Pol Pot regime from 1975 to 1979. Early on Ieng Sary had 
negotiated a “Chinese military aid package for Cambodia of 13.000 tons of weapons”, 
and the country proved to be a reliable partner, whenever the Khmer Rouge came under 
pressure even after Mao’s death in 1976 (Mertha 2014). It is help for which they 
received preciously little in return (Mertha 2014, 9). As part of some symbolic political 
gestures Pol Pot did however choose China to make some of the few public 
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announcements directed at an international audience; most notably when he revealed 
his identity as DK’s leader to the world and declared the revolution a communist 
victory in 1977. 
When Vietnam and Cambodia finally clashed China readily took the Khmer 
Rouge’s side, delivering weapons and ammunition for them to sustain their guerilla 
war. China had already suspended aid to the Hanoi regime in 1978, after Vietnam had 
joined the COMECON and thus signaled a shift in the direction of the Soviet Union. 
Following Pol Pot’s removal from power and the installation of the People’s Republic 
of Kampuchea, China briefly invaded Vietnam to punish them for their role in 
Democratic Kampuchea’s downfall.  
The international influence on the development of the PRK 
The development and implementation of policies in the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea was always affected by a complicated mix of domestic strategies, 
ideological ties and the economic realities of the country. After their victory and the ad 
hoc establishment of a new administrative structure, Vietnam had three priorities: End 
the war, promote loyal Cambodian leadership to assure political stability, and establish 
a communist economy (Gottesman 2003, 96). All three priorities were evidently suited 
to further their own geopolitical strategies. In order to keep the new Cambodian 
leadership on track, the related reforms were supervised by Vietnamese advisors. It 
would be wrong to say that these advisors simply offered their help, but it is not correct 
either to say that they imposed their ideas.  
Despite the fact that they had the consequences of communism’s grave failures 
right in front of their eyes, many of the former Khmer Rouge cadres were not yet ready 
to give up on the idea that this system could work eventually (Gottesman 2003). Given 
that there are next to no statistics covering the years of this isolated regime, it is still 
difficult to put the achievements and failures of the PRK regime in numbers. In 1991, 
after the UN mission was already decided upon, there were plenty of reports that 
decried the harsh conditions in the country – but they mostly failed to account for the 
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fact that the poverty of the people and the struggles of the new leadership were in no 
small part due to the economic sanctions the West had imposed on them.  
During the ten years between the intervention and the withdrawal of the 
Vietnamese army the PRK underwent a number of political reforms. In sum they 
indicated a growing willingness on part of the leadership to downscale the importance 
of communist ideology and prepare Cambodia’s rapprochement with economically 
more successful countries. In this regard, its development mirrored the wider global 
trend. Gottesman indicates that Vietnam was most successful in setting up a 
Cambodian army; and the fact that tens of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers died in 
Cambodia between 1979 and 1989 can also be read as proof of their commitment to 
keep the Khmer Rouge from regaining power (Gottesman 2003, 143).  
The development of the economy on the other hand, has to be regarded as a 
failure with respect to Hanoi’s initial goals. Government authorities were never able to 
provide for the people’s many needs in a satisfactory manner. In a system touting a 
communist ideology this evidently had an effect on the credibility of the government 
as such: “The state commercial system had failed and only private merchants were 
bringing food and consumer goods into Phnom Penh and the other towns” (Gottesman 
2003, 203). The PRK was therefore early on inclined to allow the evolution of a small 
scale private sector, and towards the end of the 80s a more pragmatic leadership under 
Hun Sen began to envision a market economy. These plans were met with less and less 
opposition from Vietnam, also because they were faced with communism’s economic 
unsustainability in their own country.  
Cambodian leaders did in fact have quite some leverage with regard to 
Vietnam’s reform intentions, but this independence was evidently not apparent to the 
Cambodian people. The continuous presence of Vietnamese advisors and its military 
in the country unsettled many and led to a lot of tensions. In order not to lose domestic 
support Cambodian officials were therefore particularly eager to show their muscle in 
symbolically important matters, notably the highly delicate immigration issue 
(Gottesman 2003, 125).  
People had complained about the lax enforcement of immigration policies 
between Vietnam and Cambodia: The perceived unrestrained influx of Vietnamese 
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workers and their families nurtured deep seated fears of their nation’s annihilation. But 
a quick solution to this problem was not in sight and the issue provided the exiled 
opposition with excellent material for their propaganda machine. In contrast to the 
comprehensive influence of the Vietnamese, the Soviet Union stayed largely in the 
background. They provided the PRK with material and expensive advisors, which 
nobody dared to refuse (Gottesman 2003, 146). China on the other hand supported the 
Sihanouk-Sann-Sary coalition with support for their campaign against the PRK. It was 
also due to their pressure that Democratic Kampuchea kept Cambodia’s seat at the 
United Nations.  
Foreign countries affected Cambodian politics not only through their money 
and advisors. The PRK was also increasingly concerned regarding its international 
standing. How the international community perceived Cambodia was a factor to 
consider regarding the long-term survival of their state and had an impact on several 
decision making processes: In addition to its economic reforms the PRK presented 
itself more and more open to democratic changes, abolished the death penalty, allowed 
small (and very well controlled) elections on the commune level and renamed itself 
State of Cambodia in 1989 – thereby giving up the communist heritage of its name. 
From the international point of view these changes did of course little to make 
the PRK acceptable from a political point of view. Suggestions to solve the ongoing 
conflict between the four factions by means of a UN supervised election had already 
been tabled in 1981 by China and ASEAN (Gottesman 2003, 118). But this proposal 
became only worth considering when local interests and the geopolitical situation 
finally converged: With the end of the Cold War both the Soviet Union and Vietnam 
lost their respective incentives to further invest in the small Southeast Asian country. 
Hun Sen on the other hand knew that he could not withstand the opposition 
forces without their military aid. In 1987 he launched a policy of national reconciliation 
announced his decision to ‘switch from the military to the diplomatic field’ to his party 
members (Gottesman 2003, 278). He and Sihanouk began a series of talks that would 
ultimately lead to the Paris Peace Conference in 1989 and the signing of the Paris Peace 
Agreements in 1991.  
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5.4. After the Paris Peace Agreements: UNTAC and the Establishment 
of a New Political Order 
5.4.1. Introduction 
With the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991 Cambodia made its 
reappearance on the center stage of international attention. The long awaited diplomatic 
success was hailed as an opportunity for the country to make a fresh start and become 
a member of the international community after decades of war and isolation. In order 
to prepare the country’s first nationwide democratic elections the conflict parties had 
agreed to the establishment of a UN transitional authority. It would be up to the 
Cambodian people to decide who was to become their next leader and the United 
Nations would do everything in their power for them to make their choice in free and 
fair elections – this at least is how Cambodia’s fate was summarized and presented to 
the world. 
Signed on October 23 1991 in Paris, the Peace Agreements encompassed four 
separate documents: 1) the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, 2) the 
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 3) the 
Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and 
Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and 4) the Declaration on 
the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Out of these four, only the two 
agreements were legally binding treaties (Findlay 1995: 11).34 The Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict detailed the mandate of 
the United Nations and by signing it, the Supreme National Council (SNC) formally 
delegated all powers necessary to ensure its implementation. The SNC constituted a 
legal novelty: As article 78 of the UN prohibits putting a sovereign member under 
trusteeship Cambodia was going to be represented by the SNC for the duration of the 
transitional period.  
                                                 
34 In the following the expression „the Agreements“ is used in reference to both the Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflic and the Agreement Concerning the 
Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of 
Cambodia. The chapters will paraphrase the Agreements.  
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Until the formation of a new government this institutions embodied 
Cambodia’s ‘sovereignty, independence and unity’ and represented the country’s 
‘unique legitimate body and source of authority’. Headed by Norodom Sihanouk the 
SNC consisted of 12 members. The incumbent State of Cambodia was represented by 
six members, while the remaining three parties, namely FUNCINPEC, the BNLDP, 
and the Khmer Rouge, who had formerly collaborated in the exile government, were 
each given two of the remaining six seats.1  
 Justified with the necessary establishment of a neutral political environment 
(NPE) prior to the country’s first nationwide democratic elections, the powers 
delegated by the SNC encompassed the placement of all elections, administrative 
agencies, bodies and offices, which could directly influence its outcome, under direct 
UN supervision.35 For the first time, the UN also obtained the powers to organize the 
elections in the context of such a mission. In previous cases it had only been mandated 
to supervise them.  
All together UNTAC consisted of seven units, which were assigned with 
different responsibilities in the context of the mission: Military, Police, Civil 
Administration, Human Rights, Repatriation and Rehabilitation, and Information and 
Education. The Paris Peace Agreements determined that the end of the transitional 
period was to be marked by the formation of a new government: A constituent assembly 
elected through free and fair elections would have to draft Cambodia’s new constitution 
and transform itself into a legislative assembly.  
Put in sheer numbers the situation in Cambodia was as grave as it can be when UNTAC 
arrived: In rankings on health care, life expectancy, and per capita income the country 
found itself at or near the very bottom of the lists, while securing high places in 
statistics on the number of unexploded land-mines buried in the ground and – 
accordingly – ranked first among the world’s countries with the highest percentage of 
physically disabled people (Chopra 1994, 56).  
As a result of the ongoing civil war close to half a million of refugees lived in 
dire conditions along the borders and thousands of people within the country continued 
                                                 
35 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Article 6 
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to live in temporary dwellings, without knowledge about the whereabouts or the fate 
of their family members. Observers called the country morally and politically bankrupt 
(Carney 1993, 3), its population traumatized and stated the country’s “institutions of 
every sort [were] shattered, from family to nation” (Chopra 1994, 57). The challenges 
the UN mission would have to deal with were judged enormous. Consequently, with a 
pledged budget of close to two billion US Dollar and more than 20.000 international 
staff members, the mission became the most expensive and largest of its kind.  
In order to ensure that the factions complied with the cease-fire agreement and 
to begin with the clearing of mines the UN had sent UNAMIC, a small advance 
mission, to Cambodia, which became operational in November 1991. On March 15, 
1992 when UNTAC was formally established with the arrival of the UN Special 
Representative of the General Secretary (SRGS) heading the mission, Yasushi Akashi, 
the larger mission absorbed this advance group.  
The entire mission was set up to last 13 months. Considering the unresolved 
problems between the main conflict parties, the economic devastation of the country, 
and the novelty of the democratic system it has been rightly remarked that it had never 
been UNTAC’s intention to fully democratize Cambodia. Rather, the mission aimed at 
the establishment of a legitimate government. In the future, such a government could 
then receive encompassing support to rebuild and reform the key-sectors of the country. 
In the process of preparing the elections UNTAC had to deal with a huge number of 
issues; most of them had been foreseen in the planning stages, like the difficult details 
of registering eligible voters, some of them had been underestimated, like the 
establishment of control over the existing administration, and again others had to be 
assumed on a rather ad hoc basis, like UNTAC’s involvement in the conflicts over land. 
In order to establish some kind of level playing field for the new political game, 
UNTAC had to simultaneously address the problematic legacy of Cambodia’s past, its 
present, and lay out the groundwork for a different future.  
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5.4.2. UNTAC and the Past: Addressing the Legacies of the Conflict 
With their signature under the Paris Peace Agreements the four conflict factions had 
committed themselves to a peaceful transition, but even with UNTAC’s arrival political 
power and status were still measured as a function of existing administrative control 
and military strength. It was therefore crucial for UNTAC to create conditions in which 
compliance with the agreements’ terms could be perceived of as beneficial to all parties 
involved. The international administration had to prove to the leaders of the different 
faction that they had a chance to gain or keep positions of power by means of peaceful 
participation in the envisaged elections. Three issues were of particular importance in 
this regard, namely the establishment of control over the existing administrative 
structures, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the demobilization of the soldiers.  
Article 6 of the Paris Peace Agreements authorized UNTAC to supervise or 
control all administrative structures that might interfere with the organization of free 
and fair elections. To ensure a neutral political environment in which the people could 
exercise their new right to vote without fear of threat or coercion the agreements 
detailed that foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information 
would be given special attention.  
UNTAC’s efforts in this regard were under close scrutiny and throughout the 
mission the former members of the exiled government remained dissatisfied with the 
results. Contrary to the expectations of many Cambodians, the UN did not intent to 
take over the Cambodian government for the duration of the operation, but ‘only’ to 
correct for the political bias resulting from SoC control over the administration in order 
to establish a neutral political environment prior to the elections. After all, the 
administration of the State of Cambodia and its organizational patterns and routines 
had been established from 1979 on – and thus for more than a decade by the time of 
UNTAC’s arrival. The Civil Administration Unit that was meant to put this apparatus 
under ‘effective control’ consisted of merely 400 to 500 people, who were not even 
fully deployed until September 27, 1992. Only a minority of these staff members were 
proficient in the Khmer language. Under these circumstances compliance could not be 
enforced but the unit’s work “relied on the willingness of local authorities” (Chopra 
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1994, 31–32), which was described as “partial and begrudging” (Findlay 1995, 62). 
Doyle put it more bluntly when he concluded that the “State of Cambodia simply 
administered around UNTAC” (Doyle 1995, 35).  
According to Chopra the UNTAC police unit CIVPOL could have supported 
the Civil Administration Unit in its important task to establish neutral institutions prior 
to the elections. Not only mandated to supervise but also to control CIVPOL was 
nominally “in a powerful position to challenge abuses of power and direct law and 
order”. They did, however, apply a very narrow interpretation of their supervisory 
powers and did “not even attempt to carry out its control tasks” (Chopra 1994, 44).  
Apart from the missing cooperation between UNTAC’s different units and the 
low priority given to Civil Administration in the larger context of the mission effective 
control over the EAS was also hindered by the fact that the administrative structures of 
Cambodia’s different provinces were put under the control of different nations, each 
relying on and trying to implement “their own styles of administration” (Chopra 1994, 
34). Observers judged the impact of the Civil Administration Unit by and large a failure 
– which puts them in agreement with the assessment of the opposition parties.  
The second issue that was of vital importance from the opposition’s point of 
view was the return of the foreign forces. Section IV, Article 8 of the Paris Peace 
Agreements stipulated that UNTAC’s Military Unit was to verify the withdrawal of 
any foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia, together 
with their weapons, ammunition, and equipment. UNTAC’s performance in this matter 
was severely criticized throughout the mission and the issue became a touchstone for 
the administration’s legitimacy. Amidst heated accusations and suspicions voiced by 
politicians and the people UNTAC tried rather desperately to sustain its neutrality.  
The departure of Vietnamese military personnel was monitored via checkpoints 
along the border and additionally UNTAC investigated into the frequent accusations 
of foreign forces living under concealed identities in Cambodian villages. Apart from 
the initially slow setup of the border checkpoints that drew some criticism, international 
observers unanimously judged UNTAC’s work as substantial and thorough (Findlay 
1995, 34). Cambodians were of a different opinion: In their propaganda the Khmer 
Rouge, FUNCINPEC and the BLDP strived to blur the lines between members of the 
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foreign forces, Vietnamese migrant workers and even Cambodians of Vietnamese 
descent. To them, they all represented unwanted and hostile foreigners that were in one 
way or another connected with the Hanoi government and its alleged plan to undermine 
Cambodian politics and culture. 
Estimations as to the numbers of concealed enemies living in the country 
hovered around one million people and were thus a far cry from the three men UNTAC 
actually identified as members of foreign forces living illegally in Cambodia according 
to the provisions of the Agreements. All three held small positions in the SoC military 
and were married to Cambodian women. Unsurprisingly, the Cambodians “found it 
hard to understand why UNTAC could not find the Vietnamese that every Cambodian 
had seen and had heard about” (Jordens 1996, 148–149). 36  
The symbolic value of the issue is not only evidenced by the factions’ 
accusations against UNTAC for its failure to ‘find’ the Vietnamese spies, but also by 
the immense attention the UN devoted to the verification of the three men’s identity. 
After Vietnam’s refusal to acknowledge their status as foreign forces and to take them 
back the UN Security Council hurried to express its “strong concern at recent reports 
by UNTAC of a small number of foreign military personnel serving with the armed 
forces of the SOC in violation of the Paris Agreements” in its resolution (Amer 1993, 
220–221).  
Doubts about UNTAC’s efficacy in supervising the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
military were exacerbated by the fact that cross-border migration did indeed pick up 
after the signing of the Agreements. In the wake of economic liberalization and the 
sudden cash flow that poured into the country many Vietnamese men and women 
migrated to Cambodia to work in the construction business or to feed the growing sex-
worker industry (which only served to confirm Cambodians’ long-held convictions 
about the morality of Vietnamese women) (Jordens 1996. 138-139). Quickly, rumors 
about Vietnamese obtaining Cambodian citizenship to vote for the incumbent 
government in the upcoming elections spread and UNTAC could do little more than 
                                                 
36 According to Findlay UNTAC later discovered another four men, which matched the criteria of foreign 
forces (Findlay 1995: 37).  
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counter these accusations through their own information channels, in particular through 
Radio and TV UNTAC run by the Information and Education Unit (Amer 1993, 215; 
Jordens 1996, 147).  
The third issue concerned the foreseen demobilization of the conflict factions. 
The Paris Peace Agreements detailed that the cease-fire and disarmament would be 
implemented in two phases. Phase I began immediately after the agreements and 
demanded of all factions to observe the new orders to refrain from hostilities. During 
Phase II the UNTAC Military Unit would supervise, monitor and verify the cease-fire. 
In a related step the unit would then focus on the factions’ demobilization including 
the regrouping, cantonment and ultimate disposition of all Cambodian forces and their 
weapons. Early on, it became clear that the mission could not rely on the full 
cooperation of all conflict factions.  
The greatest concern in this regard was the Khmer Rouge’s slow withdrawal 
from the peace process. Phase I of the peace process had officially started with the 
Agreements’ entry-into-force on October 23, 1991. In the five month until UNTAC’s 
arrival the cease-fire was violated on multiple occasions and the Khmer Rouge refused 
to grant UNAMIC officials access to territories under their control (Findlay 1995, 25). 
Equally concerning from the UN’s point of view was the sudden absence of the Khmer 
Rouge representatives from the Mixed Military Working Group meetings which had 
taken place on a regular basis since December 28, 1991 (Amer 1993, 212–213). They 
had given little or no explanation for their behavior and early on each side called out 
the other for not conforming to the regulations of the peace plan. This changed little 
even after UNTAC’s deployment. The Khmer Rouge in particular insisted that the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia was neither adequately encouraged 
nor supervised by the UN. Their preoccupation with the Vietnamese issue was evident 
in their propaganda as well as in the repeated requests they addressed the United 
Nations with (Roberts 2000). 
Apart from the diplomatic tension between the UN and the Khmer Rouge 
leadership, violent clashes between troops of the Khmer Rouge and the SoC continued 
to occur on a regular basis. The fighting reached a critical point in January 1993 when 
SoC troops tried to recapture zones under Khmer Rouge control. Their successful move 
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was followed by several retaliation attacks (Chopra 1994, 28). Due to these and other 
repeated violations of the cease-fire agreement Phase I could not be fully implemented, 
which inevitably led directly to the failure of Phase II: the disarmament and cantonment 
phase.  
The Khmer Rouge widely refused to provide the UN with the necessary 
information to estimate the numbers and location of mines in their territories and the 
weaponry in their possession, or to hand them over. Of the four conflict factions only 
the KPNLF demobilized fully, while FUNCINPEC’s troops were considered 
demobilized to 50 percent and the SoC’s to 25 percent. “The end result was that, while 
the two smaller factions had mostly disarmed the SOC kept the best part of its army 
intact and the KR suffered no impairment of its fighting capacity whatsoever” (Findlay 
1995, 38–39).  
There is mixed judgment regarding the intentions of the Khmer Rouge. Some 
are of the opinion that they were genuinely prepared to transform into a political party 
and compete in the elections and only withdrew their consent because the UN was 
unable to truly accommodate their interests in the peace process (Roberts 2000), while 
others doubt that the Khmer Rouge ever intended to submit themselves to Cambodia’s 
democratization and the resulting rules (Chopra 1994, 30; Findlay 1995, 49). It was 
probably already clear by January 27, when the Khmer Rouge failed to register as a 
political party, that their dropout of the peace process was final. It would take until 
April 4, 1993 though, until they officially declared their decision to withdraw. 
The legacies of the past did not only affect the level of government. Most 
heavily they weight on the Cambodian people. Two decades of war with its bombings 
and forced relocations had torn almost every family apart. During the years of the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PDK) international attention and aid had largely 
been devoted to the refugees in the camps alongside Cambodia’s borders. Khmer 
Rouge soldiers ran many of these camps and the constant flow of aid towards these 
regions had also ensured the survival of those loyal to Pol Pot. The factions under the 
leadership of Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann largely recruited their followership 
from these places too and the camps quickly gained the (accurate) reputation of being 
opposition strongholds. 
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Part V of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement put forward that 
Cambodian refugees and displaced persons located outside Cambodia have the right to 
return to Cambodia and to live in safety, security and dignity, free from intimidation or 
coercion of any kind. Given the political tensions arising from the fact that the 
repatriation of refugees equaled the massive immigration of opposition voters from the 
State of Cambodia’s point of view, in addition to the pure logistical challenges of 
transporting hundreds of thousands of people through the huge mine-field of a country 
still at war, and the need to provide them with acceptable living conditions and 
possibilities to earn money at their manifold destinations, this task was deemed no easy 
one. In retrospect the work of the Repatriation and Rehabilitation Unit would constitute 
one of UNTAC’s undisputed successes, with observers unanimously praising the 
mission’s achievements and problem solving capacities in this matter (Amer 1993, 220; 
Doyle 1995, 2; Jeldres 1993, 109).  
Via TV UNTAC the people witnessed emotional family reunions with 
overjoyed mothers and fathers who embraced the children they had long thought dead. 
UNTAC’s success is mostly accorded to the heavy involvement of the UNHCR, who 
had helped to administer the camps since the early 1980s and who had been involved 
in all crucial planning stages of the peace-plan concerning this undertaking (Findlay 
1995, 53). Initially, the intention had been to complete repatriation of the 370.000 
refugees by the end of the year as this date coincided with the registration deadline for 
voters’ registration. Despite the efforts of the UNHCR and the Military Unit UNTAC 
failed to meet this ambitious goal and completed the process only by April 1993 
(Chopra 1994, 62).  
The UN was aware of the long-term problems that tailed the reintegration of so 
many people into a divided country with an overwhelmingly poor population. On the 
one hand, there were the pure economic challenges of providing the returnees with 
some kind of livelihood. As a possible solution to the problem each refugee was 
promised two hectares of land upon their return. But due to “the lack of sufficient mine-
free arable land”, they were soon offered other options (Findlay 1995, 53). These 
included for instance the receipt of a one-time payment (which turned out to be the 
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most popular compensation) or the offer to simply wait for the availability of a suitable 
spot (Chopra 1994, 62).  
On the other hand there were the social tensions that arouse only partially from 
the competition for land and employment. As Chopra summarizes it, there were not 
only the internally displaced and the refugees, but also thousands of demobilized 
soldiers totaling “two-thirds and three-quarters of a million [that] would need 
reintegration into a population of about nine million itself in need of rehabilitation” 
(Chopra 1994, 56). In other words: With the completion of the repatriation process, the 
larger and much more complicated process of national reconciliation only began.  
5.4.3. UNTAC and the Present: Establishing Law and Order 
Throughout the preparatory phase the establishment of a neutral political environment 
(NPE) was not only hindered by the regular clashes of the factions’ military arms, but 
also by severe incidents of political violence, from voters’ intimidation to murder. 
Apart from CIVPOL these incidents were also investigated by the UNTAC’s Human 
Rights Unit in order to establish whether or not a particular incident was motivated by 
political or other reasons. This judgment determined further proceedings. According to 
internal reports members of the FUNCINPEC party constituted the main targets 
(Ledgerwood 1996). The continued attacks on members of the opposition parties were 
deemed a symptom of UNTAC’s failure to effectively control the SoC security forces 
and provide the new political parties with a neutral political environment to compete 
in (Findlay 1995, 60). In January 1993, Norodom Sihanouk briefly resigned from his 
position as head of the SNC and retreated to Beijing to protest the violence against ‘his’ 
party although he was the founder of the party, he officially was no longer a member – 
a fact that the party itself liked to deny or downplay in its campaigns. He only resumed 
his responsibilities after Akashi had personally paid him a visit and assured him of 
UNTAC’s increased efforts to promote safety for the candidates (Amer 1993, 218–
219).  
One of the measures immediately put in place was the creation of a “special 
prosecutor’s office and court system designed to indict, prosecute, sentence, and 
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imprison individuals responsible for political crimes” (Chopra 1994, 40–41). In the 
reports the authors highlight time and again that UNTAC was only as powerful as its 
control over the SoC apparatus was great. Accordingly there are hundreds of incidents 
that have been quoted to evidence UNTAC’s de facto impotence in the face of political 
violence, as a result of the local authorities’ refusal to cooperate in the arrests, 
detainment or prosecution of the accused.  
Cambodians of Vietnamese descent were another particularly vulnerable group 
as they were viewed as representatives for the Khmers’ hereditary enemy. Changes in 
government and the period of disorganization surrounding it had in the past almost 
inevitably led to violence against them: The killing of Vietnamese could always be 
interpreted as some kind of political statement. UNTAC formed no exception to this 
pattern. Amnesty International reported that during the six month prior to the elections 
Khmer Rouge soldiers killed almost 200 civilians of Vietnamese descent. Apparently 
unfazed by the possibility to meet any kind of armed resistance, most of the massacres 
were preceded by violent threats against the targeted community and the local 
authorities often knew weeks in advance of the planned atrocities (Jordens 1996, 140).  
The brutal killings of men, women and children received wide media coverage 
– in particular the massacre of 33 people in Chnong Kneas village, where most of the 
victims were women and children. With their attacks the Khmer Rouge revived 
elements of the terror the Cambodian people had experienced in the 70s and in the 
wake of these atrocities thousands of people, most of whom were born or had lived in 
Cambodia for decades, fled the country (Amer 1993, 221; Jordens 1996, 139).37 
UNTAC drew severe criticism for its management of the tensions between Cambodia 
and Vietnam and the resulting consequences. Jeldres put forward that it would have 
been the UN’s responsibility to (forcibly) repatriate the 600.000 illegal Vietnamese 
settlers that lived in Cambodia at the time according to his estimation. He thereby 
endows much of the parties’ propaganda with reason and – contrary to well established 
                                                 
37 After the UNTAC sponsored elections most of them tried to return to the country they considered 
their home but were denied entry. Considered Vietnamese by the Cambodians and Cambodian by the 
Vietnamese thousands of them became trapped at the border, where they lived under deplorable 
conditions on their boats. For a discussion of their situation and legal status see (Berman 1996). 
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facts – presents the massacres of Vietnamese as a result of public emotions running 
high, rather than planned attacks executed by the Khmer Rouge (Jeldres 1993, 108). 
Chopra on the other hand discusses UNTAC’s shortcomings in this matter in the 
context of CIVPOL’s weak performance and its failure to protect Vietnamese settlers 
effectively (Chopra 1994, 43).  
Many high-ranking officials declared that as a peace-keeping mission, UNTAC 
was not authorized to intervene in armed conflicts – even if, as was the case with all 
massacres, one party had no means to defend itself. Others insisted on more decisive 
action, quoting UNTAC’s responsibilities to “assure the protection of human rights, 
and the non-return to the policies and practices of the past” as laid out in the Paris Peace 
Agreements (Jordens 1996, 145–147). In sum, the authors judge that UNTAC was 
apparently more concerned with the organizations of the elections and not willing to 
intervene more actively with either words or weapons in this sensitive issue for the 
price of jeopardizing its impartiality.  
The human rights provisions detailed in Part III and Annex 1, section E of the 
Agreements were in fact quite substantial: As pointed out by many observers in the 
aftermath of the violence against the ethnic Vietnamese UNTAC was responsible to 
establish an environment in which human rights would be respected. Accordingly, one 
of the main tasks of the Human Rights Unit was the investigations in incidents of 
political violence, often in close cooperation with the Cambodian authorities. As a 
signatory to the Agreements, Cambodia had committed itself to facilitate UNTAC’s 
efforts. In 1992 and 1993 the SNC signed a total of seven human rights conventions. 
Based on these conventions UNTAC was able to establish new procedures for arrest 
and trials and promote the independence of the magistrates, which constituted a “major 
step forward in creating respect for the rule of law” (Duffy 1994, 94–95, 101). 
Despite the achievements and orders from ‘above’ the local authorities remained rather 
unsupportive of UNTAC’s efforts to reform the judiciary, the police or the prison 
system. Under the PRK/SoC the only criminal code ever drafted was a document that 
declared ‘betraying the revolution’ a crime. Gottesman comments that “only 
subsequent circulars clarified that ‘betraying the revolution’ meant any act deemed to 
be in opposition to the regime, its ideology, or its Vietnamese patrons” (Gottesman 
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2003, 241). This opened the door for all kinds of legal abuses and corruption was 
rampant. With a focus on the zones under SoC control UNTAC did therefore conduct 
a broad survey of the prison system, released political prisoners and implemented a 
range of programs to improve the conditions of imprisonment (Duffy 1994, 101).  
With its work the Human Rights Unit attempted to lay the foundation of an 
overall reformed justice system future generations could build on. In practice, the unit 
was therefore working in two separate teams: One concerned with the fieldwork of 
investigation and the other one with human rights training and education (Duffy 1994, 
94).  
5.4.4. UNTAC and the Future 
The ultimate goal of the large and expensive mission to Cambodia was obviously to 
have a lasting effect on the institutional framework and change the attitude of 
governmental representatives towards the state. With regard to the wider population 
UNTAC’s work was therefore heavily geared towards empowerment through 
education. The Human Rights Units installed officers in the accessible zones of the 
different provinces and informed the people about their rights. Simultaneously they 
provided other components with support in the educational training of the 
governmental administration and the police. With the help of the newly translated 
relevant legal texts they received lessons concerning their obligations, and the rights of 
the citizens they were supposed to serve.  
All of these efforts would have been in vein without the creation of a legitimate 
government. Consequently, the preparation of the elections had the highest priority. 
According to the Paris Agreement UNTAC’s mandated powers encompassed every 
important aspect of this endeavor. The international administration was entitled to set 
up the legal framework that would determine the registration process, the formation of 
the new parties, and the general elections. Furthermore, UNTAC was mandated to 
organize and facilitate the campaigning period, which included to ensure all competing 
parties fair access to the media.  
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For the Cambodian people the Agreements foresaw the implementation of an 
electoral education process, so that they could live up to their new role as voters. 
Whenever existing laws contradicted the intentions of the Agreement, UNTAC was 
able to suspend or abolish them. Though it was underlined that all measures would be 
taken in consultation with the SNC, the authority to make binding decisions lay solely 
with the head of the mission, the Special Representative to the Secretary General 
Yasushi Akashi.38  
Designed to constitute the end of the ambitious mission as well as the beginning 
of Cambodia’s democratic political future, the planning and proceeding of the elections 
under the lead of the Electoral Unit were influenced by every other aspect of UNTAC’s 
work: In order to ensure the registration of the voters it was essential to successfully 
complete the repatriation process. The return of the refugees was also vital to reassure 
the opposition parties, as they overwhelmingly represented the constituency of the 
KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. For the opposition it was of even greater importance that 
UNTAC’s Civil Administration would establish effective control over the SoC 
administrative apparatus prior to the elections.  
CivPol and the Military Unit tried to curb the ongoing violence in the country 
as politically motivated killings intimidated the members of the established factions, 
the newly emerging parties and the voters. In the month leading up to the elections 
UNTAC’s international staff members themselves became increasingly the target of 
abduction and malicious attacks at their hands. Several peacekeepers were murdered 
by the KR soldiers and after the death of a Japanese member of the UN Volunteer 
Corps in April 1993 the peace process was in serious jeopardy (Findlay 1995, 76–77). 
Given the multitude of violent attacks and the high level of intimidation in many of the 
country’s provinces UNTAC had to admit that the establishment of a Neutral Political 
Environment had essentially failed. The elections nevertheless proceeded as planned. 
According to Findlay the UN came to the conclusion that it had already invested too 
much to pull out, but couldn’t invest more to stay longer (Findlay 1995, 39–40). 
                                                 
38 Compare Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, Part II 
Article 12, 13, 14; Annex I, Section D, Annex III 
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Therefore everybody focused on the positive aspects of the pre-election process, such 
as the high numbers of registered voters as representative for the will of the population 
to participate, and decided to go ahead.  
UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit: Shaping ideas of the new 
political order 
In the evaluation of UNTAC’s work the Information and Education Unit has received 
a lot of praise. With Radio UNTAC the unit had created a novelty in UN peacekeeping 
mission and in “assessing how well its own message was being received by the 
Cambodians Info/Ed developed what may have been the UN’s first political 
intelligence department” (Doyle 1995, 55). It was widely recognized that the 
information provided by Radio UNTAC played a significant role in motivating the 
people to cast their vote despite the tension filled atmosphere ahead of the election. 
With its radio programs and other media distribution InfoEd provided an alternative to 
the factions’ ‘propaganda’ and contributed to a fair competition by giving the smaller 
parties access to a bigger audience.  
The following analysis does not question this achievement. But by drawing 
attention to the symbolic dimension of the unit’s direct communication with the 
Cambodian people it can demonstrate the highly political aspect of the ‘neutral 
alternative’ they offered: By creating a new public in the context of Cambodia’s 
interventions society the unit sought to develop interpretative authority and to 
discipline the local political actors’ discourse over the country’s political future.  
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6. Analysis  
6.1. Assessing the Conditions: The PPA as a Symbol of the New 
Political Order 
Considering the very recent, very complicated past of all actors involved in the 
Cambodian peace process, the radically different interpretations of the conflict history 
as asserted by the main Cambodian actors, and the profound change in the relationship 
between the Cambodian people and their government that this mission wanted to bring 
about, it seems imperative to inquire into the management of the tensions that were 
bound to prevail in the implementation phase. The entire interaction of these actors was 
determined by the Paris Peace Agreements. The history review presented in Chapter 7 
does therefore suggest that these Agreements may have ended the debate over the 
country’s new governmental institutions, but remained at the center of an ongoing 
negotiation over the character and purpose of the country’s new political order. 
 
The theory of interpretative authority sees the strength of a symbol and the possibility 
of an institution to develop and exercise political authority in a mutual constitutive 
relationship. In order to implement the Paris Peace Agreements and lay the foundation 
for a new political order, UNTAC was dependent on the repeated public 
acknowledgement of political actors and the people that these Agreements did in fact 
represent a change in the way society and the government relate.  
The ongoing violence between the four conflict factions posed a difficult issue 
in this regard. It demonstrated to everybody that the conflict had not been resolved, but 
rather temporarily transformed. The early meetings between Hun Sen and Prince 
Sihanouk, prior to the Peace Conference, had been justified with everybody’s desire to 
promote ‘national reconciliation’. UNTAC attempted to build on this established theme 
by encouraging Sihanouk to take on the position as head of the Supreme National 
Council. His son Rannaridh became the head of the FUNCINPEC Party and Sihanouk 
was henceforward praised as Cambodia’s symbol of national reconciliation by 
international and local political actors. 
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 Endowed with this type of ‘neutrality’, this was UNTAC’s hope, he could 
mediate between the different factions and keep the Khmer Rouge in check. Especially 
in the early months of the intervention Sihanouk did in fact intervene on behalf of 
UNTAC, but with the final drop-out of the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC’s perceived lax 
implementation of the Vietnamese withdrawal, and the ongoing attacks against the 
members of his former party, he withdrew his support and began to openly question 
the legitimacy of the mission.  
 
Many of these debates and UNTAC’s reconciliation efforts did, however, evolve on a 
diplomatic level behind closed doors and were thus not truly different from the 
‘political spectacle’ the people were used to. In the strict sense of the word the Paris 
Peace Agreements promised the Cambodian people the establishment of a ‘liberal 
pluralist democracy’. But how could the people imagine such a political order? 
During UNTAC the term democracy was usually paired with the Khmer 
expression put brakot, emphasizing its true nature. Under the Khmer Rouge Cambodia 
had been known as Democratic Kampuchea and the insistence on the true character of 
the new ‘untacist’ democracy was also meant to absolve the discredited term. Vis-à-
vis the population the word ‘liberal’ – or rather the word ‘free’ (serey) in Khmer – was 
mainly used in descriptions of the new economy. After more than a decade of 
international sanctions against the State of Cambodia (SoC) a free market would end 
the country’s economic isolation and reestablish a profitable exchange of goods and 
money across the country’s borders.  
The expression pluralist had been translated into Khmer as peahupak, which 
combines the word for party with the prefix peahu, meaning great, multi or many. In 
official documents it was therefore often translated with ‘multiparty’ instead of 
‘pluralist’. From the citizens’ point of view it was this idea that captured the essence of 
political reforms most clearly. The past had taught the Cambodian people two things 
about politics: That they are subordinate to their political leaders and that political 
labels are void of any meaning. Their country had been designated a monarchy, a 
republic, a democracy and a socialist state in the course of less than 50 years, while the 
same actors continued to dominate the scene in different roles.  
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The common trait of all past regimes had been that they essentially constituted 
one-party systems. Occasionally the Cambodians had been asked to vote, but these 
elections were mere invitations to express their support and never intended to change 
established power-structures. Much like any other revolutionary leader UNTAC did 
therefore try to promote the new political order as a liberation of the people that would 
follow the long awaited abolishment of existing oppressive structures. In a multiparty 
democracy, this was how UNTAC summarized its political vision, the government was 
depended on their vote and therefore bound to act in the interest of the people and not 
its own.   
UNTAC’s central message of ‘having a choice’ clearly gained credibility 
through the subsequent registration of the 20 parties. The successful completion of this 
process had been important for the Transitional Authority for a variety of reasons. 
Preceded by lengthy debates to determine who was eligible to compete, the party 
formation demonstrated to the people that most of the actors were willing to submit to 
the new rules. Here, it was certainly of greatest significance that three of the four 
conflict factions had followed the procedures and confirmed their commitment to 
transform ‘the war of guns into a war of words’. Ironically, even the Khmer Rouge did 
not question the superior status of the Agreements. After dropping out their criticism 
was directed against UNTAC’s biased interpretation of the PPA – not against its 
stipulations or potential as a solution to the conflict.  
The registration also signaled a certain equality between the political elite and 
the people, as the latter were likewise required to submit to certain procedures to 
participate in the elections. Factions turned into political parties and people into voters. 
Each successful party registration was announced by means of a public notification in 
UN Special Representative’s Akashi’s name, linking the procedure to the stipulations 
of UNTAC’s electoral law.39 The notification was distributed via radio and copies were 
placed on “on prominent display at all premises in Cambodia occupied by [UNTAC’s] 
                                                 
39 UNTAC New Parties FDRP: Public Notification of the Provisional Registration FDRP as a Political 
Party, 25.11.1992 
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Electoral Component”40 for the people to take note. More than just a technicality, the 
implementation of the registration formalities formed part of a socialization process 
that rewarded the elite for compliance and signaled the broader population the validity 
of the new rules ahead of the election. On a symbolic level all of the new parties became 
signatories to the Paris Peace Agreement, which significantly strengthened its status as 
representing the future political order.   
 
Looking past the visible markers of institutional change, it becomes quickly obvious 
though that UNTAC was hard pressed to incite trust in the viability of the reforms. This 
skepticism is evident in the statements of representatives on every level, foreign 
observers, members of the established parties, members of the new parties, and of 
course in the concerned comments and questions of the people. An Information officer 
reported from a conversation with some villagers:  
“The meaning of elections to these people is clear: they are one means of bringing peace 
to Cambodia. Democracy is not a concern; the problem of Vietnamese illegal settlers is 
not a concern. The most important electoral issue for these villagers is how to end over 
twenty years of war. ‘We want the elections to stop Khmers fighting Khmers’, they 
said.”41  
Observing the ongoing violence in the country, the people found it increasingly 
difficult though to see how a competition of this kind could contribute to the 
establishment of a peaceful order. In response to a radio program hosted by UNTAC, 
thousands of people all over the country sent letters describing their concerns in hope 
for an answer by the Transitional Authorities. ‘What will happen to the losers of the 
elections?’ was a question they posed over and over again and to which there seemed 
to be no truly satisfying answer.42  
Many of the foreign observers shared the people’s concerns that the creation of 
the new parties was not per se a guarantee for a more just and peaceful future, albeit 
for different reasons: “Their leaders include a donut king and a convicted rapist on the 
                                                 
40 UNTAC Electoral Chronology: Public Notification of the Official Registration of Political Parties, 
23.02.1993 
41 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on Conversations with Villagers in Takeo about Elections, 
29.04.1993, p.2 
42 This statement is based on my preliminary research with the collection Letters to Radio UNTAC. 
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lam.43 They have proposed platforms ranging from turning Cambodia into the Detroit 
of Southeast Asia to extending the national borders by 2,000 square kilometers”44 
summarized a journalist the sometimes bizarre peculiarities of Cambodia’s would-be 
leaders and their plans.  
The registration records show that the majority of those who were able to 
comply with UNTAC’s registration formalities came from abroad. In a way all of the 
parties bore testimony to Cambodia’s recent history of quick and brutal regime 
changes. Some of them had been formed with the support of Cambodian refugees that 
had established successful lives abroad and were relatively new to politics – but many 
more represented the attempts of chassed politicians and members of the various 
resistance movements to make a come-back.  
Former members of Sihanouk’s Sangkum Reastr Niyum occupied leading 
positions in the new parties as well as people, who had been involved in the putsch 
against him. Sometimes for as long as 20 years these refugees had observed 
Cambodia’s fate from afar or been actively involved in the creation of an opportunity 
to return. And although some of them had pre-established loyalties to one of the former 
factions, their absence from Cambodia had cut them off from any valid information as 
regards their current power structures and political tendencies. Kol Pheng described 
the decision making process that preceded the creation of the new Khmer National 
Congress Party as follows:  
“We discussed about how we can contribute to the peace development […] the 
rehabilitation of Cambodia. Some suggested that we should start a NGO; some suggested 
we should start a political party, and finally we decided why don’t we try a political party? 
At that time the political party, the FUNCINPEC that I am in right now, was the most 
powerful party. But we do not have… we intended to join but some sympathizers here in 
                                                 
43 The author is referring to the leader of Cambodia’s Khmer Farmer Liberal Democracy Party, Mr. 
Pon Pireth, who escaped from prison after being found guilty of rape in a trial supervised by the 
United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO). While UNTAC recognized “the seriousness of the 
offence […] there is no provision in the Electoral Law to disqualify anyone from being a candidate on 
the accounts of a criminal record. […] We feel therefore that we should not attempt to remove [him] as 
a candidate […] by amending the law. This approach may open up a whole can of worms, especially 
given what must be a large number of crimes against humanities committed during the period of 
conflict.” UNTAC New Parties FLDP: The Case of Mr. Pon Pireth, President of the Khmer Farmer 
Liberal Democratic Party, 19.04.1993 
44 Burslem, Chris. 1993. “Small Parties Could Be Cambodia’s Big Hope.” Phnom Penh Post, May 21. 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/small-parties-could-be-cambodias-big-hope. 
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the States… we decided that we do not know enough people inside that we trusted. So we 
decided to test it out ourselves. To see what happens if we start a new party.”45  
To a certain degree the simultaneous presence of so many former ‘enemies’ in the 
country was well suited to confirm the UNTAC narrative of a new beginning, free of 
oppression. But uncertainty as a result of missing reliable information affected both the 
members of the emerging political elite and the people. Throughout the intervention 
Cambodia remained a patchwork of more or less clearly defined zones under the 
control of the different factions.46 The Information and Education Unit sent officers on 
field trips to selected provinces in order to report on UNTAC’s progress in its attempts 
to establish a situation conducive to free and fair elections. Visits at the offices of party 
officials in the different provinces and casual conversations with people they met along 
the way provided snapshots of a life in Cambodia that was still very much marked by 
fear: of other factions, the state authorities, superiors, and – on a more general note –
the future.  
“Representatives [of the opposition parties in Siem Reap province] described a pattern of 
widespread, pervasive and multiform repression and violence by SOC organs and agents 
directed at both nascent political and the general public. […] Acts of political violence 
against party members range from insults and verbal threats to death threats, murder and 
attempted murders and violent armed attacks on and/or ransacking of party offices.” 
UNTAC’s presence in this province, the officer concluded, seemed to be “a mere 
superficial itch” to the comfort of the established CPP, who aimed at creating an overall 
“tense and insecure environment”.47 Most of the repression against competing parties 
was reportedly committed by the hands of the SoC/CPP or the NADK, the Khmer 
Rouge military: The former in order to assure sufficient votes for their own party, and 
the latter to protest the ‘untacist’ elections as such. But in the more remote and poverty-
stricken areas of the FUNCINPEC controlled areas UNTAC Information Officers also 
witnessed growing impatience and anger with the royalist led movement: 
                                                 
45 Interview Kol Pheng, December 22. 2012 
46 UNTAC Maps: Province and Districts of Cambodia 
47 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on the Political Environment in Siem Reap Province. Discussions 
with Political Parties, 29.03.1993, p. 2-3 
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“The predominant feeling is one of intense frustration, helplessness and despair. People 
see themselves, and rightly so, as totally dependent for their subsistence and security upon 
a leadership whom they regard as oblivious, selfish, opportunist and corrupt.”48  
 
With sufficient distance between them and their superiors many expressed interest in 
the new parties, which led the officer to assess that there was “potential for political 
opposition”. It is, he continued “however unlikely, that opposition parties will open 
military offices in such a wild, remote, sparsely-populated, lawless and military-
dominated zone.”49 In these remote areas UNTAC’s efforts to provide the people with 
reliable information about the electoral process were not only challenged by the ever 
present security threats to members of the opposition, but by more basic problems, such 
as bad radio reception and non-existent TVs. 
Party members and associates were of course eager to reach the people with their 
messages, but remained “unwilling to show their face at a political rally and thereby 
end up ‘targeted’.”50 In conversations with UNTAC members they made several 
proposals to deal with these problems and increase their chances for the elections. The 
SoC’s continued firm grip on the structures of the state was at the center of the 
oppositions’ complaints and many urged UNTAC to enforce its mandated authorities 
with more determination. In reference to the Paris Agreements the chairman of an 
opposition party informed an UNTAC officer that the Transitional Authority  
“[…] was applying procedures that simply do not work with Cambodians, implicitly 
suggesting that sweet-talking leads to nowhere and that what Cambodians understand are 
power relations. […] ‘Why UNTAC does not take over? It has the right to do so. If it needs 
help, we will help it.’”51  
Others suggested to join forces with other parties for the campaign period. An officer 
summarized his observations of the weekly meeting of political parties: 
                                                 
48 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Political Environment in FUNCINPEC/ANKI Controlled Zones. A 
Report on the Perceptions and Feelings of ANKI Soldiers, and Officers, and Civilians towards their 
Leaders, 24.03.1993, p. 5 (207) 
49UNTAC Analysis Reports: Political Environment in FUNCINPEC/ANKI Controlled Zones. A 
Report on the Perceptions and Feelings of ANKI Soldiers, and Officers, and Civilians towards their 
Leaders, 24.03.1993, p. 9  
50 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Summary Report on Kompong Cham, 27.04.1993, p. 3-4 
51UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on the Neak Tasou and MOULINAKA for Freedom Party, 
15.12.1992, p. 4 
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“At the meeting, the latest […] ‘Roundtable’ video was screened, followed by a 
discussion. [It] centered on a proposal made by the DP representative that […] political 
parties organize combined campaign trips to districts and communes, supervised by 
UNTAC to guarantee security and equal exposure. While representatives of some of the 
smaller parties supported the proposal, the provincial representative of the FUNCINPEC 
party all but condemned the idea on the basis that it would result in favoritism. […][He] 
went so far as to accuse the smaller parties of ‘conspiring’ to gain unfair advantage.”52  
None of the small parties had great financial means at their disposal, which made it 
even more difficult for them to get their own message across. Accordingly, most of 
them focused all of their attention on Phnom Penh, the “political hot house” of the 
country.53 As of March 18th, 1993 FUNCINPEC had opened 301 party offices, the CPP 
246, and the BLDP 74. These were evenly distributed over several provinces. The 
smaller parties averaged 8 offices and showed next to no presence outside of the capital. 
Three parties had no offices at all.54  
The airtime UNTAC provided them with on TV and Radio was for many the 
only chance to directly reach an audience outside of the capital. But even there, people 
complained about a perceived lack of substance in the parties’ programs. In a report 
from a field trip to Phnom Penh an Information Officer quoted a Cambodian 
acquaintance: “I asked one hundred people who they are going to vote for in the 
elections, and not one of them had any idea. They say the parties are all the same!” 
Many complained, the officer added, that “the political parties spend all their time 
hurling abuse at each other, while all together, they blame UNTAC for the current 
problems in implementing the Peace Accords.”55 This report was widely distributed 
and read by the directors of all units in late January 1993. Other reports confirmed that 
people desired to know more about the country’s new parties but found information 
                                                 
52 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap Province, 06.03.1993, p. 14-15 
53 The entire sentence reads: “The political hot house that is Phnom Penh probably accurately reflects 
the much lower temperature of provincial views.” Handwritten remark on UNTAC Analysis Reports: 
Field Trip Report. Phnom Penh, 7-12 January 1993, 18.01.1993.  
54 UNTAC Electoral Chronology: Established Political Party Offices, 18.03.1993. The reach of the 
individual parties’ campaigns can also be inferred from the following information: During the 
campaign period from April 7 to May 18 1993, the CPP held a total of 833 rallies, with a total of 
544.788 people attending, FUNCINPEC a total of 298 with 137.676 attendants. In the same time 
period the small parties averaged 10 rallies with some thousand attendants, and six parties held no 
rallies at all. UNTAC Electoral Chronology: Consolidated Report of Political Rallies/Meetings held, 
18.05.1993 
55 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Field Trip Report. Phnom Penh, 7-12 January 1993, 18.01.1993, p. 9 
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about their platforms inadequate.56 The limited resources of the small contenders were 
only partially to blame for this matter.  
In an analysis report on the available material outlining the new parties’ programs 
an officer writes: 
 “In comparison to the glossy, modern look of some of the major Cambodian political 
bulletins, the Democracy Bulletin of the Democratic Party is printed in a no-fuss black 
and white typescript. The Bulletin’s lackluster presentation style is carried over in content. 
This is no doubt a deliberate tactic to avoid direct criticism and the possibility of 
harassment.”57 
In their attempts to maneuver through Cambodia’s (real and figurative) mine-
field of political conflicts the new contenders were not inclined to present ideas that 
would turn them into a target of the dominant forces.58 All of them were well-aware 
of the fact that UNTAC’s presence in the country was limited and adjusted their 
strategies to create the conditions for peaceful coexistence.  
 “The line of the LDP representative in Sot Nikum (he didn’t give anyone else a chance to 
speak), was summed up as ‘we live with the tiger and therefore must act in such a way as 
to avoid being eaten’. [He] stressed over and again that the LDP are not in power in 
Cambodia, and thus must respect and abide by the wishes of the ‘host party’. [He] even 
described the SoC as ‘patriotic’ for having allowed opposition parties […] [In this 
province] ‘big brother had never killed little brother’ despite the fact that ‘big brother 
prays constantly for little brother’s death.”59  
In another report another party member described his efforts to preempt conflicts with 
the authorities: 
“I have told them that we did not want to pick the fruits from the branches, but merely 
satisfy ourselves from those that had fallen to the ground.”60  
These elaborate euphemisms, coined to express the political climate of oppression and 
fear, stand in sharp contrast to the rather ‘bland’ style of the newcomers’ programs (a 
fact often remarked by observers). It shows that even the political actors, who intended 
                                                 
56 UNTAC Analysis Reports: FUNCINPEC/ANKI in O’Smach, 03.03.1993, UNTAC Analysis 
Reports: Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap Province, 06.03.1993; UNTAC Analysis Reports: 
Report on the Political Environment in Siem Reap Province. Discussions with Political Parties, 
29.03.1993. 
57 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Digest and Analysis of the Democratic Party Bulletins, 13.01.1993, p. 2 
58 Some observers have pointed out that it is also likely that newcomers intended to build up a platform 
and a followership in order to join forces with one of the big parties later. This would ensure 
individuals a higher entry position.  
59 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap Province, 06.03.1993, p. 13-14 
60 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on the Political Environment in Siem Reap Province. Discussions 
with Political Parties, 29.03.1993, p. 6 
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to establish themselves as opposition players in Cambodia, did not assume that there is 
a direct link between the new institutions and political change. Rather, they perceived 
of them as emerging opportunities that they could use to slowly negotiate the extent of 
influence that the major players would grant them.  
What can this brief overview on the nature of political competition in Cambodia during 
UNTAC tell us about the status of the Paris Peace Agreements as a symbol for the new 
political order? The theory of interpretative authority draws attention to the place a 
symbol occupies in the ongoing deliberations of a society’s political identity. From the 
citizens point of view the emerging ‘multiparty system’ was the most visible marker of 
change. The transformation of the factions and the creation of parties did therefore have 
a positive effect on the willingness of Cambodians to deliberate their future in terms of 
party politics and elections. But UNTAC’s analysis reports show that the Transitional 
Authority faced a number of challenges when it came to link these institutional reforms 
to the idea of meaningful political change.  
It is not the aim of this work to evaluate the populations’ perception of UNTAC 
and the here presented statements are by no means an exhaustive analysis of the 
symbolic conditions. But they can demonstrate how important it is for an institution 
that aims to develop interpretative authority (this is by definition any institution that 
aims for a peaceful political change) to communicate with the population and to convey 
a convincing image of the future. The high voter turnout may have been useful to claim 
that the mission was legitimate, but by and in itself this says nothing about the meaning 
people have given these reforms or the degree to which the new norms and values have 
in fact taken center stage in the political discourse over the future.  
This overview is of particular importance to get a sense for the background 
against which the work of UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit is set. Or, in 
terms of the theory, it is important to get a sense for an environment marked by 
uncertain symbolic conditions. As already discussed, this unit was charged with the 
communication of the Transitional Authority. The following chapter will determine 
how this unit’s particular type of intervention related to the stipulations of the Paris 
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Peace Agreements. This analysis will form the basis for a closer observation of the 
results and effects of their interpretative practice.  
6.2. Creating Opportunities for Public Acknowledgment 
As Cambodia’s temporary symbol of the new political order the Paris Peace 
Agreements provided both local and international actors with opportunities to 
deliberate the country’s future. In order to keep the PPA at the center of Cambodia’s 
newly emerging political order, UNTAC was particularly dependent on the local 
politicians’ voluntary acknowledgement of its superior status. In a highly politicized 
context as the one created by UNTAC’s intervention, everybody’s awareness for the 
symbolic dimension of statements and acts is significantly raised. The previous chapter 
has discussed the party formation under this perspective: The local actors’ willingness 
to submit to the rules constitutes ‘compliance’, but on a symbolic level it also confirms 
the legitimacy of UNTAC’s interpretative practice and the validity of the PPA as the 
symbol for the new order.  
With their actions the local actors signaled that they saw good reasons to 
participate in the peace process. For the same reason it had been important to UNTAC 
that Prince Sihanouk continued to intervene in discourse in his new function as Head 
of the Supreme National Council. Every time an actor presented itself as a 
representative of one of the newly created institutions he or she symbolically confirmed 
the significance of the new common ground.  
These examples demonstrate the intimate link between symbol, interpretative 
practice and opportunities: The latter are only to a certain extent ‘given’. Rather they 
have to be continuously created by UNTAC through an interpretative practice that 
relates to the PPA. It is in this perpetual circle of interpretation and acknowledgement 
that a symbol can structure and guide a political community’s ongoing deliberation 
over the future. 
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6.3. A Neutral Political Environment: InfoEd’s Interpretative Practice 
The work of UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit was formally legitimized 
under Article 6 of the Paris Peace Agreements.  
In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general 
elections, administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the 
outcome of elections will be placed under direct United Nations supervision or control. In 
that context, special attention will be given to foreign affairs, national defence, finance, 
public security and information. To reflect the importance of these subjects, UNTAC 
needs to exercise such control as is necessary to ensure the strict neutrality of the bodies 
responsible for them. 
Annex Section D, entitled Elections, further detailed that  
In the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to the electoral process, the specific 
authority of UNTAC will include the following: […] Ensuring fair access to the media, 
including press, television and radio, for all political parties contesting in the election. 
In the evaluations of UNTAC’s work the interventions of a given unit were regularly 
discussed with regard to the scope of action that the mandate had provided them with. 
We have already seen that most of the criticism was directed at CiVPol and the Military 
Unit for not fully using its mandated authority. InfoEd on the other hand was praised 
for its creative interpretation of the brief stipulations and the broad range of activity it 
incited. In both criticism and praise the observers thus acknowledge the relative 
autonomy given to international actors in deciding over a legitimate course of action 
on a day to day basis.  
The Paris Peace Agreements provided InfoEd with the opportunity to supervise 
and control the information sector to ensure a neutral political environment. No party 
should have an unfair advantage over others. This intention is likewise confirmed in 
the stipulation to ensure fair access to the media. But how can we define the ‘neutrality’ 
of a given environment? During the drafting process of the Paris Agreements the 
ongoing violence between the factions and the SoC’s full control over the entire 
government structure was of greatest concern to everybody at the negotiation table.  
To ‘neutralize’ their impact meant to demobilize the factions and to ensure that 
the SoC was not in a position to monopolize the existing administrative structures.61 In 
                                                 
61 I am grateful to Benny Widyono for making me aware of this original interpretation of the NPE 
clause in the Paris Peace Agreements. Widyono served as the UN governor of Siem Reap province 
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diplomatic circles the meaning of the ‘neutral political environment’ was hence 
discussed as a negative; its existence was defined by the absence of violence and 
monopolized power.  
How does this definition relate to the activity of the Information and Education 
Unit? InfoEd was divided in three subunits: Production, Control, and Analysis and 
Assessment. The first unit was concerned with the production of educational materials 
related to the peace process. It is in the context of this unit that Radio UNTAC was 
created as an effective tool to provide the population with UN approved information. 
The Control Unit was directly charged with the implementation of Article 6. The CPP, 
FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Rouge were the only parties in possession of radio 
stations powerful enough to broadcast over a wide range. As the latter refused to 
cooperate with UNTAC in the later stages of the intervention and did not grant access 
to the zones under their control, the officers vetted in particular the contributions of the 
two main parties. The smaller contenders used printed materials, including the already 
mentioned Bulletins or leaflets with information on their program.  
“Narrowly defined, the role of the Analysis/Assessment Unit was to evaluate 
the impact of the materials produced by the Production Unit on the general Cambodian 
population” (Marston 1997, 278). In practice this meant that officers would provide the 
Production Unit with reports on the criticism, the questions and the rumors they heard 
in their conversations with the people. The Production Unit would then adapt its 
information accordingly. The serious and continuous integration of this feedback 
accounted for much of the radio’s popularity: Radio UNTAC successfully conveyed 
the idea of engaging in a true dialogue with the Cambodian people.  
The principle of neutrality became central to all of this activity. Marston recalls 
that InfoEd’s entire media production was “extensively vetted for any sign of political 
bias in the use of language or the situation described or for anything which was not in 
accord with the wording of the Paris Agreements” (Marston 1997, 281). In order to 
‘create a neutral political environment’ UNTAC was first and foremost dependent on 
                                                 
during the Transitional Authority, and was appointed to the position as the UN Secretary General’s 
Political Representative to the new government of Cambodia from 1994 until 1997.  
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the notion of its own neutrality. For a unit that was charged with communication the 
possibility to intervene effectively in the country’s public discourse was thus based on 
its ability to speak with a neutral voice.  
It is, in fact, striking how many former members of this unit define their own 
role and the role of the mission as one that was concerned with ‘language’ and ‘voice’. 
Radio UNTAC’s voice – the one the mission came to be identified with –had to be 
“steadfastly neutral in political issues” and trustworthy to inform and reassure people 
in the context of continued heated propaganda by the different political factions (Zhou 
1994). As members of the mission, they represented the “international voice”, and with 
this very voice they spoke about people’s rights and change.62 “We had to be the one 
voice people could trust. That’s a big responsibility.”63  
The Control Unit was charged with the supervision and control of the 
Cambodian information sector. Just like the development of UNTAC’s own ‘voice’ in 
the context of Production the statements of the different parties were evaluated and 
criticized based on the principle of ‘neutrality’. To this end InfoEd had developed the 
Media Guidelines. Originally intended to take precedence over SoC’s media laws, they 
laid out general rules concerning the right of access and the presentation of a balanced 
view in democratic media. It stipulated for instance that media should give parties, 
groups or individuals whose views have been misrepresented the ‘right of response’, 
and noted that a democratic media seeks to publish views and counterviews at the same 
time. Even in their “watered-down” version as mere guidelines they became the main 
reference source UNTAC acted upon when confronting media representatives in cases 
of perceived breaches against new journalistic standard (Marston 1997, 231).  
At the time of the intervention all of the media was clearly linked to a specific 
party. Criticizing the media was therefore tantamount to criticizing a political party. 
The implementation of these guidelines was all but straightforward and the officers 
found themselves relentlessly engaged in discussions over the meaning of InfoEd’s 
guiding principle.  
                                                 
62 Interview with John Marston, December 23, 2012; Interview with Anne Guillou, November 20, 
2012 
63 Interview with Jeffrey Heyman, November 30, 2012 
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“When I commented to the editor of Nokorbal Cheat on the fact that his newspaper now 
had anti-Vietnamese rhetoric which we had never seen there before, the editor pointed out 
that there were also anti-Thai articles; together it constituted a new sort of ‘neutrality’.” 
(Marston 1997, 256)  
The editors’ argument is rather difficult to counter, as indeed, the principle of neutrality 
can be translated into ‘everybody gets treated the same way’ – if one applies a 
procedural perspective. In order to maintain a neutral stance in discourse, however, the 
meaning of the term remains highly ambiguous. The interventions of the Control Unit 
were hence severely criticized by the main contenders, who, because of their 
domination of the public sector, found themselves at the receiving end of InfoEd’s 
criticism. In an analysis report entitled UNTAC Unfair an InfoEd officer detailed the 
CPP’s accusations that “UNTAC would listen to and publicize all accusations against 
SOC without waiting to hear the SoC version of events.” The quoted SoC official 
“alleged that ‘FUNCINPEC never respects the agreement and UNTAC does not warn 
the party at all’.”64 In the same vein Hun Sen “questioned UNTAC’s neutrality: ‘If 
UNTAC is going to carry out supervision, it should do so on all sides. It cannot control 
just one side and leave others’.”65  
With their frequent references to the intentions of the Paris Peace Agreements 
and the signatories’ commitment to the establishment of a neutral political environment 
the SoC officials showed that they knew how to use the Agreements language to 
criticize the Transitional Authority’s work according to their own standards. The other 
competitors took issue with UNTAC’s take on neutrality for entirely different reasons. 
While the CPP complained over the biased interventions by UNTAC, the other 
contenders criticized the Transitional Authority’s apparent laisser faire approach.  
“The UN had to control all the mass media, TV, and so on because the other political 
parties did not have any TV or radio stations. They therefore could have control over all 
of that for the benefit of everyone. What was really revolting for me was their final 
argument. They said they could not control the CPP TV because on the ground of freedom 
of expression. Can you imagine? And then we were frustrated because we didn't have any 
means of propaganda and finally they created the UN radio; they gave you ten minutes. 
What can you say within ten minutes?”66 
                                                 
64 UNTAC in the Media: UNTAC in SoC Media. August1992-February 1993, 25.02.1993, p. 5 
65 Ibid.,  p. 11 
66 Interview Son Soubert, December 4, 2012 
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With the elections approaching all parties were eager to present the electorate 
with a clear agenda. This led to another conflict with UNTAC: The members of the 
former exile government saw the roots of the conflict in Vietnam’s occupational policy 
and put Cambodia’s issues with the ‘Hanoi government’ and its people at the center of 
their programs. Anti-Vietnamese sentiments were expressed openly and frequently. In 
view of the violent attacks against the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, UNTAC 
decided to outlaw the use of the term ‘yuon’ in official statements of the media: Foreign 
observers consider this a derogatory term for people of Vietnamese citizens, but only 
few Cambodians agree with this interpretation, which in turn led to a number of 
confrontations between InfoEd and party representatives.67  
What does this description of InfoEd’s work tell us about the link between the 
Paris Peace Agreements and UNTAC’s activity in the sector of information? 
Production, Control and Analysis and Assessment justified all of their interventions in 
relation to Article 6 and UNTAC’s mandated authority to establish a neutral political 
environment prior to the elections. But the interpretative practice as derived from the 
mandate is itself already based on an interpretation of the Agreements stipulations that 
does not correspond to the drafters’ initial reasoning. Instead of applying a negative 
understanding of the neutral political environment, defined through the absence of 
something, they defined the NPE in a positive manner: As the expression of a specific 
political culture.  
This is noteworthy for a variety of reasons. UNTAC’s mission was the first 
mission of its kind and took place in the early 90s. The individual members of the unit 
may have given different weight and meaning to the interventions legitimized through 
the principle of neutrality. But it shows that much of InfoEd’s work was based on the 
acknowledgement that the transformation of a country’s political culture involves more 
than just a change of institutions – and that its members were very much interested in 
shaping this deeper transformative process.68 In his analysis of Cambodia’s changing 
                                                 
67 Interview John Marston, Interview Jason Roberts, January 6, 2013 
68  How little is known about the work of this unit is also evident in the following statement by Talentino, 
who wrote a highly acclaimed article on the role of perceptions in peacebuilding: ”International actors 
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media Marston remarked that “it almost goes without saying that lying behind the 
attempt to make the state media more neutral is the attempt to define a unified national 
identity” (Marston 1997, 255). This work philosophy seems to contradict the 
widespread notion of unengaged and ‘chirurgical’ approaches to peacekeeping in the 
early 90s as reflected in state building literature. It rather proves the emerging notion 
that we can infer only very little from the strategic intend behind the design of a 
mandate for the level of implementation.  
The politicians’ criticism of UNTAC further shows that international and local 
actors disagreed with regard to the legitimacy of InfoEd’s interventions. For the 
purpose of the chosen analysis here, it is not so much an issue whether or not it was 
legitimate from a legal point of view. Rather, it is important to note that InfoEd clearly 
attempted to promote a specific vision of political culture and that the practices aimed 
at disciplining the public discourse were considered a political act by the local actors. 
The ensuing confrontations and negotiations confirm the need to understand more 
about the nature of power that defined their relations.   
 
It is the aim of the analysis to observe how the Paris Peace Agreements shaped ideas 
of the new political order. The main corpus of the analysis will be provided by a 
transcript of the UNTAC produced TV program Political Roundtable Discussions. 
InfoEd started to broadcast recordings of the show on TV and Radio UNTAC in 
December 1992. From January 1993 on representatives of the 20 political parties were 
invited on a weekly basis to present their views to the Cambodian public.69  
                                                 
tend to focus their efforts on the macro-level and assume that citizens will catch on to both the intent of 
reforms and their value. That is a foolish assumption in any society, and more so where traditions of 
consent and inclusion are absent and violence has hardened societal divides. […] Public education 
campaigns should therefore be a much larger part of peacebuilding efforts and should seek to both inform 
and involve the citizenry more directly. This means that international personnel need to pursue non-
traditional avenues to help citizens learn about reform, such as by taping radio programs, holding town 
meetings, making reforms the subject of plays and puppet shows, holding essay contests in schools, and 
a variety of other things that have probably never been contemplated” (Talentino 2007). With the 
potential exception of the essay contest all of these suggestions and many more projects had in fact been 
put into practice by UNTAC’s Information and Education Unit during the 1992/93 intervention.   
69 This information is based on my interpretation of the dates given in copy of the roundtable script on 
national reconciliation. The date given for the first roundtable is the 18.12.93. This is obviously a typo. 
The second one is 13.01.93, then 20.01.93 and 03.02.93. Accordingly, the first recorded roundtable 
took probably place on December 18th 1992.  
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The last episode of the Political Roundtable Discussions ran briefly before the 
elections, which means that the program aired during the five months that were 
arguably the most tense and conflict-filled ones of the whole mission. This program 
provides an ideal opportunity to observe the symbolic dimension of negotiations 
between local and international actors in an intervention society: Scripted by InfoEd, 
the design of the program relates directly to the identified stipulations of the Paris Peace 
Agreements and UNTAC’s particular interpretative practice. All of the party 
representatives had been invited to join the program, their participation was hence 
voluntarily. But in order to present their views they were obliged to respect the Media 
Guidelines.70 The theory of interpretative authority allows us to understand UNTAC’s 
role as a ‘neutral moderator’ of the program as an effect of its particular interpretative 
practice. Rather than simply providing the invited parties with an opportunity to present 
their ideas, the Roundtables constitute an opportunity for the Transitional Authority to 
enforce a particular vision of the future liberal, multiparty democracy and generate 
interpretative authority 
6.4. UNTAC’s Political Roundtable Discussions 
6.4.1. Setting the Scene: Procedural Neutrality 
In the introduction to a booklet with the complete Khmer transcripts of the first 
Roundtable series on National Reconciliation Tim Carney, the Head of InfoEd, 
summarized the importance of the program as follows:  
“Now that all 20 political parties prepare to compete in the elections for a Constituent 
Assembly in May 1993 it is crucial that the Cambodian people get to know all of these 
parties, their symbols, and their views regarding all the issues that affect this nation.”71  
The decision to produce the Political Roundtables as a TV show and not for the radio 
had been taken despite the more limited reach of its distribution.72 Only few people in 
Cambodia were in possession of a TV and electricity was expensive. Still, in a country 
                                                 
70 Interview Isabelle Abric, November 25, 2012 
71 The booklet was intended for circulation among the Cambodian people.  
72 Interview Isabelle Abric 
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with such a high rate of illiteracy a TV show had for instance the advantage of helping 
the people to memorize the symbol of their favorite party. But aside from such practical 
considerations UNTAC was certainly well aware of the added visual effects they could 
achieve with such a program. In order to assess the competitive advantage that UNTAC 
had in creating this image, the analysis will therefore first turn towards the set-up of 
the program. In accordance with the theoretical framework all of its rules and 
procedures will be understood as interpretations of the Paris Agreements. In sum they 
represent UNTAC’s efforts to generate interpretative authority based on its mandated 
authority. Any actor or institution that strives for interpretative authority is dependent 
on other’s public acknowledgement of its interpretations. This entails the need to create 
opportunities for others to confirm him or her in this status. The Political Roundtable 
Discussions will be hence be regarded as such an institutionalized opportunity.  
The program opened with a jingle of traditional Cambodian instruments. Those, 
who watched the program on TV UNTAC would follow the eye of the camera: It first 
focused on the drawing of a ballot box before guiding the onlookers’ view along the 
handwritten Khmer title of the program. After the first cut the onlooker faced four 
Cambodian politicians and an UNTAC representative, lined up behind a table, two 
seated to the left, and two to the right of the moderator, little name cards in front of 
them that also displayed the parties’ symbols and names. A dark blue curtain in the 
background intensified the impression of looking at a stage.  
The considerations behind the choice of moderators to speak on UNTAC’s 
behalf during these programs demonstrate the problematic link between neutrality and 
power. Radio UNTAC had hired a number of Cambodian moderators for all of its 
broadcasts, but the nature of the medium allowed them to stay anonymously if 
necessary. During a TV program such a solution was hardly possible. The job was 
therefore considered “too dangerous” by many.73 The reluctance to charge Cambodians 
with tasks that had a representative function was mutual. Apart from fears for their 
personal safety UNTAC deemed this detrimental to its efforts of maintaining a neutral 
and trustworthy voice: 
                                                 
73 Interview Anne Guillou, November 20, 2012 
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“… the Cambodians were afraid of doing this, I think, and also it would not have been 
free and fair because that was from inside Cambodia, in Phnom Penh. Most of the people 
sent were from the CPP side so it would not have been perceived as being fair.”74 
In the early shows, UNTAC was always represented by a foreign Khmer speaking 
UNTAC official: Either Heder or Guillou. Later on, two Cambodian moderators joined 
the show to represent UNTAC. But both of them didn’t actually reside in Cambodia; 
instead they “came from outside”.75 Not associated with any of the powerful parties 
UNTAC decided that they could play there part without jeopardizing its neutral 
appearance.  In the very first broadcasts Stephen Heder welcomed the viewers and 
explained the program’s purpose and its basic rules:  
“Welcome to all of you. You are about to watch the second program of UNTAC’s 
‘Political Roundtable Discussion’. Every week you will get to know four political parties 
that have already provisionally registered. Each political party will present its political 
program to you and the entire country as you all will have to choose a party that you like 
and that you will vote for shortly. Today, just like every other time, the four parties have 
been chosen to come through a drawing of lots. Thanks to all the party representatives that 
have taken the opportunity to meet here. You all have two minutes to answer each of my 
questions concerning national unity and reconciliation.”  
The choice of language and form of address mark this program as one that is 
exclusively directed at a Khmer audience. There are no English subtitles and none of 
the names are romanized. The representatives look directly at the camera and during 
the half hour program there is almost no direct interaction between the participants. 
During the following roundtables it would become custom for the UNTAC moderator 
to introduce the participants one by one and tell the audience which party they 
represented.  
The arrangements clearly reflect UNTAC’s attempt to introduce neutrality on a 
procedural level. In essence such procedures are based on the credo that everybody gets 
treated the same way: Only registered parties are eligible for participation, and neither 
the order of appearance, nor the amount of speaking time or the seating arrangement is 
to suggest any preference of UNTAC, or any type of pre-established powerbase. 
Though these arrangements might seem banal at a first glance, they did constitute the 
                                                 
74 Interview Anne Guillou 
75 Ibid. 
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rather radical imposition of a new protocol, in the sense that they negated an existing 
hierarchy.76  
In front of their perceived audience the politicians would have to compete by voicing 
their ideas for the countries future, and it would be up to the Cambodian people to 
establish a new hierarchy with their vote. In a country that had experienced the fast-
paced change from one autocratic rule to another in the course of only 40 years and did 
thus not include many people who had ever had a real choice with regard to their 
government, the symbolic power of this image was profound and meant nothing less 
than “the breaking of a taboo”.77   
In order to get a sense for the excitement that people reportedly felt when watching the 
rather monotonous two-minute statements, delivered by an overall tense, nervous, or 
outright annoyed looking group of invitees, it is of particular significance to recall the 
novelty of transparency in political communication. Under the Khmer Rouge 
anonymity and secrecy had been instruments of power and destruction as much as they 
had been means of survival. And although certainly not to the same degree the regimes 
that preceded and followed them had not exactly encouraged people to present their 
opinions publicly, or – unthinkable – even contradict and criticize those in power. Even 
after UNTAC’s arrival acts of political violence occurred on a regular basis and it was 
already clear that the elections would essentially take place in a country still at war. 
Yet here these mainly unknown individuals, (seemingly) unaffiliated with any of the 
established parties appeared nationwide on TV, identified with their names and acted 
in the interest of their own parties and thus by definition against the well established 
players. 
According to Heder’s introductory remarks only representatives of those parties that 
had provisionally registered had been invited and given the right to present their ideas. 
With this reminder it was clear to the Cambodian viewers that the Khmer Rouge – 
which, under the name of Party of Democratic Kampuchea, constituted the only ‘non 
                                                 
76 This observation and the following section owes very much to my reading of John Marston’s (1997) 
analysis of the changing media landscape during UNTAC, entitled: Cambodia 1991-94: hierarchy, 
neutrality and etiquettes of discourse. 
77 Interview Anne Guillou 
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provisionally registered party’ after the end of the deadline – would not participate in 
the program and were thus quite literally out of the picture. The Roundtable 
Discussions thereby served as a reminder of the conditions of access to the new public 
space and replicated the symbolic value of the actors’ compliant behavior.  
According to the results of a drawing of lots, each week four representatives got invited 
to present their views. Neutrality here was expressed in the equal chance of each party 
to obtain an invitation. The random assignment did also determine the seating 
arrangement and the order in which the representatives were allowed to answer the 
questions. At the beginning of each roundtable the moderator introduced the 
participants and then proceeded to ask the first question to each of them in the same 
order. The next round for question number two then started with the representative that 
had answered the previous question as the second one etc.  
What such a seating arrangement and the corresponding speaking order meant 
for the representatives of the more powerful parties can best be illustrated in reference 
to an incident during the preparation period of the 1989 Paris Peace conference: “It was 
widely reported that the Khmer participants could not agree on who would sit next to 
whom. The term ‘squabbling’ was used”. In recounting the debate Roberts criticized 
these remarks as expressing among others “the degree of ignorance of Khmer political 
culture” (Roberts 2000, 22). In Hun Sen’s own words, accepting the arrangement 
would have meant accepting “the legitimacy of an equal distribution of power when 
we did not accept the legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge […] to sit with them was to 
recognize them” (Roberts 2000, 23). Hun Sen interpreted the seating arrangement here 
in view of the party’s quite particular relationship with the Khmer Rouge at the time; 
but his recollections still show that the Cambodian politicians were all but insensitive 
towards the symbolic power of formal procedures.  
The two-minute-rule for answers achieved a similar effect and turned out to be 
the one rule participants and observers of the Roundtable Discussion tended to 
remember most vividly. Oek Serey Sopheak, who represented the LNDP at the time, 
recalled: “We had to be very careful about the timeframe and… not to go beyond. I 
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remember rehearsing for a lot of times to stay in the time frame.”78 Anne Guillou, who 
acted as the UNTAC moderator several times, remembered that 
“Everything was strictly planned. Nobody could be interrupted. And everything was 
focused on time, as far as I remember. Time was kind of an obsession. As if the quality 
was symbolized by time. Nobody was able to speak spontaneously. All the questions were 
prepared in advance; people came and read from the paper. I also did that, actually, 
because I was afraid of making a mistake. We had pressure on us too. So I didn't say 
anything except during my time.”79  
When watching the videos it becomes quickly obvious that the strict time limit accounts 
for much of the reported awkwardness of the program. In between the representatives 
statements the UNTAC moderator would always thank the previous speaker and 
introduce the next one, giving him the word with a polite: Please. 
The majority of speakers was clearly not used to speaking in public and upon 
hearing their ‘starting signal’ they would look down on their notes and read out their 
prepared answers, anxious to respect the time limit, which gave their presentations a 
rushed yet monotonous melody. One Cambodian observer pointedly characterized 
them as “langue de bois”.80 Here, as with the other rules, the most powerful effects 
were achieved because of what they denied to the ‘big players’ and not what they 
granted to the others. The “…CPP was not happy with the fact that they had exactly 
the same time as other, very small parties. They thought that, as they were the biggest 
one, this was not fair.”81  
As with the seating arrangement the symbolic dimension of these procedures 
derived its importance from the parties’ awareness of an audience: The symbolic 
negation of an existing hierarchy could only take effect in the realm of ideas; it played 
on the shared knowledge that all participants and viewers had about the traditional 
authoritarian interpretation of ‘fairness’ by negating its validity.  
The Cambodia’s People’s Party (CPP) considered the demand to present 
themselves at eyelevel with competitors that, to them, were insignificant an insult and 
                                                 
78 Interview Oek Serey Sopheak, November 26, 2012 
79 Interview Anne Guillou 
80 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Excerpts of Notes of Recent Conversation with Sak Saraeun, Chairman 
of the ADDP, 09.04.1993, p.2  
81 Interview Anne Guillou 
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they refused to participate in the first roundtable session under the title of National 
Reconciliation.82  UNTAC took the dramaturgic decision to leave the chair reserved for 
the CPP representative in this particular episode empty. The camera zoomed in on the 
name card and party symbol, while Heder expressed UNTAC’s “deep regrets about the 
absence of one political party that didn’t agree to participate in our program, namely 
the Cambodian Peoples’ Party.” He went on to explain that “UNTAC had sent the 
Cambodian Peoples’ Party an invitation to participate here today together with the 
other parties, but it has just received an official message, saying that this party doesn’t 
wish to participate in today’s program” (RT1, 39).  
After their absence from the first series of roundtables the CPP did appear in 
the subsequent sessions on Human Rights, and Economy.83 Their initial refusal and 
reluctant decision to join the other parties later is particularly apt to illustrate the modus 
operandi of UNTAC’s interpretative authority. The CPP had its own radio and TV 
stations and dominated much of the public space. From a strategic point of view they 
did not need to participate in the Roundtable Discussions to present themselves to the 
viewers. UNTAC was also not in any position to force them to participate. So what 
constituted the ‘compelling reason’ for them to come?84 
In the here presented framework the PPA represents the temporary symbol of 
Cambodia’s political order. In contrast to its mandated status of being in authority 
UNTAC’s status of representing an authority was highly depended on its 
interpretations of the Agreements: In an ever changing context all its actions had to be 
retraceable to this source and considered its valid interpretation in the eyes of the 
public. If an interpretation did indeed qualify as such, the resulting measures became 
by definition an extension of this source and the common ground it represented. 
UNTAC’s neutrality was the sine qua non for the delicate task of constantly 
‘translating’ the PPA into a more and more detailed agreement without changing its 
                                                 
82 Interview Anne Guillou; Interview with Oek Serey Sopheak, Isabelle Abric 
83 They might have participated in the session on the National Constitution too. Of this particular 
session, one video is missing. 
84 Unlike an agent who is in authority, an agent who is an authority can issue commands that 
“constitute a compelling reason to comply, but not an obligation” (Zaum 2006, 457). 
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original character; and only through the constant acknowledgement of their 
interpretation could they maintain their status as authoritative interpreters.  
Applying this perspective to the example at hand the participation of the other 
19 parties in the first session of the Roundtable Discussion can be read as the symbolic 
confirmation of UNTAC’s interpretation: By accepting the conditions and by using the 
opportunity UNTAC had provided them with, they acknowledged its status as an 
interpretative authority in front of the now decisive Cambodian public. In this setting 
the CPP’s refusal to participate in the public created by the PPA had to appear as an 
act of disrespect that was not directed against UNTAC but against the new common 
ground itself.  
Apart from the CPP’s refusal to join the first session (and the noted tendency 
of their representatives to use the two minutes to say three times as much as anyone 
else), there are two more incidents that qualify as attempts to negotiate the procedures 
determined by UNTAC. The first example concerns the preparations for the program. 
The former representative of the LDP, who participated in all four roundtable sessions, 
recalled: 
“We thought that, since it was a TV program it would be about the image […]. I put a lot 
of names in color but once there, Steve Heder was very astonished and surprised to see 
that. Other parties did not prepare that so I had an advantage over them. It was, however, 
not my fault. I was not told not to do that. But later on, Steve Heder and others asked me 
to stick to black and white. Since I was the only one, the program would look very 
imbalanced. The LDP would have a lot of advantage. I said, ‘okay’ as I did not want to 
make anybody else angry against my party. But I pointed out to Steve that it is not fair 
because the others should think about that. Now you penalize the one who has the idea 
and it is not against the rule.” 
The representative’s expressed disappointment is as understandable as justified. 
Technically both his acknowledgement of the rules and his creative usage of the given 
opportunity constituted exactly the kind of behavior UNTAC had set out to encourage: 
The participants were supposed to develop political authority by presenting the viewers 
with unique ideas. But in order to convey the image of a perfectly neutral political 
environment, a visually ‘balanced’ program was valued even higher.  
The second example concerns an exchange between Heder and Vanthun, the 
representative of the Republican Coalition Party, during the first roundtable session. It 
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was Vanthun’s turn to answer, but instead of addressing the viewers, his first words 
were directed at Heder:  
“Before answering to the second question, I would like to ask you to help me think 
something through; namely if I came here for any good reason, or if we are only supposed 
to come here to reply to these questions acting as clowns; to suggest solutions when you 
already know what the results of the game are going to be. But however, we have greatest 
interest [in the issues] and honestly want to make a contribution in the search for a 
solution.” 
The question is purely rhetorical; Vanthun didn’t pause for a second and kept looking 
at his notes at all times while presenting his answer. After he finished his complete 
statement an equally motionless Heder replied to Vanthun: 
“Thank you Mr. Ouy Vanthun, representative for the Republican Coalition Party, for your 
answer. And with regard to your question; in the name of UNTAC I would like to clarify 
that everything UNTAC does has only one goal, namely to implement the Paris Peace 
Agreements without any bias, in order to ensure that those parties who respect these 
agreements have equal opportunities to participate in free and fair elections.” 
The polished phrasing of this statement and the fact that Heder – like Vanthun – 
continued to consult his notes while speaking, indicate that the answer to the statement 
was as prepared and rehearsed as the question itself. Heder didn’t remember this 
particular scene 20 years later, but wasn’t surprised when hearing what he had 
answered:  
“I paraded the line. […] As I say, procedural impartiality, procedural neutrality is simple. 
You don't have to be neutral in order to act neutral. Arguably, nobody is neutral. It's just 
a matter of playing a role. […] Once we had agreed amongst our unit I don't think we even 
had to discuss it.”85  
The exchange demonstrates that the characterization of interveners and local actors as 
imposers and imposed upon often fails to adequately capture the dynamic of their 
relationship. In the scene Vanthun questions both UNTAC’s intentions and the 
potential effects of such a program. He insinuates that UNTAC isn’t as neutral as it 
pretends to be and that the small parties cannot expect to be rewarded for the originality 
of their ideas. In order to reaffirm his neutral status Heder replied that he speaks in the 
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name of UNTAC and acts only on behalf of the Agreements. After voicing his doubts 
Vanthun then continues to answer the question without pressing any further.  
The theory of interpretative authority stipulates that the power bias that puts the 
international actors in a considerably stronger position than their local counter parts 
results from their status as the authoritative interpreter of the Paris Peace Agreements 
as the symbol of the new political order. Unlike the local actors the Transitional 
Authority is therefore in a position to determine rules of legitimate and appropriate 
political behavior. In contrast to the other examples though that very much 
demonstrated how the parties’ acknowledgement of these procedures strengthened 
UNTAC’s interpretative authority, Vanthun’s intervention exposed the mutual 
dependency of all players. Or, to briefly borrow from Goffman here, he showed that 
they have to act as a team to support each other’s performance. 
He called the Roundtables out for what they are: An elaborate act. At the same 
time though he acknowledged that he has to accept the premise of the play if he wants 
to preserve the opportunity that allowed him to speak up in the first place. He thereby 
signaled that there are compelling reasons for him to comply. And it is not despite but 
because of UNTAC’s directing role that Heder is also confined to ‘parade a line’, to 
stick to the script: Only by constantly reaffirming its neutral status can UNTAC 
develop interpretative authority. As a symbol of the new political order the Paris Peace 
Agreements are then not simply a contract to abide by, but they are the most important 
point of reference to symbolically confirm the continued existence of a common 
ground.  
Conclusions 
The UNTAC produced TV program was presented as an opportunity for the political 
parties to present themselves to the Cambodian public. By drawing on the theory of 
interpretative authority its design was discussed as a representation of UNTAC’s 
broader attempt to enforce and uphold a particular vision of Cambodia’s new political 
order. In order to sharpen this vision and provide the Cambodian people with a distinct 
image, the focus lay on the ‘multiparty’ element of the liberal democracy and, related, 
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the idea of ‘having a choice’. This contrasted most clearly with the political history of 
the country, marked by autocratic leadership and one-party-systems. The positive 
interpretation of the ‘neutral political environment’ clause allowed InfoEd to further 
promote a certain political culture and thus add substance to the one dimensional image.  
The rules and procedures UNTAC defined for the participants are an expression of this 
interpretative practice. Their analysis demonstrated how a Transitional Authority can 
use its competitive advantage as the authoritative interpreter of the PPA: It regulated 
the access to the public of the intervention society and thus the very realm in which the 
struggles over the meaning of the new institutions take place. An authoritative 
interpreter can only strengthen its symbol through the acknowledgement of others. The 
public of an intervention society constitutes an institutionalized opportunity for others 
to express this acknowledgement.  
The design of the program assured that the participants appeared only in their 
role as representatives of their parties, and hence as representatives for an institutional 
design determined by the Agreements. It further diminished the participants’ 
possibilities to use pre-established symbolic resources in their own favor – rather 
UNTAC played on this knowledge in such a way that it strengthened its own image as 
authoritative interpreter of the new political order: Procedural neutrality achieved its 
main effect here by appealing to the shared knowledge the people had with regard to 
the protocol usually reserved for the more powerful. To someone who doesn’t partake 
in their understanding of traditional notions of hierarchy and political power the 
groundbreaking character of the stiff set-up is simply not visible. The choreography of 
the roundtables was created for the eyes of the Cambodian people, but the real drama 
could only manifest itself in the act of watching.  
As far as the procedural aspects of UNTAC’s interpretative practice is 
concerned the analysis highlighted the mutual dependency of all player in granting and 
confirming each other a place in an ongoing negotiation over the meaning of the new 
political order. Furthermore, it demonstrated that in order to generate political authority 
as interpretative authority the engagement of the wider population is of vital 
importance as both means and ends of these struggles relate to the realm of ideas and 
the shared knowledge of the people.  
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6.4.2. Writing the Script: Discursive Neutrality 
With its interpretative practice UNTAC successfully regulated the access to the public 
of the intervention society. The analysis of the Political Roundtable Discussions as a 
representation of this public demonstrated how the implementation of these rules 
reinforced its status as interpretative authority and the symbolic strengths of the Paris 
Peace Agreements. Aimed at a Cambodian audience it was the expressed intention of 
the program to present the Cambodian people with the 20 newly formed parties and 
their programs. To this end, all of the invited representatives would be given the chance 
to answer to a set of three questions.  
It almost goes without saying that the degree of control the Transitional 
Authority could exercise over the character of these statements was comparably 
limited. The previous discussion of UNTAC’s positive interpretation of the Neutral 
Political Environment and its related interpretative practice showed that UNTAC did 
nonetheless intend to regulate the political discourse. For the creation of the program, 
InfoEd’s Production Unit did therefore have to solve the same problem that the Control 
officers were regularly faced with: How to guard its own neutral status, while 
implementing measures that were considered highly political by their local 
counterparts. 
The roundtables were designed to accommodate for invitees and the party 
representatives had two minutes to answer each of the questions. The title of the 
program is thus extremely misleading. UNTAC’s Political Roundtable Discussions did 
not present the Cambodian public with any kind of actual debate between the 
representatives of the parties. The politicians engaged only with their invisible 
viewership behind the cameras. The stiff format did not allow the UNTAC moderators 
to interrupt the speakers, or comment on their performance. To guard a perfectly neutral 
appearance they had to restrain themselves to briefly introduce the topic and explain 
its relevance for the peace process, ask the questions, and guide the order of speakers.  
The questions are arguably the most important measure that UNTAC could use 
to discipline the representatives’ public presentation. Just like the procedural measures, 
everything the moderators said had to clearly relate to the Paris Peace Agreements as 
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their main source of legitimacy. In a first draft of questions sent to Carney, the director 
of InfoEd, Heder underlined his effort to “take language directly from the Paris 
Agreements” in phrasing the introduction to these questions: “In this sense, at least, the 
questions should be non-controversial.”86 In the same document he presents a list of 
six potential topics: Human Rights, Economic Policies, Foreign Policies, National 
Unity and National Reconciliation, the Vietnamese Issue, and Law and Order. Under 
each headline he outlined the relevance of the topic and three questions that could be 
posed to the candidates. The scarce handwritten notes scribbled on the side of the 
document don’t offer much insight as regards Carney’s decision making process. An 
analysis report on the other hand, that had circulated only two month earlier, may 
explain why Foreign Policy, Law and Order and the Vietnamese Issue did not make 
the final selection. 
Entitled Report on Public Perceptions of UNTAC in the City of Phnom Penh it 
paints, according to the officer’s own account, a rather “disturbing” picture. Based on 
conversations with Cambodians from all social spheres she detailed why the general 
population had grown frustrated with UNTAC’s work. One issue in particular stands 
out, namely the increasing insecurity in the streets of the capital. This was blamed on 
UNTAC for a number of reasons, all of which are in one way or another linked to its 
interpretation of the mandate. Under its human rights mandate UNTAC had released a 
number of prisoners and initiated training programs for the police. 
Faced with violent crimes on an ever more frequent basis, the people were not 
exactly open for the subtle differences between political prisoners and criminals: 
“Many [of the released] are believed to be thieves who are now robbing people again.” 
Equally difficult to understand was how law enforcement could muster up the required 
authority without being “accused of human rights abuse” when “UNTAC will not let 
thieves be beaten or shot […]; thus thieves are not afraid.”87  Further adding to the 
problematic character of the Law and Order Issue was its link “to the Vietnamese 
issue”. For once, because of the “traditional animosity and the notion that Vietnamese 
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87 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on public perceptions of UNTAC in the city of Phnom Penh, 
18.09.1992, p. 3 
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are immoral”, but also because people accepted “the KPNLF and PDK propaganda to 
the effect that the Vietnamese should go home, but UNTAC is protecting them.”88  
Against this background it becomes evident why InfoEd’s directors settled on less 
thornier issues and abstained from asking the representatives what they would to in 
order to “resolve the problem of illegal immigration of Vietnamese and other foreign 
nationals into Cambodia” or stop “recent crime in the towns and the countryside before 
it happens” as suggested in the first draft of roundtable topics.89  
In order to discipline the discourse and strengthen its interpretative authority 
UNTAC was highly dependent on its neutral appearance. The reasoning behind the 
drafting and the selection of the questions demonstrates that this principle was given 
highest priority. In the end the choice fell on the topics and questions listed in Table 
1.90 All of them clearly relate to the stipulations and goals that were laid out in the four 
documents comprised in the Paris Peace Agreements. It is important to note that despite 
the liberal agenda of the mission, neither the word liberal, nor the word democracy or 
democratic appears in any of the questions. The signatories of the Agreements had 
committed themselves to a liberal political order, but the agreements did not define the 
future economy of Cambodia other than one that should “promote Cambodian 
entrepreneurship and make use of the private sector, among other sectors, to help 
advance self-sustaining economic growth.”91 
Furthermore, it becomes evident that all questions feature the same basic 
elements and structure: The invitees are not addressed personally but as representatives 
of their parties, the questions are (with one exception) not concerned with past or 
current events, but with the future or – more specifically – the time after the elections, 
and the value of the presented solutions is explicitly framed as being dependent on the 
people’s vote through the repetitive use of the formula ‘if your party wins the election’. 
To a certain degree one could therefore consider them as closed questions in disguise: 
                                                 
88 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on public perceptions of UNTAC in the city of Phnom Penh, 
18.09.1992, p. 3-4 
89 UNTAC Roundtable: Roundtable Draft Questions, 30.11.1992, p.3-4 
90 My translation 
91Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia 
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They present themselves as open, but are intentionally designed as a strong incentive 
for an affirmative answer. Effectively, UNTAC could thereby achieve to center and 
discipline the debate as the act of answering itself would almost inevitably constitute a 
confirmation of the questions’ most basic elements: That the results of the elections 
would be accepted, that the new government would respect human rights and an 
opposition, that refugees and migrants would be received with open arms, and that a 
future Cambodia would be independent, sovereign, neutral and founded on the respect 
of the new constitution. 
 
Table 1: Topics and Questions of the Roundtable Discussions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I) National Reconciliation 
 
1. What kind of policies and measures would you choose to achieve national reconciliation 
between Cambodians who have different political tendencies? 
 
2. If you are the election winner, can your party guarantee that the Cambodian territory will 
not break apart into different political regions? 
 
3. How can your party guarantee the harmonic return of the Cambodian refugees and migrants 
into the national society, so that they can contribute to the reconstruction of the country? 
 
II) Human Rights 
1. A number of organizations for the protection of Human Rights have taken up work since 
UNTAC’s arrival in Cambodia. If your party wins the upcoming elections, what kind of 
measures would your party take in order to guarantee the respect, implementation and 
protection of the fundamental rights and liberties of the Cambodian people? 
 
2. What kind of projects does your party have and what kind of effective measures will you 
take in order to guarantee that the policies and practices of the past won’t be allowed to 
return to Cambodia? 
 
3. In the past there have been a number of incidents of political violence in Cambodia. What 
kind of opinion does your party have with regard to this problem? 
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All of UNTAC’s statements or questions were closely tied to the provisions of the Paris 
Agreements. By presenting the questions as an extension of the PPA they could be 
justified as representing the common ground agreed upon by all parties. In both 
confirming and reminding them of their commitment the question were designed to 
prompt the representatives’ acknowledgement of its validity and contained the implicit 
demand not to violate the therein-expressed intentions. The interpretative practice 
reflected in these measures is thus aimed at reproducing the consensus inherent in the 
mandate and at upholding the collective legitimization derived from it. 
Independently from the content of the representatives’ answers the program was 
therefore a public display of UNTAC’s interpretative authority. While maintaining the 
neutral appearance of an uninvolved arbiter, they created a context in which it was 
nearly impossible for the parties to refuse them their acknowledgement of the validity 
III) Economy 
 
1. What kind of practical policies and measures would your party adopt to ensure that 
reconstruction efforts will reach all levels of Cambodian society, including the more 
disadvantaged? 
 
2. If your party wins in the upcoming elections, what would your party do in order to advance 
the possibilities for a self-sustaining economy in Cambodia? 
 
3. What does your party plan to do in order to coordinate Cambodia’s bilateral, regional and 
international economic relations? 
 
IV) National Constitution 
 
1. If your party wins in the upcoming elections, what kind of measures will you take and what 
kind of policies will you adopt in order to ensure that the National Constitution as adopted 
by the Constituent Assembly will turn Cambodia into a truly sovereign, independent and 
neutral state? 
 
2. What type of constitution will your party choose as a model in order to ensure that Cambodia 
will be truly sovereign, independent and neutral, a European, an Asian or a domestic 
system? 
 
3. If your party wins the elections, can your government establish an independent court that 
will protect the different rights as inscribed in the National Constitution?  
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regarding the future proceedings as laid out by UNTAC. The mere exchange of 
questions and answers was furthermore a simple yet effective way of keeping the Paris 
Peace Agreement symbolically at the center of the Cambodian politicians’ public 
discourse about the new political order and to reassure people of the continued 
existence of a common ground.  
The representatives were provided with the questions a week ahead of the 
recordings and were obliged to respect the Media Guidelines. On a more technical level 
the delay between record and broadcast of the program has to be considered another 
effective measure on UNTAC’s part to regulate the content of the presentations. 
Similar procedures had been in place for programs like Equal Time, Equal Access, 
where party representatives read prepared statements to be broadcasted via Radio 
UNTAC: If the recorded messages did not conform with the guidelines they had to 
come back and read a revised statement (Zhou 1994). In the case of the Roundtables 
this was not an option, but the party officials were still informed about perceived 
breaches and instructed to respect the rules during subsequent recordings.  The fact that 
UNTAC provided all the roundtable participants with the questions in advance allowed 
them to prepare adequately and made it more likely that no one broke the established 
rules during the actual recording of the program: An event that, incidentally, no one on 
UNTAC’s side would have actually been prepared to respond to.92  
The program is presented as an opportunity for the 20 newly formed parties to 
present themselves to the Cambodian people: They are addressed as future voters that 
will have to make an informed choice. The possibility of a peaceful future is explicitly 
linked to the institutional democratic reforms. With the theoretical perspective chosen 
here, it is possible to identify how the interpretative practice of the Transitional 
Authority creates a public of the intervention society centered on the Paris Peace 
Agreements – and thus an opportunity for UNTAC to generate authority: To enable 
political discourse in an intervention society means to intervene in discourse.  
With regard to the procedural measures that determined access to the decisive 
public, the Transitional Authority was in a position to fully use its competitive 
                                                 
92 Interview Anne Guillou; Interview with Isabelle Abric 
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advantage. The effect, however, was rather limited: As the created image played on the 
idea of breaking pre-established hierarchies by submitting everybody to the neutral 
procedures, it was mainly the appearance of the CPP that underlined the novelty of the 
multiparty system. The other former conflict factions had always presented the Paris 
Peace Agreements as ‘their’ agreements (and thus downplayed their true sentiments 
about the nature of the Agreements)93 – submitting to the new rules and presenting 
themselves as equal to the newcomers did not come with the aura of defeat for them.94  
Letting the representatives speak as advocates of the new political order was 
considered to have a potentially greater effect, but bore likewise more risk from the 
Transitional Authority’s point of view: Local actors may use this opportunity to present 
alternative ideas or question the neutrality of UNTAC. All of the described measures 
were aimed at minimizing this risk, disciplining the discourse and thereby exercise 
control over the ideas the Cambodian people were presented with. But in order to 
observe how the local actors reacted to the Transitional Authority’s implicit entitlement 
to define their future political order it is necessary to first clarify the precise link 
between UNTAC’s interpretative practice, the resulting measures and their symbolic 
dimension. In other words: We need a way to identify what precisely the local actors 
may negotiate here.  
In the case of the procedural measures the link was clear: UNTAC derived its 
interpretative practice from (their interpretation of) the neutrality principle in the PPA 
and the local actors attempted to reject or negotiate the resulting procedures of access. 
On a symbolic level the Transitional Authority and the local actors negotiated the 
meaning of a multiparty democracy with its distinct norms of transparency and fairness 
as imagined by UNTAC.  
To clarify this matter it is useful to recall that UNTAC used two types of 
measures to discipline the debate and ensure the ‘neutrality’ of the presentation: It 
                                                 
93 “We believed that [the UN] would implement all the stipulations within the PPA but as you know, I 
did not happen so. They did not do that. It is very difficult for us to assert our point of view because 
the whole framework was within the interest of the five perms.” Interview Son Soubert 
94 In reports from other, similarly organized events and public discussions the officers do report though 
that the members of the bigger factions regularly broke the established rules and that their 
contributions were broadcasted despite threats to cut them off after their allocated time slot. This 
happened at media outlets other than Radio or TV UNTAC. 
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obligated the participants to comply with the Media Guidelines and it centered the 
debate on the Paris Agreements. John Marston, who was charged with the 
implementation of the guidelines and hence with the task to ensure the ‘neutrality’ of 
the state media, had defined these particular measures as a ‘new etiquette of discourse’ 
in his own analysis of the evolving Cambodian media. According to Marston an 
etiquette represents a multitude of categories of understanding; as society changes these 
categories change too. One important function of etiquette is its potential to contribute 
to the temporary creation of a common ground as it “neutralizes or euphemizes” power 
relations in a given situation, to allow for the productive interaction of actors with 
conflicting tendencies or interests (Marston 1997, 34). In his analysis he traced the 
newly developing etiquette in reference to the changing use of personal pronouns and 
forms of addresses after the signing of the PPA.  
The correct use of pronouns in Khmer is of greatest importance because they 
are chosen in consideration of the complex relationship between the speakers. Changes 
in standard forms of address are therefore indicative of changes in the understanding 
of hierarchy. Marston analyzed political cartoons in order to assess these changing 
perceptions; in particular of the relationships between people traditionally regarded as 
powerful and the general population. As an anthropologist he is interested in how the 
new socio-political context affects the configuration of personal relationships and 
people’s understanding of their place in society.  
The analytical framework Marston developed with its sensitivity for context, 
perceptions, meaning and the effects of peoples’ interactions on their self-constitution 
is thus characteristic for an anthropological approach – but it also captures the 
analytical perspective that recent state building literature on internal legitimacy calls 
for. Of particular interest in this regard is the acknowledgement that social reality is by 
definition ‘hybrid’ in nature and has to be analyzed as the result of integrative effects:   
 “[I]f we want to talk about the discourse of neutrality in Cambodia in this period, we must 
talk about the role of the U.N. in producing and promoting a discourse of neutrality, and 
it is ultimately no less a Cambodian discourse because non-Cambodians had a role in the 
negotiation of it as a social reality.” (Marston 1997, 275) 
To speak of attempts to neutralize or euphemize the discourse, instead of an attempt to 
democratize discourse holds two advantages: a political and an analytical one. 
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Politically it evidently allows the ‘euphemization’ of the interveners’ role. The efforts 
to reform the media seem to bypass ideological intent: It is not the aim to establish a 
liberal order, but rather a peaceful political culture. The implicit equation of liberalism 
with peace does then no longer need to be addressed. What may appear problematical 
on a political level, holds a distinct analytical advantage though that will also benefit 
the observation we intend to make here: Instead of deciding a priori that the 
interpretative practice is ‘liberal’ in nature, we can instead focus on the implicit 
attempts of interveners to euphemize or neutralize state-society relations. This will 
likewise allow us to observe the nuances of local actors reactions to the interpretative 
claims of the Transitional Authority and to move beyond the liberal/non-liberal bias 
usually applied to analyze the vision local political actors have for their country’s 
future.  
The fact that the local political actors participating in the Roundtables had to 
abide by the Media Guidelines is of little use for the analysis. The constant negotiation 
between the Control Unit and the media representatives had already produced a certain 
set of clearly defined ‘no-goes’. As with the rules for the procedures the local actors 
simply had to accept them in order to gain access to the new public. For this reason the 
analysis will center on UNTAC’s questions as the main element used to promote a new 
‘etiquette’ and discipline the politicians own presentations.  
Based on the review of Cambodia’s history in Chapter 5 it is possible to argue 
that the transformation of three types of relations generated most of the insecurity: 1) 
The relationship between the factions was now defined as a relationship between 
political parties; 2) The government was said to be dependent on the people, and no 
longer the other way around; 3) Instead of negotiating their place in the world through 
strategic alliances with other foreign governments, Cambodia was supposed to become 
part of the ‘international community’.  
These transformations are taken for granted and are implicit in all of the 
questions UNTAC asked the invited party representatives. For UNTAC’s attempt to 
promote a new political order and develop interpretative authority the politicians’ 
public acknowledgement of the value and validity of these ideas played an important 
role. The following analysis intends to observe how the local political actors negotiated 
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this ‘new etiquette’ with their interpretative practice to generate interpretative authority 
for themselves. It is not designed as an exhaustive discussion of the contenders 
programs and visions for Cambodia. Rather, the different cases have been chosen to 
analyse and illustrate a given tendency to behave towards the discursive etiquette that 
UNTAC derived from the Paris Peace Agreements. All cases are organized according 
to the same basic structure and implicitly answer the following questions:  
1. What does UNTAC neutralize or euphemize with  its questions?   
2. What are the tensions the candidates decide to highlight or address?   
3. What kind of knowledge do the representatives mobilize in order to confirm, 
reject, or re-interpret a given etiquette?  
6.4.3. Performing on Stage: Authority Building and the Negotiation of a New 
Etiquette  
 
Confirmation: Case 1 
With each question UNTAC intended to invoke the imaginary of the time immediately 
after the elections by promting the representatives to describe the actions envisioned 
‘should your party win the elections’95. The therein expressed confidence of achieving 
the important goal of creating a political order, in which anybody could become a 
respected government official entitled to take actual decisions, stood in sharp contrast 
to the reality of a competition that was marked by intimidation and violence.  
Many of the representatives present at the roundtable therefore used the 
occasion to appeal to Cambodia’s political elite – old and new – urging them to respect 
the Paris Peace Agreements. Still firmly rooted in the present with all its tensions they 
emphasized that this agreement that was so difficult to achieve had “paved the way”, 
and constiuted “an opportunity” not to be missed, a “formula” to be followed, the 
                                                 
95 If not indicated otherwise, all quotes are taken from my translation of the Khmer transcripts. Short 
terms, questions, or other elements that are repeatedly used are quoted without reference to the session 
or page number in order to enhance readability of the analysis. In all other cases the quotes indicate the 
number of the Roundtable (RT1 National Reconciliation, RT2 Human Rights, RT3 Economy, RT4 
National Constitution) and the corresponding page number of the translation.  
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“center, the foundation” of the peace process, or, in the words of another representative: 
“The most important measure to achieve national reconciliation is first and foremost 
that the Paris Peace Agreement must be 100% successfully implemented, because this 
issue affects all the other problems” (RT1, 29). In asserting to govern as laid out by the 
PPA it is in particular the representatives of the small parties that continually confirm 
and accknowledge an exisisting “sphere of consensus” (Marston 1997, 36) – as 
intended by UNTAC. 
The former conflict parties on the contrary, tended to pair any explicit reference 
to the agreements with a reproach to others for not respecting its provisions (while they 
do)96. As the election’s favorite contenders, these parties could afford to highlight 
existing tension to garner local and international support.  
“[FUNCINPEC] members portrayed themselves as victims of a permanent SoC threat, 
which to an extent has credibility. They maintain that they are so dedicated to the cause, 
they are willing to risk their lives for it. [...] Therefore, if the CPP wins the elections, it 
will be a result of their successful intimidation of political party member. If FUNCINPEC 
wins, it will be a legitimate expression of popular choice [...]”97  
In terms of self-preservation the need to uphold the peace process towards the 
establishment of pluralism was obviously much greater on the side of the small parties 
than it was for the CPP or FUNCINPEC.  
“We cared a lot about not to oppose or to criticize the ruling party directly. We said things 
that should or should not be done for the sake of the people of Cambodia but we never 
pointed fingers to anyone or to any institution.” 98 
Uncertainty paired with the established “logic of national reconciliation”99 thoroughly 
influenced the interpretation of the Paris Peace Agreement and its resulting status as 
the symbol of Cambodia’s new order by those contenders. Depending on the topic of 
the roundtable the agreement was presented as the guarantee to eliminate corruption, 
end poverty and social inequality, avoid another “catastrophe” or, more directly, 
another genocide and reintegrate Cambodia into the international community. Usually 
                                                 
96 During the roundtable sessions the FUNCINPEC and the BLDP denounced the politically motivated 
killings of their own party members, while the CPP representatives deplored the continued accusation 
against their own party by their opponents and UNTAC, and pointed to the grave actions of the Khmer 
Rouge instead.  
97 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on a Field Trip to Siem Reap Province, 06.03.1993, p. 13 
98 Interview Oek Serey Sopheak 
99 Ibid. 
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juxtaposed with Cambodia’s past, its wars and killings, the PPA's greatest promise 
appeared to be not so much the new democratic order, but the non-recurrence of the 
past. 
Any symbol that succeeded in becoming the focal point of a society’s re-
integrative discourse is marked by its great ambivalence. In order to build their political 
authority vis-à-vis their audience all the party-representatives attempted to offer valid 
interpretations of the opportunities enshrined in the agreement. Ultimately they strived 
to represent the realization of this potential to motivate and convince the voters. Unlike 
the established parties that could refer to past achievements and shared experiences in 
order to create a sense of identification with the people, the small parties’ authority was 
highly depended on a convincing image of Cambodia’s democratic future.  
What united Cambodians was their “fear that they will again be confronted with 
mountains of bones, rivers of blood and an ocean of suffering” (RT2, 52; compare also 
RT2, 76). In the process of this interpretative practice all these representatives therefore 
came to identify democracy with peace. In their visions different political tendencies 
were declared meaningless and subordinated to the common goal of reuniting and 
reconstructing Cambodia; in many cases to the point of presenting the election results 
as somewhat secondary – after all they would all come together in a “nationally 
reconciled government” and continue to work together in the spirit of the “higher 
national interest”. 
“I would like to make an appeal to all the people, in particular to those who are in the 
parties, please come together, reach for each other’s hands and cooperate in order to steer 
the Cambodian ship towards becoming a civilized country. I am certain that if we don’t 
reconcile this ship of ours will sink. This is why I want to tell everybody in the different 
parties, that I do believe that the ship must be rowed, pushed and poled forward and for 
this reason my party needs all the people to reconcile in order to rebuild Cambodia.”  (RT1, 
57). 
The candidates’ awareness for the powerful potential of this theme is also 
evident in some of the newly founded parties’ names, among them the Khmer Neutral 
Party or the Liberal Reconciliation Party, and party symbols that display shaking hands 
(Republican Coalition Party and the FDRP) or the peace dove (Cambodge Renaissance 
and the Republican Coalition Party). Even the Cambodia’s People’s Party attempted to 
profit from this narrative and first unveiled a symbol that bore strong resemblance to 
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the UN’s ‘trademarks’: a dove framed by a wreath of branches. UNTAC was not 
pleased by this mimicry and the CPP later exchanged the dove with an angel 
distributing flowers.100  
Regardless of whether this particular interpretative practice was conducted out 
of opportunism or true convictions, it contributed to solidify the Paris Peace 
Agreements and on the same token codify democracy as something to which there was 
no alternative.  
Confirmation: Case 2 
While many people would have liked to vote for a ‘UNTAC Party’101, the members of 
the mission were constantly concerned to appear without interests and agenda. There 
was a great awareness of words with considerable “political weight”102, heavy enough 
to cause an imbalance and affect the neutrality of a given statement. One well-
documented example for the conscious change in vocabulary these considerations 
entailed is the search for a neutral term to address ‘the people’ as the available words 
“were all politically marked”.  
“The word pracheachon was associated with the socialist period and the word 
pracheapolrot was associated with the Lon Nol period. In order to avoid using one or the 
other, the decision was made to combine them into a single compound word 
pracheachonpracheapolrot.” (Marston 1997: 282)  
What makes for the weight of words that are forms of address is that they do “not only 
affect but shape relations.” (Marston, 1997: 117). The use of a neutral form of address, 
no matter how awkward the pronunciation, could therefore serve two important ends: 
For once it helped to further refine the tone of UNTAC’s ‘trustworthy voice’ and 
secondly, it signaled the people that they belonged to no one. One of the central 
                                                 
100  UNTAC Analysis Reports: Use of the Dove Symbol by the CPP, 07.08.1992. The authors of the 
report “strongly recommend that UNTAC act immediately to forbid the CPP and all other parties from 
using the dove on any of its emblems, flags and other symbols”. It remains unclear though, why the 
CPP finally retracted the proposed symbol and why the party Cambodge Rennaissance was allowed to 
keep the dove – in particular considering that this party’s symbol also figured the outlines of 
Cambodia’s map which is further reminiscent of the UN’s imagery.  
101 Interview Fabienne Luco, November 22, 2012; Interview Oek Serey Sopheak. Benny Widyono 
commented that most of the ballots declared invalid during the election, were in fact ballots where the 
people had made their cross next to the UNTAC emblem. Personal conversation with the author. April 
2013, San Diego, CA. 
102 Interview Anne Guillou 
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messages that the Transitional Authority had aimed at them was that they had the 
freedom of choice. This choice would enable them to sanction the parties that tried to 
intimidate or threaten them and promote those that would act in the country’s best 
interest: “Our weapons are our votes. […] If any political party uses violence against 
people, it shows that they don’t have any good plan for the future. […] We can vote 
for any party. It is up to us.”103 Choosing a new form of address was a way to 
symbolically adjust their status: As pracheachonpracheapolrot the people had no 
obligations, no historic debts that tied them to one of the established parties. Many of 
the short introduction-speeches performed by the UNTAC moderator at the beginning 
of each roundtable were a variation of this message.  
“Yasushi Akashi said that: A fair, strong and open electoral process will give the 
Cambodian people (pracheachonpracheapolrot kampuchea) the opportunity to identify 
with and vote for those political party candidates, who respect Human Rights. One way in 
which the Cambodian people can prevent political violence in the future is to vote against 
those who are committing acts of political violence today. UNTAC hopes that the program 
Political Roundtable Discussions will help the Cambodian people to judge the Human 
Rights policies of each party and decide which party to support by casting their secret 
ballot in the upcoming elections.” (RT2, 62, 72, 82) 
Just like UNTAC used a new form of address to euphemize the political freedom of the 
people, the new parties carefully chose their words when it came to speak to their fellow 
Cambodians. Although they would evidently not use UNTAC’s artificial compound 
word (with one notable exception, tellingly by the Khmer Neutral Party), most of them 
were eager to confirm that times for the people had changed.  
Speaking to a divided country the choice of all candidates naturally fell on 
inclusive terms that emphasized a sense of belonging, but the character of this 
relationship as expressed in the different terms revealed some clues regarding the 
nature of the society they imagined to take decisions for “should their party be elected”. 
The royalist parties tried to exploit their ties with Samdech Oev, the dear Father 
Prince,104 and addressed the roundtable audience emphatically as “one great family”, 
or “the rulers of Cambodia”, while others used the more nationally exclusive khmae 
                                                 
103 Radio UNTAC: Dialogue No. 28. The Power of the Vote. 
104 Kate Frieson (1996) analyzes the FUNCINCPEC’s electoral strategy in her article: The Politics of 
Getting the Vote in Cambodia.  
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yoeng (we Khmer), or – this usually employed by the new parties – chose to emphasize 
the peoples’ new political function and status by addressing them as “you, the voters”. 
The choice of words was embedded in a larger vision of Cambodia’s future as 
a truly fresh start, or the continuation of a history they perceived of as unfinished. Some 
of the competitors were indeed completely new to the political scene; like the 
aforementioned ‘doughnut king’, a former refugee who had made (and then lost) a true 
fortune with the sale of these sugary baked goods and provided a successful business 
model for thousands of migrants arriving in the United States.105 In line with his 
personal narrative he had created the Free Development Republican Party, propagating 
the possibility of a Cambodian version of the American dream for his fellow people.  
Many more, however, had re-emerged from the past with the intention of a 
comeback. The person who was most likely to succeed in this endeavor was In Tam. 
Born in 1917 he was already 75 years old at the time of the elections and his impressive 
CV included several high posts in Sihanouk’s Sangkum government and the Khmer 
Republic under Lon Nol, where he briefly served as prime minister.106 Immensely 
popular with the people both Nol and “Matak had always viewed [him] as a potential 
rival” (Chandler 1999, 213). In Tam’s career provided the background narrative 
necessary to reinforce “the weak link between the old and widely respected Democrat 
Party and its new incarnation.”107 Without a more recent history or an established 
follower base the party was very much identical with his persona:   
“Because His Excellency In Tam, the leader of our Democratic Party, is on a mission 
abroad, and because I have received the permission of His Excellency by phone from the 
United States, I have the great pleasure to participate in the Roundtable Discussion 
UNTAC has organized, by representing his Excellency In Tam” (RT1, 18) 
After this one-time appearance of the party’s secretary, In Tam spoke personally on his 
parties behalf. Dressed in a white military uniform that was supposedly meant to revive 
memories of the old days, His Excellency looked slightly out of date between the 
mostly young Cambodian men in Western suits. Much of what he said confirmed the 
                                                 
105  McPherson, Poppy. 2013. “The Story of the Man They Called the Doughnut King.” Phnom Penh 
Post, October 11. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/7days/story-man-they-called-doughnut-king. 
Accessed on 30th January 2015 
106 UNTAC New Parties DP: CV of In Tam, 30.09.1992 
107 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Digest and Analysis of the Democratic Party Bulletins, 13.01.1993, p.2 
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importance of the Paris Agreements and democratic governance, though he spoke 
without passion and rarely addressed the viewers directly. This demeanor only changed 
when the questions provided him with an opportunity to relate the new system to the 
survival of Cambodia: 
“In this regard we would like to make an appeal to all the Cambodians, all the parties, to 
please understand that we are currently repeating history; we are fighting with each other 
and are destroying our country, wiping out the West, wiping out the East […]; in another 
30 years will have disappeared from the face of the earth, so please…. Please, I would like 
to make an appeal to all the people to unite to create one national reconciliation 
government; don’t postpone the elections, missing them is not an option, when we miss 
them we open the door for the millions of foreigners to come, and our country will 
collapse.” (RT2, 70) 
His messages are matched by a form of address that draws not only a line between 
foreigners and Cambodians, but more specifically and nationally exclusive, 
distinguishes between those that are only Cambodian and truly Khmer with only the 
latter ones being his ‘brothers and sisters’. The notion of Khmerness and its role in 
reframing national identity will be further discussed in the next subchapter. Here, it is 
important to note that the act of voting is interpreted as an act of patriotism that renders 
political affiliations meaningless. The people are indebted to their country, not to a 
particular leader or party.  
The brief republican era of Cambodia served also as a model for those parties 
that wished to limit Norodom Sihanouk’s role in a future government. The Prince had 
officially resigned as the FUNCINPEC’s leader in 1990 (a fact that the party liked to 
downplay in their propaganda) and taken on the task to represent Cambodia as head of 
the Supreme National Council. Encouraged by several states and Cambodian parties it 
had been contemplated though to hold presidential elections and reinstate him as the 
country’s executive leader.108 Those against such a plan tended to keep their opinion 
to themselves. In this regard, the Republican Coalition Party formed an exception. A 
report on this party states: 
“Its leadership is comprised of former officials of the Khmer Republic (1970-75) who 
belonged to the Social Republican Party of Lon Nol, the Republican Party of Sirik Matak, 
                                                 
108 UNTAC Electoral Chronology: For Internal Discussion. A Presidential Election in Cambodia – An 
opinion. 02.06.1992; UNTAC King Sihanouk and the Royal Family: Presidential Elections in 
Cambodia. 24.08.1992  
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or the Democrat Party of In Tam. [The party] intends to carry on where the Khmer 
Republic left off in 1975.” 
The party was openly anti-royalist and “conceded that it will take long beyond the 
election to win popularity” on such a platform. “Its president is Cheng Heng, one of 
the leading proponents of the March 18 1970 coup against Sihanouk. [He] wrote to 
Sihanouk in Peking informing him of his dismissal from office.”.109 During the 
Roundtables the party was always represented by the slightly defiant Vanthun, who 
argued vigorously against the ‘forgive and forget approach’ advocated by many others 
when it came to Cambodia’s past. Stating that its people had “never known democracy, 
and only experienced violation and oppression” (RT2, 89) he criticized all past regimes 
for their arbitrary use of the state’s institutions: 
“I would like to remind the people again that during the times of French colonialism, 
foreigners rendered judgment through the French, and the Cambodian people had the very 
lowest rank. During feudalism the king had the people killed through his own court. 
During communism the party elite who killed the people had every right to do so.” (RT4, 
202)  
In this context, the consistent use of procheapolrot, the form of address associated with 
the Republican period, served symbolically as a re-affirmation of the 1970 coup and a 
criticism of the more recent rulers. He denounced that every leadership that presents 
itself as working on behalf of the people, but does so without any independent 
institutions, will ultimately abuse their inferiors. As procheopolrot the people would 
be able to regain control. The Cambodia’s People’s Party (kunapack procheachoun 
Kampuchea) evidently continued its use of the term procheachun. In comparison to the 
tame and measured answered of many other party representatives Vanthun’s statements 
are incredibly direct. It is thus unsurprising that the party’s leaders were afraid to 
become the target of political violence and had asked for UNTAC’s protection.110 The 
most ambitious attempt to explain the value of a democratic system in the context of 
the Roundtable Discussion had been undertaken by the Free Republican Party. Bit 
Seanglim, the party’s president, attended every roundtable and presented the audience 
with short, but highly complex commentaries on the principles of democratic 
                                                 
109 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Report on the Republican Coalition Party, 11.01.1993  
110 Ibid. 
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governance. Delivered with a stern face and a slow deliberate tone that befitted their 
didactic purpose, these statements were just as hard to listen to as they were to translate. 
Asked how his party would promote national reconciliation, he said: 
“My name is Bit Seanglim, I am the president of the Free Republican Party, which has the 
image of the white eagle as its symbol;111 we have chosen a policy that highly values the 
opinion of the voter. The voter hands over the power from below to the leader above, but 
if he doesn’t see the leader using it wisely the voter can topple the leader by a vote of no-
confidence, both, at the end of the mandated term or before it.” (RT1, 16) 
As the Cambodian people had never before been addressed as ‘voters’ by a potential 
leader such a statement had a near performative character: It signaled that it wasn’t the 
act of voting that would make the difference, but the acknowledgement of having 
become a voter. Considering these carefully crafted messages – always introduced by 
reminding the listeners of the party’s name and symbol  – it is somewhat of a puzzle to 
note what term had been chosen to translate ‘the people’.  
Bit Seanglim used neither the socialist procheachun, which is understandable, 
nor procheapolrot, which would have been the obvious choice, given the party’s name 
(Free Republican Party/ kunapack satiaranrot sereyniyum) and program. Instead, he 
used procheareas. This particular term “was associated with the monarchy, and 
literally means, ‘subjects’ of the king” (Marston 1997, 282). There are two likely 
explanations: Either, the author(s) of the answers as or were unaware of the literal 
meaning and had chosen it as a neutral translation for the term ‘citizen’, or they were 
indeed aware of this connotation, but still chose it with the intention to reinterpret its 
meaning in a democratic context. In this regard it might be important to note that the 
answers he gave during the Roundtable Discussions do not sound like they have been 
drafted in Khmer. The complex thoughts are somewhat betrayed by a slightly clumsy 
style that is characteristic of a text that has been translated from a different language. 
It is thus likely that the text has been written by Seanglim and potentially other foreign 
educated intellectuals, who were simply not aware of the connotation the term 
procheareas carried in modern day Cambodia. Whatever the reasons: The choice of 
                                                 
111 As Burslem has pointed out, the party symbol is modeled on the American 25 cent coin. Burslem, 
Chris. 1993. “Small Parties Could Be Cambodia’s Big Hope.” Phnom Penh Post, May 21. 
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this term oddly contrasts with the intended message of giving the people more power 
as voters.  
The examples clearly show the limits of strategic intent when it comes to re-
imagine Cambodia’s democratic future. Accepting the need for a different relation with 
the people, the representatives tried to present their audience with a vision that 
convincingly captures their new status. Depending on the degree to which they 
mobilized the country’s history in their explanations, they also attempted to 
circumscribe their own authoritative status in the current and future system.  Taken 
together these singular choices and their contextualization can therefore be perceived 
of as expressions of an ongoing negotiation to rephrase national identity in the context 
of a changing political order.  
Case 3 
It was not part of UNTAC’s mandate to implement a market economy. The Paris Peace 
Agreements dealt with the needs of the economic sector in the Declaration on the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. It set forward that the “main 
responsibility for deciding Cambodia's reconstruction needs and plans should rest with 
the Cambodian people and the government formed after free and fair elections. No 
attempt should be made to impose a development strategy on Cambodia from any 
outside source.” In the course of a first rehabilitation phase UNTAC was supposed to 
ensure that the populations basic needs would be met, including housing, basic 
infrastructure and public utilities. The Economy Roundtables were designed to present 
the people with their future representatives’ long-term objectives. They were recorded 
in February and March of 1993 and coincided partially with the country’s most serious 
period of inflation:  
“The riel underwent a 70 per cent depreciation […] resulting in the temporary closure of 
the gold and gems markets, petrol stations and even produce markets as the currency found 
its new level […] The price of a kilogram of first quality rice, for instance, jumped from 
450 riels in mid-March to a high of 3,000 riels on 20-21 March, settling to some 1,800- 
2,000 riels by mid-April. The prices of fish and meat rose by 80 per cent, keeping pace 
with general inflationary increases.” (Curtis 1993, 19)  
The cause of the inflation remained unknown, but gave rise to all kinds of speculations 
and contributed to an atmosphere of insecurity and fear. UNTAC was well aware that 
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these rather dramatic developments only two months before the elections would also 
negatively impact their own image. Apart from ‘peace’, the other promise that was 
associated with UNTAC and came with an exclamation mark was ‘prosperity’. Its 
legitimacy was thus very much dependent on presenting the people with some 
attainable results. In the introduction to the Roundtable the moderator reminded the 
audience of the positive contribution UNTAC’s presence had already made to the 
country’s economy: 
“UNTAC has stimulated development in a rather short period of time, it has boosted the 
reconstruction business and trade, provided Cambodians with work and has supported the 
work of the many new enterprises.” 
Despite the growing tensions between the Transitional Authority and several of the 
political parties, none of the representatives at the Roundtable used the occasion to 
challenge UNTAC, or question the narrative that had attained the status of a truth after 
the end of the Cold War: Socialism equals isolation and underdevelopment, while 
liberalism stands for integration and prosperity. In the words of the FUNCINPEC 
representative: 
“In advanced countries it is acknowledged that political liberalism and economic 
liberalism cannot be separated from one another. There are communist or formerly 
communist countries that used to govern all of these areas autocratically, which have 
experimented with having political liberalism, but no economic liberalism, and there are 
other countries, which have tested to have economic liberalism, but no political liberalism; 
all of them have failed the same. One example is the Soviet Union, which has already 
dissolved. A second example is Vietnam and the current State of Cambodia, which have 
given some economic liberties but no political liberties, which is the reason for the current 
grave social crisis.” (RT3, 162-163) 
Cambodia would transition to a liberal market economy, this was confirmed more or 
less explicitly by all parties. But the answers to the three questions UNTAC posed them 
during the program demonstrate that this transformation involved a re-orientation that 
touched upon a much broader understanding of ‘order’: Before the intervention the 
world outside of Cambodia’s borders had been presented to the people as a menacing 
place, populated mostly by enemies and a few patrons, willing to support the country’s 
efforts for independence and self-reliance.  
The idea of economic prosperity had been inexorably linked to the idea of 
political independence. Considering Cambodia’s complicated history with Vietnam 
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and its perceived role in the long conflict, ‘independence’ was furthermore strongly 
equated with hermetically sealed borders. The envisaged transition to a free market 
economy was difficult to reconcile with this perception and essentially necessitated a 
redefinition of Cambodia’s place in the global order. According to UNTAC’s questions 
the new economy would have to be self-sustaining and there was no doubt that 
Cambodia would engage in bilateral, regional and international economic relations.112  
While detailing their economic plans for the future the representatives therefore 
also presented the outlines of a new map that designated the world’s regions and 
countries with a new purpose. In contrast to the old enemy/patron distinction the newly 
emerging categories had multiplied and were oftentimes overlapping. Five are of 
particular importance in regard to the then most pressing questions of who Cambodia 
is and who it wants to be in relation to the world outside of its borders.  
Big Powers 
By using terms such as big powers or big leaders the representatives signaled that the 
Cold War period and its power structure still had a bearing on their policy strategies. 
Some representatives used the occasion to build on the liberation narrative inherent in 
the economic reforms, but others presented themselves more wary:  
“If the state relies on the financial aid of the big foreign powers, sooner or later we will 
have to cooperate with these foreign big powers. For this reason the state wants to protect 
its independence, in order to live of its own financial means, of its own country. Therefore, 
the state must make an extremely strong effort to create development, prosperity and 
diverse national resources.  […] But the state must proceed carefully with regard to 
everything that drives the national economy and ensure that it remains in the hands of the 
Khmer and the Khmer immigrants and will under no circumstances be governed by 
foreign countries.” (RT3, 144) 
Creating a market economy meant to create structures of economic interdependence 
and in view of the country’s history, where leader after leader had to “run away to beg 
                                                 
112 Question 2: If your party wins in the upcoming elections, what would your party do in order to 
advance the possibilities for a self-sustaining economy in Cambodia? Question 3: What does your party 
plan to do in order to coordinate Cambodia’s bilateral, regional and international economic relations? 
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foreigners for help” (RT1, 21) many were concerned as regards the lack of control this 
involved.  
Neighboring Countries  
This insecurity was even more evident in the representative’s efforts to reconcile the 
demand to foster regional economic integration with the expressed wish to keep 
Vietnam at arm-length. The development of a prosperous economy seemed to depend 
on integration, but one of the most important aims of a prosperous economy was 
political independence. During the Roundtables the representatives visible struggled to 
solve this apparent contradiction in order to provide their audience with a convincing 
image of Cambodia’s future regional cooperation.  
In Tam for instance acknowledged that Cambodia would have to join ASEAN, 
but underlined that this doesn’t mean that a political integration à la EU would 
automatically follow: [The Europeans] want to get so close. We couldn’t live like that” 
(RT3, 159). Willingness to participate in regional economic institutions was hence also 
presented as a signal to potential investors and donors that Cambodia truly intended to 
put the past behind it: 
“There is only this project that can provide our country with the currency that we need so 
urgently to buy machines, factories and modern technical knowledge to build and 
reconstruct our country as quickly as possible. But this project can only be implemented 
if our country has a democratic government and true political stability, and wants to be in 
peace with all other countries, in particular with the neighboring countries in our Southeast 
Asian region.” (RT3, 147) 
As already discussed the term liberal (serey) was presented to the Cambodian people 
most often in combination with descriptions of the economic system to underline the 
country’s new freedom (sereypiap) to partake in a more mobile and interrelated world. 
In this regard the economy provided the new political leaders also with a narrative to 
depoliticize their relations with “our neighboring countries”. These would allow the 
Cambodian people “to trade goods freely, FREE TRADE.” (RT3, 146) 
Markets 
The concept of ‘international markets’ played a similar role in depoliticizing 
Cambodia’s relations with other countries. 
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“[W]e have the liberty to trade goods on the national and the international market, short, 
with all the countries in the world. So, in order to foster development in Cambodia we 
need to strengthen the trade of goods with countries both near and far. We can produce 
some goods that can be sold easily, tailored to the needs of the international market; and 
we have other goods and materials that we cannot produce ourselves and which we need 
to import as required according to the needs of the Cambodian people.” (RT3, 168) 
Tied to the idea of ‘the world as market’ was the possibility to the present the 
Cambodian borders as permeable to goods, money, and knowledge – but closed for the 
unwanted immigrants. The concept was also necessary to make the benefits of the new 
economy relatable to the Cambodian population, which lived in a country with only 
one major city and was overwhelmingly confined to farm for a living.  “[I]t is of 
outmost importance that the relations with foreign countries contribute to find markets 
for our people that produce rice and other agricultural products to sell there.” (RT3, 
142) 
Developed Countries 
The dire state of the country’s economy put Cambodia at the bottom of almost all 
rankings evaluating the quality of live. For the Cambodian people this acknowledgment 
was also a problematic issue in terms of their national pride. The representatives of the 
party’s frequently used the example of “highly developed liberal countries” (RT3, 135) 
or “civilized countries” (RT3, 166) to chart the country’s way forward to a different 
future. Most of the parties had been founded by formerly exiled Cambodians and 
refugees. They were eager to use one of the few advantages their association with these 
foreign countries could bring them, namely the skills and know-how they had 
developed during their years outside of Cambodia. In their discussion of the economic 
challenges a new government would have to face the representatives thus confirmed 
the need for politicians “that have adequate economic skills and expertise (RT3, 143)”, 
praised the expertise of their own members – our president is “an agriculturalist who 
has worked abroad and received a golden trophy in France” (RT3, 178), we should 
renew the economy “by making use of the experience and the capabilities of our party 
[in] Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and the USA” (RT3, 141) –, or advertised more broadly 
the “superior knowledge” of their leader (RT3, 163). Their expertise would allow the 
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economic reconstruction of Cambodia and assure that the “honor of our people that has 
become so small will be raised to great heights again” (RT3, 140).   
 
International Community 
The representatives of the parties had no illusions regarding Cambodia’s potential to 
stand on its own feet anytime soon:  
“Cambodia has escaped a large war, with injuries and scars that are unparalleled. It is 
evident to us that today our country is completely destroyed. And our people are shattered 
and poverty stricken; from those in the hearts of our cities to the people living everywhere 
else in Cambodia. The refugees that return from the different borders are in the same state 
of poverty than the people inside of the country […] our country can’t be reconstructed 
quickly (RT3, 139-140). 
The vast majority of the newly founded parties (if not all) was linked to or sympathetic 
with the former opposition factions; in any case they were hostile towards the 
SoC/CPP. This also meant that they shared the same conflict interpretation, namely 
that the greatest problem UNTAC needed to solve was the occupation by Vietnam. The 
idea of liberation, sovereignty and independence was historically difficult to reconcile 
with foreign aid. Still, all of the parties acknowledged this necessity. The concept of an 
‘international community’ allowed them to demand financial assistance while 
upholding the idea of a country that was free at last from foreign interference. In the 
representatives’ statements the ‘international community’ is presented to the people as 
a moral judge that would decide over Cambodia’s fate by granting or denying them 
entry.  
Our Cambodian country, in the state that it is in today, must become part of the 
international community But before we can enter [ASEAN] they ask us to become a state 
under the rule of law ETAT DE DROIT; that means to have a territory, to have citizens, 
to have a law, to have a government that comes from the people. So, now we really have 
to make an effort and do everything to fulfill these four characteristics. So, this is why the 
Democratic Party asks you to […] please participate in the elections; so that there are 90 
percent or even more, so that they can see that we want to be a country that obeys the law 
and lives under the rule of law together with each and everybody. Today they regard us as 
people living under the rule of the jungle, today there is nobody who recognizes us; so if 
we do not all go to the elections, if we can’t be bothered to vote, then we will continue 
being a country that is excluded from the global community, so mobilize everything there 
is” (RT3, 159) 
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The idea that Cambodians would need to show manners and prove their worthiness to 
the world if they wanted peace and prosperity was very often repeated during the 
mission: “Don’t forget, the world is watching!”113 Or: We have to solve our problems 
now, “if we don't do this, the international community will abandon the Cambodians 
and we will again be isolated with absolute certainty” (RT1, 4).  
With these descriptions the representatives confirm the propagated potential of liberal 
institutions to foster peace and prosperity – but these developments are explicitly linked 
to Cambodia’s new place in the world: The value of the new institutions is defined in 
terms of the value accorded to them by others. Considering just how much emphasis 
the representatives put on the necessity of international recognition, one could argue 
that the Cambodian people did not turn out in such high numbers on Election Day 
because they felt that they had a choice, but that they voted because they had none. 
This case demonstrates that the character of the new economic order is mainly 
substantiated in reference to Cambodia’s defining foreign relations – not liberalism as 
an economic theory or ideology.114 None of this means that the Cambodian 
representatives have ‘misunderstood’ the reforms: All of them simply confirm the 
benefits of the aspects that are of greatest importance to them. It rather shows how all 
institutional reforms, no matter how technical they may be presented, are deeply 
interwoven with the broader question of national identity.  
Rejection 
During the first roundtable session on ‘National Reconciliation’ all party 
representatives had to answer a question that dealt with the reintegration of those 
Cambodians that had left the country. “How can your party ensure the harmonious 
integration of the Cambodian refugees and Cambodian immigrants into national 
                                                 
113 Radio UNTAC program transcript, Program 35 (Eviction Special), 18.03.93, p.6 
114 This also explains why several parties see no contradiction in presenting the nominally socialist 
economic system of Sihanouk’s Sangkum as the model for the new capitalist order: The Sangkum 
represents a time, when the “people lived in dignity” (RT3, 155), and when Cambodia was prosperous 
and the “biggest exporter of rice”  (RT3, 167). Likewise, the party that was most adamant in its 
demonization of communism (Party Republic Democracy Khmer) presented a reform program that 
showed a lot of similarities to planned economy, with suggestions to relocate people from populated to 
less populated areas, plans to provide the poor with animals and farming equipment, or build state owned 
factories to provide people with work (RT3, 173-174, 177).  
 
Analysis 
 
 
182 
 
society so that they can contribute to rebuilding the nation?” The seemingly harmless 
question touched at the heart of the unresolved issues that had created the long-lasting 
conflict. Migrants and refugees were not simply considered people that had fled the 
country as a consequence of the war. Rather, the fact of their absence was framed as 
both a political and a moral issue.  
In the eyes of the people the whereabouts of a person in 1992 and 1993 
expressed an affiliation with certain factions. From the CPP’s (accurate) point of view 
the border camps constituted opposition strongholds, while the FUNCINPEC, BLDP, 
and LNDP underlined their various efforts of helping and assisting the refugees (who 
would soon become their voters). After decades of poverty and with the colorful 
promises of economic prosperity in clear sight Cambodians also feared the financial 
burden that the arrival of thousands of have-nots would entail. As farmers and unskilled 
workers the majority of the country’s population differed only marginally in education 
and status, which made of every arrival a direct competitor for land and jobs. 
To a slightly lesser degree the assumption of established political associations 
did also apply to those Cambodians living abroad, who were often accused to be ‘slaves 
of the big powers’.115 With regard to this group of migrants UNTAC mainly 
euphemized the tensions that had built up as a result of the grudge many of those who 
had lived through the war held with regard to those who had left. The fact that they 
suffered while others presumably didn’t was often described as a betrayal to their 
fellow people and it was not uncommon to rebuke those who returned after living and 
studying abroad as arrogant opportunists.116 These two aspects made this an issue that 
affected the process of national reconciliation. 
As far as the character of these internal relationships was concerned, the 
representatives mainly confirmed the established etiquette and did their best to present 
themselves as a welcoming party whose arms (and ranks) were wide open. In order to 
dilute the notion of existing conflicts between the Cambodian people one dominant 
                                                 
115 In this particular quote, the representative asks the audience to stop accusing those coming from 
abroad to be the slave of some moha omnadj, which literally translates into higher authority and refers 
to China, America, or France (RT1, 36). 
116 I thank Hang Chan Sophea for this information. 
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narrative focused on the forced and painful absence of those Khmer ‘outside of the 
country’ and their possible future contributions:  
“All the Cambodian people, high-school and university students, teacher, professors, 
government personnel, civilians, dignitaries and others have been killed, and some had to 
flee and run for their lives, separated from their families, friends and their home country, 
fleeing from their motherland to live under the protection of foreign countries”(RT1, 35) 
Given the chance, they would all return and with them desperately needed assets in the 
form of knowledge, skills and money. Emphasizing the project of reconstructing 
Cambodia, the promise was that unity could be restored through the pursuit of a 
common objective. Aside from these rather predictable suggestions and assurances, the 
debate took an interesting turn as some representatives took issue with the wording of 
the question and used the occasion to shift the roundtable off UNTAC’s intended focus. 
In their Khmer translation of the term ‘Cambodian immigrants’ UNTAC had 
used the expression anikedjun khmae. Unlike the words for refugees (djun piah kluan) 
or displaced persons (djun plahbdoh ti konlaeng) the word anikedjun is not part of the 
concerned stipulation in the Khmer version of the Paris Peace Agreements.117 
Documents related to the preparation of the program as well as inquiries with those 
involved confirmed that the UN personnel nevertheless perceived of this as a 
completely neutral term.118 But while the representatives usually repeated the phrasing 
of the question when wording their answer, the term anikedjun khmae is only used in 
the intended form by four of the 19 candidates participating in the first Roundtable, 
while ten choose to distinguish between “Khmer inside and outside of the country” 
instead (khmae noev knong neng noev kravy brotheh), and five others explicitly 
criticize the choice of this word and refuse to use it in reference to their fellow 
Cambodians. The word anikedjun, as one candidate puts it, is a word that we use “only 
for foreigners who happened to be born in Cambodia […] for example the anikedjun 
djin and the anikedjun yuon.”119  
                                                 
117 Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part V, Article 19 and 20; 
Annex 4  
118 UNTAC, Roundtable Draft Questions, 30 November 1992 
119 Chinese and Vietnamese. The word yuon was used by two representatives during the first 
Roundtable. After these two incidents UNTAC reminded the participants that the use of this word will 
not be tolerated (Interview, Isabelle Abric) and no one used it during the three following Roundtables.   
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For this reason, he adds, his party does not want to “hear the expression 
anikedjun khmae in this country”. This word, concurs another candidate, “must only 
be used for foreigners”. To explain why the term anikedjun is of such a negative or 
even offensive character one representative warns that it would intensify the artificial 
dividing line between Khmer who live inside and outside of their country (bratheh 
djiat) that was first introduced by the SoC, then adopted by UNTAC and now sadly by 
the Khmer themselves.  
Awareness for the idea that forms of address have the power to shape relations, 
is expressed in the statement the use of this word could be tantamount to the desire of 
turning Khmer against Khmer.120 All of these candidates do therefore interpret the word 
as one that dangerously aims at redefining Khmer identity in geographic or political 
terms. In other words, the term anikedjun khmae expresses the idea that someone who 
is of Khmer descent could become a foreigner to its own people – and (in a reverse 
reading) that the anikedjun djin or vietnam could become Khmer. Rejecting the term 
anikedjun khmae means to reject both of these assumptions. 
In order to unravel the complex issues and their perceived effect on the process 
of national reconciliation that the representatives refer to here, it is necessary to turn to 
the ongoing conflicts between UNTAC and the former factions. To identify and register 
the Cambodian voters the electoral law needed to stipulate who was eligible to 
participate in this process. The established consensus that this right would only apply 
to Cambodians entailed a lengthy debate over the common markers of nationality. 
Despite the SNC’s decision to accept the law after some slight amendments the 
members of the former exile government continued to use the issue to undermine 
UNTAC’s authority. According to this interpretation the Transitional Authority’s 
perceived inability to ‘recognize’ the Vietnamese and thus handle the problem 
appropriately endangered the elections mainly in two ways:  For once because the 
presence of armed forces in disguise would hinder the establishment of a neutral 
                                                 
120 FUNCINPEC’s representative hints at this possibility in his answer. 
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political environment, and second, because the hundreds of thousands of illegal 
migrants would obtain the right to vote.121  
“Khieu Samphan, generally perceived as distinct and separate from the NADK, was 
a number of times praised (and sometimes quoted) for his positon of Vietnamese 
immigrants and allegations of the continued presence of Vietnamese forces. […] The 
historical view – that Vietnam’s encroachment threatens to turn Cambodia into ‘a 
second Champa’ – portrays Vietnamese migrants as the ‘thin edge of the wedge’ in 
the impending ethnic/national annihilation of Cambodia. Many people expressed the 
view that the elections will fail because of the presence of Vietnamese nationals in 
such great numbers. The consequence of this failure, they predicted, will be further 
instability which will in turn engender conditions conducive to the realization of 
‘Vietnam’s intentions’, that is, to ‘swallow Cambodia’.”122  
 
The propaganda of the main contenders (excluding the CPP) deliberately aimed at 
blurring the lines between nationality and ethnicity, suggesting that the two concepts 
are equivalent.  
“One man quoted Khieu Samphan’s statements that Europeans can’t even identify 
each other’s nationality with any certainty, so how can they be expected to tell the 
difference between Asians? […][Another man] asked the Information Officer in all 
seriousness whether there was a machine capable identifying a person’s ethnicity. 
Disappointed to hear that to the Information Officer’s knowledge no such machine 
existed, he remarked that it would probably be the only fail-safe way of preventing 
Vietnamese from voting in the elections.”123  
 
The herein proposed idea that only a Khmer is truly Cambodian and vice versa 
originates in colonial times and had been reinterpreted and to different degrees 
legalized by every new leader since (Edwards 1996). After the signing of the Paris 
Peace Agreements the concept of Khmerness had once again become an important 
locus of identity, offering a sense of belonging and victimhood and it was in particular 
the main contenders that competed to determine its borders and content (Edwards 
1996). The often repeated reproach that UNTAC stumbled around like a blind man, 
unable to see what all Khmers could see thus indicates only a part of the perceived 
problem. A much stronger case against UNTAC’s interpretative authority could be 
                                                 
121 The same Information Officer that wrote the here quoted report, also mentioned that some of these 
fears were even less accessible to reasoning:  Elections will fail, not necessarily because Vietnamese in 
disguise will vote, but simply because of their presence: Vietnamese in the country equals instability 
and thus further war. 
122 UNTAC Analysis Reports: Field Trip Report: Phnom Penh, 7-12 January 1993, 18.01.1993  
p.2 
123 Ibid. 
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made by insinuating that they were indeed not able to see what was clear to everyone’s 
eyes – even if they intended to. As foreigners they were excluded from a specific 
knowledge that was originally Khmer.  
Measures that the Transitional Authority took based on what these parties called 
a ‘distorted view’ were outright rejected, among them UNTAC ‘s decision to prohibit 
the use of the term youn in official statements and the media. This word was considered 
a derogatory term for people from Vietnamese descent and as such inflammatory 
language. UNTAC insisted on compliance with this rule wherever they had the 
authority to do so (that is mainly in UNTAC produced Radio and TV programs), while 
the Cambodian politicians never stopped to oppose its interpretation of the term. In a 
letter written to Tim Carney, UNTAC’s Head of Information and Education, BLDP 
leader Son Sann very well captured the position of many Cambodians on the matter 
when he heatedly declared the prohibition of the word’s usage in official contexts as 
the illegal imposition of a “new form of cultural colonialism” and rejected UNTAC’s 
interference as an “inacceptable abuse of its mandate”. 124  To make his case, he 
interpreted the measure as standing in the tradition of Vietnam’s occupational policies: 
“Since the Vietnamese occupation in 1979 Hanoi has prohibited the use of the word ‘youn’ 
in the Cambodian vocabulary, by replacing it with the word ‘Vietnam’, which usually 
refers to the country and not the people. But this is obviously part of its policy to 
vietnamize Cambodia. By using the word ‘Vietnam’ one risks to forget that there are 
‘Youn’, that means Vietnamese, who have been sent in great numbers to our country. At 
the same time, Hanoi has artificially introduced a new concept of the ‘chonn kampuchea’ 
(Cambodian people) instead of ‘Khmer’. In Cambodia, ‘chonn kampuchea’ includes all 
the people residing in Cambodia, including the Vietnamese who therefore have the same 
legal status as those who are of Cambodian blood. This is a process of dekhmerisaiton to 
the benefit of vietnamization. It is regrettable that UNTAC acknowledges this Vietnamese 
policy of dekhmerization by forcing us to use the word ‘Vietnam’ to say ‘Vietnamese’ 
instead of the Khmer word ‘Youn’.”  
His argument culminates in the statement that using the word yuon is “not at all a racist 
reaction, but the defense of our national identity and Khmer culture”. In this 
interpretation the acknowledgement of an ever present threat to the Cambodian nation 
as embodied in the country’s migrants is inexorably linked to the possibility of 
                                                 
124 Son Sann to Tim Carney, Phnom Penh, le 13 Mai 1993, Original French, my translation. 
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distinguishing between youn and Vietnamese.125 Using the word yuon is tantamount to 
keeping the memory of their existence alive: The word is thus not only of symbolic 
value, but considered a real weapon in the fight against the nation’s quiet annihilation. 
The rejection of the concept anikedjun khmae roots in the same tradition of thought and 
offered the political parties a fertile ground to develop interpretative authority: 
“I know our people’s love for the nation, longing to come back […] The dear Father Prince 
[Sihanouk] and our leader the Prince [Rannaridh] have always said, no matter where you 
are, you are all children of the dear Father Prince. […] As you already know, we are all 
brothers and sisters. […] I know exactly what the problem of the word ‘anikedjun’ is [I 
know that] our people must have a problem with this word ‘anikedjun,’ because we Khmer 
are one family.” (RT1, 13)  
Devoid of any concrete suggestions regarding the financial or economic issues related 
to the reintegration process, the FUNCINPEC representative Norodom Sirivudh 
suggestively explained and ‘solved’ the problem at hand by reference to Khmer 
society’s shared knowledge. His party, that is the great promise of Sirivudh’s answer, 
represents the knowledge that is the common ground. As already discussed, most of 
the new and in particular small parties’ leaders came from abroad. Their insistence on 
the possibility to recreate unity through the pursuit of a common objective, the 
reconstruction of Cambodia, describes their own story and valorizes the contributions 
they themselves can offer. In contrast to the programs and ideas they offered, Sirivudh 
suggested that there is no need to restore unity among the people – in its perpetual 
existence it simply has to be recognized and acknowledged. The fact that the royalist 
FUNCINPEC won the election cannot prove how much this narrative appealed to those 
addressed. But his answer shows that in this perfectly supervised political environment, 
national identity is an important source to challenge a new etiquette and the kind of 
social change it promotes.  
Reinterpretation 
At the 1989 Paris Peace Agreements Cambodia’s competing would-be-leaders had 
already learned to speak of the atrocities committed against the Cambodian people in 
terms of Human Rights violations. Khieu Samphan accused Hun Sen of having 
                                                 
125 Edwards wrote that the concept of Khmerness could never be interpreted to include Chinese or 
Vietnamese. “Indeed, distance must be maintained to perpetuate the myth: the strangers in our midst 
are the living embodiment of the threat to Cambodian existence” (1996, 56-57) 
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committed such crimes, Hun Sen decried the genocide committed by Samphan and his 
‘brothers’, and Sihanouk declared that the Khmer Rouge’s crimes should not be 
addressed without taking the PRK’s deplorable Human Rights record into account. As 
a frame of reference Human Rights were not used to circumscribe the crimes, but to 
measure the scale of somebody else’s fault. In the context of UNTAC’s mission the 
international community attempted to promote the concept for a different purpose. 
Claiming and defending Human Rights was presented as a guarantee against further 
abuse of the people at the hands of the state.  
The second series of Political Roundtable Discussion was devoted to this 
subject and it was here that the Cambodia’s People’s Party made its first appearance. 
Like the other 19 candidates their representative Sok An was presented with the 
following question:  
”A number of organizations for the protection of Human Rights have taken up work since 
UNTAC’s arrival in Cambodia. If your party wins the upcoming elections, what kind of 
measures would your party take in order to guarantee the respect, implementation and 
protection of the fundamental rights and liberties of the Cambodian people?”  
The here presented notion of a fresh start thanks to the presence of new (international) 
organizations and a future government that would cater to the needs of its people out 
of respect for their universally accepted rights was bound to strike a chord with the 
CPP. While UNTAC was under constant criticism for their inability to effectively 
control the state’s key institutions, the CPP tried to prove that they remained 
indispensable and very much in charge of affairs. An UNTAC Officer complained in 
this regard about the terminology used in Cambodian broadcasts and their detrimental 
effect on the neutral political environment:  
“If the racialist term ‘Yuon’ is outlawed, what about the politically non-neutral terms 
consistently used by the Cambodian People’s Party in the SPK broadcasts, namely ‘the 
State of Cambodia’ the ‘Phnom Penh Government’, the ‘Government of the State of 
Cambodia’ etc.”?126  
 The party’s very successful propaganda angered not only UNTAC but also the 
members of the other parties, who would blast UNTAC for their inefficient work. In 
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one unfortunate instance an UNTAC provincial director had used the ‘State of 
Cambodia’ as part of an address on his business card.  
“As you well know, the spread of such misinformation […] supports the view held by 
some members of the Cambodian population, and by one partie to the Paris Agreements 
in particular, that UNTAC is a tool of the SOC. […] We suggest that [a memo] state in no 
uncertain terms that the SOC is not a ‘government’ but a partie to the Paris Peace 
Agreements, and that UNTAC staff should use the term ’the existing administrative 
structure’ to refer to SOC.”127   
In order to discredit the validity of the promises attached to the idea of a ‘new 
beginning’ the CPP needed to project the image of a successful past into the times that 
would follow the elections. Instead of confirming or simply rejecting UNTAC’s sketch 
of a peaceful new order, this entailed the need to re-interpret the party’s past 
achievements and present them as the blueprint to a future that was already well under 
way before the international community intervened.  
During the roundtable the CPP representative Sok An thus highlighted past 
achievements and presented the party’s very own notion of what constitutes a political 
order based on the principles of Human Rights. The protection of Human Rights, as he 
puts it, had always been fundamental to the party’s program and was arguably its most 
important raison d’être : After all it had been them, who had answered to “the cries” of 
the Cambodian people to “protect their Human Rights […] in between the years 1975 
and 1978” and ended the genocide. This allusion to his party’s essential role in the 
termination of the Khmer Rouge’s rule is combined with an interpretation of the 
Human Rights concept inspired by socialist ideology128: “The Cambodian people had 
nothing […] if one talked about Human Rights, it was because they lived like slaves 
[and] died like animals […] After the liberation the fundamental Human Right was the 
right to live…” He then stressed the dependency of all other Human Rights and 
liberties, such as the freedom of expression or health care on the non-recurrence of “the 
genocide the greatest enemy of Human Rights”.  No other institutions or organizations 
devoted to Human Rights, he elaborated further, had either the “power nor the effective 
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128 In a socialist reading Human Rights are often denounced as a luxury of the developed western 
countries. The defense of these rights would serve as an ideological tool, distracting the people from 
the harsh reality and the struggles of the working class poor around the world.  
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means” to oppose this enemy. A victory of his party would therefore constitute “the 
guarantee that Human Rights achievements in Cambodia won’t be lost again.”  
In this obvious attempt to claim interpretative authority over the term Sok An 
outlined the ‘evolution’ of Human Rights achievements in Cambodia, framing them as 
non-universal and dependent on an able provider. His answer is of particular interest 
because he demonstrates the (sometimes cynical) acknowledgment of UNTAC’s rules, 
while efficiently using the space provided by filling the term with meaning in relation 
to peoples’ experiences.  
“The only thing that the CPP could work on was peoples’ lives. When you were killed 
during those three years, eight month and twenty days, who came to liberate you? And 
when you come back, who will provide you with something to eat? And since '89, who 
will provide you with a title for your property you are sitting on? The Westerners come 
and talk about human rights, freedom and democracy. This is worthless for people who 
are almost dying. Is this really what you want, what you feel that you need, or do you 
rather prepare basic needs like a house, land to cultivate rice, survival, etc.? You compare 
theory and real live here. For them, this is why the concept of human rights opposed 
reality.” 129 
The fact that his party had ‘understood’ the meaning of Human Rights in Cambodia 
long before anybody else did lent credibility to his implicit rejection of the international 
community’s interpretation of this term. During UNTAC many people viewed the 
equality-credo of democracy with great suspicion. In letters to Radio UNTAC they 
expressed their fear that “democracy means anarchy” because the acknowledgment of 
Human Rights would deprive the state of its disciplinary power: “…the robbers will do 
whatever they want […] there will be robberies and slaughters everywhere and 
Cambodia will end in anarchy.”130Sok An did not forget to address this prevalent fear:  
“The way in which Human Rights are explained is not appropriate for the current situation 
in Cambodia and might have grave consequences for society; the killer has the same rights 
as the victim, the thief has the same rights as the owner…”  
The Cambodia’s People’s Party was very successful with this re-interpretation. Many 
people found it difficult to reconcile the ideas presented by UNTAC with the social 
reality of their lives. 
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 “Cambodia is a society with such a strict hierarchy. And you come and present the idea 
of Human Rights. The idea that everybody is equal. This does not fit any cultural concept 
on the local level.”131 
 The benefit of prisoners’ rights and the concept of political crimes turned out to be 
particularly hard to convey and UNTAC’s reforms in this regard led to a lot of 
resentment and conflicts.132  
“While SOC media accusations against other parties seem to be having effect, it also 
seems widely understood that joining a political party other than the CPP can be an open 
invitation to a visit by robbers and/or murderers. The Information Officer was told by 
several people ·that offenders are no longer put in prison for political crimes. This is 
because between now and the election they would probably be freed by UNTAC, and after 
the elections they will be freed by the new government anyway. So the easy solution for 
the authorities is ‘just to kill them on the spot’.”133  
Despite the fact that many feared the powerful state party and wished for a change, 
there were also all those people that felt it would be wiser to count on the established 
party to keep the peace (these two sentiments were not mutually exclusive).  Their 
position allowed it the CPP to characterize the transition to the new order under their 
auspices as the reliable and appropriate continuation of a process that had started long 
ago under a different label. The uncertainty of the future that unsettled so many was 
thus eased with the promise of stability.  
Evidently, none of the smaller parties had similar symbolic or material 
resources at their disposal. And while their answers won’t be subjected to an extensive 
analysis here, one notable aspect shall be pointed out: Just like the CPP they 
emphasized the dependency of these rights on the existence of a powerful interpreter 
and provider. But even in their determination to illustrate the democratic promise as 
positive as possible, many failed in their attempt to actually imagine an end of 
autocratic rule and an independent influential position for themselves. Their focus lies 
not so much on the question of Human Rights implementation, but on the need to 
protect them with a vast array of institutions and measures, such as non-governmental 
organizations for the protection of Human Rights subjected to the administration of the 
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UN, the introduction of severe punishments for corrupt judges and government 
authorities who violate Human Rights, or foundations to support the people in their 
lawsuits against the rich and powerful, to name only a few.  
Behind their emphatic appeals to UNTAC and the international community not 
to abandon Cambodia and to use their powers to the fullest extent, their requests to 
educate the Cambodian people about the true meaning of democracy and their 
continued reassurances that their own party has clearly understood the concept of 
Human Rights and won’t “consider Cambodia [its] private possession” lurks the fear 
that the Paris Peace Agreements are but a script for the powerful candidates, who “only 
play democracy” and fool their audience with “the heart of a demon and the mouth of 
an angel.” 
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7. Conclusion: How the Paris 
Agreements shaped Ideas of the 
New Political Order 
 
Current scholarship on state building and peacebuilding is increasingly willing to 
acknowledge the importance of social factors. The critique of the liberal peace model 
has successfully argued that a sole focus on institutions, norms, and interests is not 
sufficient to understand the dynamics of transitions from conflict to peace. Initially, 
this debate derived much of its emphasis from the undeniable failure of many large 
scale interventions. Instead of explaining the problems and disappointing results with 
the perceived deficiencies of local actors and institutions, attention was drawn to the 
effect that the interveners’ own unquestioned expectations and assumptions had on the 
development of ‘conflicts after the conflict’. More recent contributions express greater 
confidence that the basic criticism of the West’s implicit assumptions of superiority 
has already been received and its validity (at least to a certain degree) acknowledged. 
The overt critique of the ‘liberal’ in liberal peace has been replaced by more nuanced 
studies, searching for alternative models of analysis and techniques of observation. 
This academic project has a clear political intention, namely to transform the 
relationship between international and local actors from one between experts and 
laymen into one between true partners in peacebuilding. The fundamental question in 
the context of this debate is not ‘What should a peaceful order look like?’, but ‘What 
can a peaceful order look like?’ Legitimacy has emerged as a keyword to find an 
answer to this question, which in turn led to a revalidation of local resistance. Emerging 
hybrid or non-liberal institutions are approached with an interest in the stories they can 
tell us about the reasons for local actors’ support or rejection of thereof.  
It is in regard to this debate that this work intends to make two distinct 
contribution: First of all it aimed at developing an analytical model capable of 
accessing the realm of ideas more directly in order to observe how international and 
local actors negotiate over the meaning of the political reforms. And second, with its 
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study of the Cambodian peace process under the United Nations Transitional Authority 
it intended to present sound empirical data to make a case for the relevance of such an 
approach. The following chapter will review the analysis by linking the case specific 
results to the broader debate on internal legitimacy in peacebuilding.  
The review of the critical liberal peace debate identified two conceptual limits inherent 
in the development of new analytical models used to approach emerging institutions: 
A rather one-dimensional conceptualization of power as imposition and a marked 
tendency to define clear cut objects of reforms. These definitions are, so the argument, 
remnants of the ‘habitat’ the critique initially developed in. To oppose the predominant 
perception of local actors as disruptive or teachable objects of reforms the studies were 
particularly intent to demonstrate their agency to negotiate and subvert hegemonic 
attempts. Chapter 1 closed by proposing to shift attention to the symbolic dimension 
of local-international interaction: How do international actors convey their vision of a 
new political order and how do these efforts relate to the local actors own visions for 
their country’s future? The realm of ideas is arguably rather resistant to coercion or 
threat. A closer examination of the ongoing negotiations that ensue in the context of an 
intervention over the meaning of reforms can thus be used to chart a way forward and 
overcome the debate’s limitations.  
Chapter 3 took the current debate over the conceptualization of the state as 
government versus the state as a social system and its implications for our 
understanding of state building practice as a point of departure. The basic premise of 
the analysis is the inherent political nature of interveners’ engagement: No matter how 
technical the reform or how well defined the intent, interveners’ acts always represent 
a claim to know what a peaceful order looks like. The act of reform implementation 
cannot be separated from the intention to influence how the people may interpret the 
new order. While the critical peace debate refers to the ‘state as a social system’ mainly 
in order to argue for the relevance of an open dialogue or engagement with the local 
population to determine potential reforms, the model is here used to re-conceptualize 
the relationship between international and local political actors: In the context of an 
intervention society every actors that proposes reforms is also engaged in the struggles 
over the meaning of the newly evolving state. Interveners and local political actors are 
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thus in a competitive relationship with one another. The second part of Chapter 3 
presents the theory of interpretative authority. It builds on the hypotheses derived from 
the first part of the theory discussion to devise an analytical model that is capable of 
capturing how ideas are proposed and negotiated in the context of an intervention 
society. An institution that is accorded the status of an interpretative authority is in a 
position to formulate what defines the common ground of a political community. In 
other words, it is an institution that can formulate why and how people want to act 
together. It is a definition that implies an intimate relationship between authority and 
identity. Applied to the realm of state building the theory stipulates that all actors that 
want to have a bearing on the country’s political future, need to build such 
interpretative authority. For interveners it is of particular importance that notions of 
legitimacy converge on the state. In this regard they will attempt to focus all public 
deliberations over the new political order on the states’ new institutions. The theory 
distinguishes between three analytical dimensions: Symbolic conditions, opportunities, 
and interpretative practice. For the analysis these three dimensions and the hypotheses 
derived from the first part are systematically applied to the configuration of the 
relationship between international and local political actors in the context of the United 
Nations’ Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The resulting analytical model 
established the following:  
An intervention society is characterized by great insecurity regarding its 
fundamental categories of understanding. This provides actors with the possibility to 
build interpretative authority: In public deliberations over the meaning of the reforms 
they seek to re-establish a common ground regarding these fundamental categories. 
International actors partake in these public negotiations by communicating their own 
vision of the new political order. In Cambodia, the international actors could claim 
access to this realm of negotiation in reference to the Paris Peace Agreements. On a 
symbolic level these Agreements were perceived as representative for the country’s 
new political order. To assure their superior status over other potential symbols 
UNTAC needed to assure that public deliberations over the future converged on the 
PPA as the relevant symbol. To observe the techniques used by UNTAC to discipline 
the discourse the analysis focused therefore on the public created and controlled by 
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UNTAC. As each act of the Transitional Authority would have to relate to the PPA as 
their source of legitimacy, this public is by definition every opportunity created by 
UNTAC for itself and others to publicly speak about the peace process. This public can 
also adequately reflect the power bias between international and local actors, as the 
formers are institutionalized as the Agreements authoritative interpreters. The analysis 
was geared towards the identification of the interpretative practice UNTAC derived 
from the agreements to influence the competition in the realm of ideas to its advantage. 
In a related step this also meant to identify what kind of knowledge the local actors 
mobilized to promote their own visions and potentially challenge the Transitional 
Authority. The negotiations over the meaning of the new reforms can hence be 
discerned in the interpretative practice the local actors employ in the public of an 
intervention society. The presentation of this analytical model and the related theory 
discussion thus led to the formulation of the main question: How did the Paris Peace 
Agreements shape ideas of the new political order in Cambodia 1992-93? 
In order to access this symbolic dimension of the interaction between UNTAC 
representatives and the Cambodian political actors the analysis focused on one 
particular occasion, created by UNTAC to present all 20 new parties to the Cambodian 
people: A TV program entitled Political Roundtable Discussions. In this highly 
controlled setting it was possible to identify the interpretative practice UNTAC had 
derived from the PPA in order to discipline the image and presentation of the parties. 
The analysis is based on the video material and the translated program script of all four 
sessions. An overview of the symbolic conditions that preceded the main analysis 
provided information regarding the strategic considerations behind the practice we can 
observe in the context of this particular opportunity: The Information and Education 
Unit charged with the control of Cambodia’s information sector wanted to offer a 
‘neutral’ alternative to existing party owned media and it attempted to promote a new 
political culture. Interviews with former member of this particular unit, analysis 
documents, and materials related to UNTAC’s own media production made it possible 
to reconstruct the intervention milieu in which this practice developed and from where 
it derived its meaning. By perceiving the individual rules and regulations established 
for the program as a particular interpretative practice that aimed at building 
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interpretative authority and thus enforce a particular vision of the future political order 
it was further possible to demonstrate that InfoEd grounded its strategies in a positive 
interpretation of the neutral political environment that UNTAC was mandated to 
establish. What constituted a negative in diplomatic terms – namely the absence of 
monopolized power over the media and the end of political violence – thus came to 
inform the working ethics of several officers and officials associated with this unit. The 
legitimacy of the interventions derived from this practice had been questioned by 
several local political actors in the course of the intervention, while international 
observers described them only in approving terms. With the analytical model 
developed in Chapter 3 the criticism regarding the procedures and the rehearsed 
statements of the politicians could be analyzed in their relation to the vision of 
Cambodia’s political future as promoted by UNTAC. With the establishment of 
procedural neutrality the TA intended to promote a convincing image of the new liberal 
democratic multiparty system. All of the questions that the moderator posed them 
during each round of the roundtable program constituted, to different degrees, attempts 
to establish a new “discursive etiquette” by “euphemizing or neutralizing” the 
Cambodian people’s most defining political relations (Marston 1997). The time 
immediately prior to the country’s first elections has to be regarded as a ‘charismatic’ 
time, that is a time during which “the autonomy of the political dynamic as a whole 
seems to be enhanced” and political actors and ideas “shape politics in a dramatic way” 
(Grenier 1996, 12). This implies a heightened awareness for the symbolic dimension; 
statements and acts are perceived as charged with meaning. It was therefore expected 
that the local actors would not only confirm UNTAC’s interpretations of their future 
political order, but use the occasion to generate interpretative authority by either 
confirming, rejecting or re-interpreting the new etiquette.  
Political Authority as Interpretative Authority 
The Political Roundtable Discussions are an ideal case study because this program 
represents a situation that was entirely under the control of the Transitional Authority. 
One goal of the analysis was to capture the power bias between local and international 
actors in the realm of ideas and present a more nuanced description of their relationship 
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to contrast the predominant conceptualization of them as imposers and imposed upon. 
The rules and procedures could be clearly related to UNTAC’s expressed intention to 
provide the Cambodian people with an idea of the new political order. With its 
interpretative practice the Transitional Authority created an opportunity for the 
country’s political actors to deliberate Cambodia’s future. At the same time the 
Transitional Authority attempted to control the image and discipline the discourse to 
ensure that all presented ideas converged on the PPA as the symbol for the new political 
order. The analysis of the local actors’ attempts to negotiate these rules and procedures 
with their own interpretative practice allowed us to observe how the Transitional 
Authority’s competitive advantage played out. Chapter 6.4.1 presented several of their 
attempts to negotiate the procedural neutrality. Their explicit and implicit arguments 
revealed that all of the representatives rightly interpreted the setting as a symbolic 
statement on UNTAC’s part: It broke with established categories of understanding 
regarding the relationship between political actors with a more or less established 
power base and presented this new image to the Cambodian people. It became 
furthermore evident that the local actors felt compelled to comply with these rules 
because they were aware of the people’s attention. UNTAC could only exercise 
interpretative authority because it had succeeded in creating a public that mattered. 
This sheds an interesting light on the role of the relationship between interveners and 
the wider population as it suggests a direct link between the legitimacy the population 
accords to the TA’s role in the peace process and the compliance of local political 
actors. While several authors consider it important that interveners, and in particular 
Transitional Authorities, strive to communicate more directly with the people, it is 
usually not considered that this process of legitimization may have a direct influence 
on the TA’s interpretative authority and hence its authority vis-à-vis the political actors.   
The analysis of UNTAC’s attempts to establish a new etiquette in Chapter 6.4.3 
revealed more mixed results. If we would focus on the role of the media alone, one 
could of course argue that the mere existence of such a program had an impact on 
UNTAC’s legitimacy.  
“I think the excitement was not about what they were actually saying but about the 
idea that this whole phenomenon was possible at all. That was the drama and 
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people watched perhaps for that reason, if they watched it; for just the idea that 
things could be said that couldn't be said before.”134 
 
In the context of the intervention Radio and TV UNTAC certainly signaled a change 
in the political economy of public discourse. However, in order to draw more general 
conclusions regarding the nature of power that determines the relationship between 
actors that intent to develop interpretative authority it is more important to focus on the 
interpretative practice of the local political actors. Addressed as representatives of their 
parties they were not only pressed to find solutions to the problems they were presented 
with, but rather to lay out a vision of the political community in whose name they 
claimed to speak. 
What kind of knowledge did they mobilize to react to the Transitional 
Authority’s efforts to discipline the political discourse? First, we can note an overall 
tendency to confirm the interpretations they were presented with. As with the 
procedural rules, the statements of the representatives reflected the awareness that 
using the opportunity to speak and acknowledging the superior status of the PPA as the 
symbol for Cambodia’s new order were almost impossible to separate. A closer look 
at the interpretative practice employed to substantiate these confirmations on the other 
hand, shows that they came with unintended consequences from the TA’s point of 
view. Unlike UNTAC none of the representatives was in a position to derive its 
legitimacy from the promise of a new beginning alone. To build interpretative authority 
it was of greater importance to confirm the validity of existing categories of 
understanding: By mobilizing common knowledge over concepts charged with 
meaning such as liberty or independence the ‘confirmation’ actually only extended to 
the broad promises UNTAC itself wanted to be associated with: Peace and prosperity. 
The acknowledgement did thus certainly have a positive effect on the short-term goal 
of upholding the legitimacy of the Transitional Authority itself, but probably less on 
the long-term goal of associating the specific liberal institutions with the attainment of 
these ideas. While the cases discussed under the headline of Confirmation 
demonstrated the limits of the local actors’ strategic intent, the case of rejection showed 
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how a symbolically charged context defies even the most careful preparations on the 
TA’s part. The usage of the Khmer term anikedjun in their translation of the expression 
Cambodian immigrants led to a ‘debate’ over the limits of UNTAC’s legitimate 
interference in Cambodian affairs. By drawing on records of UNTAC’s internal 
communication it was possible to demonstrate that the tensions the representatives 
chose to highlight here, rooted in widespread concerns over yet another foreign attempt 
to define the character of Khmer identity. The last case presented an attempt by the 
formerly ruling party to promote an alternative interpretation of the concept of human 
rights. Similar to the case of rejection the interpretative practice was used to draw a 
distinct border between ‘our’ common ground as opposed to the one ‘they’ want to 
define. Interveners draw much of their legitimacy from the claim to directly represent 
the people. The interpretative practice of the local political actors, drawing attention to 
the shared knowledge and experience of the people should be regarded as a rejection 
of this claim. It highlights that interveners aren’t ‘above’ politics, but, like anyone else, 
come with a certain agenda. As pointed out at the outset the case of the Roundtable 
Discussions had been chosen because it represents the public of an intervention society 
and thus an opportunity for the TA to be in perfect control of the political discourse. 
Considering the discipline shown by all the participants and the fact that this entire 
scene played out well within the realm of formal compliance with the Agreements 
stipulations the cases demonstrate just how little interveners can actually control 
transformative processes in the realm of ideas: Even without clearly defined ‘objects 
of negotiation’ it was possible to observe the local actors’ agency and witness how they 
define the degree of social changes acceptable to them in open discussion with the 
interveners’ insistent proposition.   
Statebuilding as Nationbuilding 
The theory discussion recalled the current debate over perceptions of the state as 
government and the state as social system and its implications for the realm of state 
building. The results of the empirical analysis confirm, what had remained so far a 
rather theoretical argument: By conceptualizing the relationship between international 
and local political actors as one between competitors in the realm of ideas it became 
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evident how deeply intertwined question of institutional reforms and national identity 
are. Lemay Hebert had argued that  
“Given that ‘the state makes the nation’, it is impossible to avoid nationbuilding 
activities in statebuilding processes centered on institutions. The argument is not that 
the institutional approach cannot lead to nation-building. To the contrary, the creation 
of institutions has concrete repercussions on the nature of the socio-political cohesion. 
A better option in framing statebuilding interventions is to therefore grapple with this 
reality, rather than avoiding it” (Lemay-Hébert 2009, 32) 
 
The results of the roundtables demonstrate that it was indeed impossible for the TA to 
guide a discourse over the value of the new political order without inciting a much 
broader debate over the character of Cambodia’s political identity.  
Liberal or non-liberal: categories beyond the labels 
The entire analysis abstained from defining the interpretative practice of either group 
of actors in terms of liberal or non-liberal. After having reviewed the different cases 
and detailed the interpretative practice employed by international and local actors to 
negotiate the character of the new political order the question thus is, whether or not 
this description would add anything of substance to the conclusions.  
UNTAC’s interpretative practice had to relate to the Paris Peace Agreements. They 
stipulated that Cambodia would transition to a liberal pluralist democracy. All of the 
question did likewise describe liberal political institutions or were at least phrased in a 
way to elicit the representatives’ public commitment to a liberal order. The members 
of the Information and Education Unit likewise openly admit that they “believed in 
democracy and peace” and were “committed to restore democracy” at the time: They 
clearly equated a peaceful order with a liberal order. The emphasis on choice has to be 
related to this commitment: In line with liberal ideology the people were consistently 
addressed as autonomous subjects. But in order to describe the interpretative practice 
they used to negotiate the new order as a social reality the label ‘liberal’ is rather void 
of meaning. It might also led us to underestimate the restrictions inherent in the ‘free 
space’ interveners claim to create. The analyzed examples reveal the intimate link 
between freedom and discipline in the context of an intervention society.  
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In fact, the label might provide observers with a false sense of ‘understanding’. This is 
particularly evident if we turn to the interpretative practice used by the local actors to 
challenge their interpretations. Current analysis use the ‘liberal’ label to describe what 
the local counterparts reject, and implicitly also to explain why they choose this course 
of action: Resistance by the local community is resistance against liberal institutions 
or liberal forms of knowledge. But this doesn’t capture the concerns the representatives 
voiced in regard to the new institutions. A potential exception is the last case, namely 
the reinterpretation of the human rights principle by the CPP representative. Here, it 
would be possible to argue that the party in power did indeed reject the ‘liberal’ 
character of the new order. Provided that the overall aim of any intervention is to 
establish a peaceful order, it is probably more important though to understand the 
justification for the rejection or reinterpretation of a given principle (i.e. the 
interpretative practice) instead of simply judging actors’ decision based on the 
assumption that they are not inclined to support the establishment of a liberal order. 
Analytically, the observation of the interpretative practice can furthermore teach us 
something about the way, in which local actors build legitimacy vis-à-vis the people. 
This will have an impact on how they come to perceive of the new institutions.  
The new dialogue that current peacebuilding literature aims for, intends to reform the 
relationship between interveners and local actors by giving more weight to local forms 
of knowledge and by deconstructing the superior status of liberal ideas. Based on the 
results of the analysis two aspects are imminent to consider. The first one concerns the 
conceptualization of power inherent in this demand. It is based on the notion that 
international actors are ‘blind and arrogant’ and use their material power to impose 
ideas on foreign actors. The analysis suggested that the relationship between them is 
more complex and that the mobilized knowledge cannot be neatly ascribed to either 
category of actors. The power bias can hence not be removed simply by inversing their 
relationship. Focusing on the symbolic conditions of actors’ sources of legitimacy and 
their interpretative practice may provide better information on how to devise this new 
dialogue. In any case it can raise awareness for the fact that ‘enabling’ a discourse over 
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a country’s political future in the context of an intervention society is a symbolically 
charged and hence highly political undertaking.  
The second aspect concerns the fact that the ‘superiority’ of Western knowledge and 
institutions was often most enthusiastically embraced by the Cambodian politicians 
themselves. One could of course argue that these representatives were only given a 
platform because the Perm-5 had already imposed a liberal order on Cambodia. This 
may have oppressed the potential of other, more local ideas and their supporters. Such 
an argument though, ignores the economic realities in many post-conflict societies. 
People interested in implementing political reforms are often foreign educated and 
might be eager to put their country in the footsteps of ‘developed’ Western models. 
Several authors simply reject such an elite as inauthentic and not truly representative 
for the people. As already stated at the outset, it is clearly of the essence to engage the 
wider population more directly in the making of a new, peaceful order. But with regard 
to the conceptualization of the new partnership it might be important to ask oneself, if 
the intention to address local counterparts predominantly as representatives of the 
local-local in order to deconstruct one’s own role as a representative of ‘superior 
knowledge’ is not just as condescending. The interpretative practice of the local actors 
clearly demonstrated that reforms in itself are ‘meaningless’; they have to be related to 
the world of the people. It is thus despite the overall consensus that the interveners’ 
have the authority to establish near hegemonic narratives that local knowledge turned 
out to be quite a powerful resource to counter interveners’ claims: Not as a hidden form 
of agency, but as open rejection.   
Cooperation or Conflict 
The introduction argued that Cambodia has been perceived a close case in the realm of 
state building, because the outcomes of the peace process neatly fit into the established 
categories of both proponents and critiques of the liberal peace. This concluding part 
will briefly pick up this thread in order to add one last argument for the relevance of an 
approach that takes the symbolic dimension into account. Common wisdom has it that 
the CPP was opposed to UNTAC’s liberal agenda and that the mission was under 
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constant threat because of the incumbent party’s lack of cooperation and the fact that 
the Khmer Rouge had resorted to violence again. The analysis showed that another 
conflict accompanied the entire mission: The Khmer Rouge were not alone with their 
opinion that UNTAC had sided with the CPP (and by extension Vietnam). Growing 
impatience with the Transitional Authority could also be observed in the ranks of the 
FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. The analysis allows us to link events and problems that 
are usually discussed separately and understand why the seemingly harmless 
interventions by the Information and Education Unit elicited such harsh reactions by 
the leaders of the opposition parties. As Susanne Woodward has argued: “Crucial to 
the way a conflict ends are the parties’ campaigns to win external support (including 
intervention) for their side by shaping outsiders’ perceptions of the causes of war” 
(2007, 155). Prior to the intervention the interpretation of the opposition parties had 
the clear support of the ‘international community’: Cambodia was under Vietnamese 
occupation. This interpretation was the justification for denying the State of Cambodia 
recognition and for keeping Democratic Kampuchea’s seat at the United Nations. But 
already in the preparation of the intervention the Perm 5 members began to frame the 
conflict as an internal one – which would have confirmed the interpretation of the 
incumbent government. During our interview Son Soubert, at the time member of the 
opposition, remembered: 
“We forced the French to change the title. They called it the 'Comprehensive 
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict' and I said it is not a Cambodian conflict; 
it was not fought between Cambodians but between foreign forces and 
Cambodians. And then they changed it to 'Cambodia Conflict'.” 
 
Considering that the State of Cambodia was in control of the entire administrative 
system and had had the time to build its power base for almost a decade, the crucial 
importance that this interpretation had as the opposition’s source of legitimacy 
becomes apparent. The fact that UNTAC ‘couldn’t find’ any Vietnamese soldiers, and 
that the Information and Education Unit wanted them to use a ‘neutral’ language thus 
contributed to the widespread conviction that the UN mission was rather supportive of 
the CPP. The neutrality of UNTAC had initially been accepted and acknowledged by 
all conflict parties: The CPP was not in a position to denounce the international 
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intervention as an occupying force because of its cooperation with Vietnam. The 
opposition, who presented themselves as the liberators from Vietnamese oppression, 
had likewise no interest in questioning UNTAC’s neutral status or their own defining 
role in the settlement of the conflict. But this commitment began to waver, as they 
observed how UNTAC seemed to slowly withdraw their support of the conflict 
interpretation that was so central to their own claims of interpretative authority. 
Archived documents tell us that some FUNCINPEC members were already inclined to 
join the Khmer Rouge in their boycott of the elections. And Sihanouk, predictably not 
content with his role as a ‘neutral moderator’ of the conflict parties, had begun to 
present himself as an alternative interpretative authority. In the end, it may have been 
UNTAC’s quick departure that saved them from losing the support of all local conflict 
parties.  
Just like the results of the analysis this brief review can also demonstrate how 
important it is to observe the interpretative practice employed by all actors in the course 
of an intervention. What does or does not constitute a legitimate way of action is often 
not decided by drawing on predefined norms or values. Labels like liberal or non-
liberal may be attributed to quickly, taking attention away from the knowledge actually 
mobilized in negotiations over the character of evolving ideas and institutions. The here 
presented results confirm that “peacemaking environments are marked by dynamism 
and a complex interactionism through which the actions of one party result in responses 
by others” (Mac Ginty 2011, 218). By observing the symbolic dimension of 
negotiations over a new political order this ‘complex interactionism’ can be partially 
unraveled and its repercussions on the relationship between international and local 
actors better understood.  
 
Prospects  
The analysis focused on a very brief time-frame in the context of a short mission. It 
was possible to observe how ideas were shaped, and what kind of concepts developed, 
but in order to make the here proposed model fruitful for transitional analysis it would 
be necessary to evaluate what factors decide over the long-term success of a given 
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perspective. This means first and foremost to supplement the analytical concept in such 
a way as to measure the weight of ‘non-symbolic factors’, i.e. the wider political and 
economic context.  
The study intended to make a contribution to overcome the conceptual limits inherent 
to the current liberal peace debate by adding complexity to the nature of power that 
governs the relationships of actors in an intervention society. It drew attention to the 
fluidity of categories and questioned the validity of labels attached to ideas and 
institutions. To structure the analysis it was, however, still necessary to distinguish 
between local and international actors, internal and external – although it could be 
shown at various instances how void of meaning these categories truly are: First of all 
it was evident that international actors were anything but ‘external’ to the ongoing 
process of building a national identity. Another example that comes to mind are the 
Khmer moderators at the Roundtables. They were considered ‘neutral’ as they did not 
live in Phnom Penh and were hence not connected with any of the parties. The 
distinction between internal and external in this case was the result of perceptions about 
political affiliations, rather than their place of birth. Many of the representatives on the 
other hand, that had to be subsumed under the label of ‘local’ actors in this work, were 
identified as ‘foreigners’ by the Cambodian people who watched and discussed the 
program with me: A single sentence by one of the party representatives was often 
sufficient for the Cambodian viewership to reject their status as ‘locals’. In order to 
draw the boundaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’ Cambodians see a particularly intimate 
connection between language and identity. The way some of the foreign educated 
representatives spoke the language marked them as outsiders. We wouldn’t trust 
someone as our leader, who can’t speak Khmer, several people confirmed to me. In 
other words: It was the concrete social practice of actors, that identified them as 
external or internal, not their place of birth or designated position. Instead of deciding 
a-priori what constitutes ‘external’ or ‘internal’ it would be more consistent to develop 
these categories as a result of the observed interpretative practice. 
This work does not contribute to clean up the ‘messy’ character of interventions and 
their analysis that has been acknowledged in recent state building scholarship; quite on 
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the contrary. It rather supports the emerging notion that a thorough critique of 
established categories and labels is still of the essence: Where are they useful to guide 
our analysis and where do they promote a false sense of security and knowledge? In 
order to change the relationship between international and local actors the current trend 
emphasizing communication and mutual learning processes is certainly a step in the 
right direction – albeit not without pitfalls, as discussed earlier. To reconcile the here 
presented analytical models with more traditional approaches of intervention analysis 
one could begin by promoting a different perspective on the ‘symbols’ that structure 
actors’ relationships during an intervention, namely mandates and peace agreements: 
Considering the ongoing negotiations between all actors involved in the making of a 
new order it seems promising to cast aside the technical term of ‘implementation’ and 
begin to think of the related practice as a process that is more concerned with 
‘translations’.   
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